Benchmarks prove elusive in Iran talks
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's high-profile trip to Moscow
this week to shore up Russian support for tougher sanctions on Iran if talks on
its nuclear program fail has been openly rebuffed by Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov.
He labeled as "counter-productive" even the mere threat of sanctions at this
delicate moment in the Iran nuclear standoff. "At the current stage, all forces
should be thrown at supporting the negotiating process. Threats, sanctions and
threats of pressure in the current situation, we are convinced, would be
counter-productive," Lavrov said.
The October 1 talks in Geneva between Iran and the "Iran Six" nations dealing
with its nuclear portfolio, have been hailed as a minor success by both sides
and a follow-up meeting is
scheduled in the Austrian capital Vienna for October 19. This will work out the
modalities of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) inspection of
Iran's newly unveiled uranium-enrichment facility known as Fardo, as well as
Iran's explicit request for outside assistance with nuclear fuel for its
medical reactor in Tehran.
This lays the foundations for a meaningful breakthrough in the Iran nuclear
crisis, assuming that the process is not derailed by negative inputs or policy
turnarounds by either side, that is, Iran on the one side and the US, Russia,
China, France, Britain and Germany on the other.
Iran has shown flexibility by setting aside its reservations about direct talks
about its civilian nuclear program, as demanded by, first and foremost, the
administration of US President Barack Obama. A difficulty is, the
administration talks with several voices and tones, although to term this
diplomatic schizophrenia would be overstating the case.
In his classic book Essence of Decision, American political scientist
Graham Allison used the euphemism "you stand where you sit" to highlight the
role and positions of "hawks" versus "moderates" in the John F Kennedy
administration during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
Today, the traditionally more nuanced US State Department sounds more hawkish
than the Defense Department on Iran, or for that matter the White House itself.
Clinton is acting as a shrewd saleswoman of coercive diplomacy, following the
seemingly logical justification that the US should pursue "both tracks". Yet
"sticks" and "carrots" do not always complement one another.
This is especially the case now, when the virtues of a normal-based approach
led by Obama have begun to yield tangible results, prompting Tehran to even
talk about a "new framework in confidence-building". But, it will not be too
long before the Iranian government comes under fire at home for "appeasing
Obama" if the other side continues with its split behavior. For instance,
Clinton referring to Iran's "evolving threat" does not help.
Russia's polite yet firm rebuff of Clinton is a minor setback for US diplomacy
that will not be without ramifications on broader US-Russia issues, above all
nuclear arms issues. The rebuff may also cause concern in the West that Iran
will exploit such rifts to its advantage. However, this overlooks that Iran is
in dire need of nuclear assistance, otherwise its multi-purpose medical reactor
in Tehran will cease to operate come next year.
This throws light on the fact that Iran has not misused its stockpile of
higher-enriched uranium. Furthermore, its proposal to ship out the bulk of its
low-enriched uranium for further enrichment, under the full monitoring and
timetable of the IAEA, reinforces Iran's claim that its nuclear intentions are
peaceful. If Iran had sinister military objectives for its enriched uranium, it
would not advance such a proposal.
"Iran has several concerns," said a Tehran University political science
professor who asked to remain anonymous, "One such concern is that the
countries participating in fuel delivery to Iran would not renege, and here
history plays a prominent role because of numerous past cases when valid
nuclear contracts were trashed by Western governments and some of their private
contractors.
"The other concern is that even short of reneging, this could become entangled
in a deadly delay game, just as the power plant [that Russia is building] in
Bushehr has become. The third concern is that the other side may ask for too
many concessions in return."
In the event that the US and its allies reject Iran's request for assistance
with the Tehran reactor, Iran is prepared to go it alone, despite the
technological challenges and the costs involved. This would also heighten
anxieties about possible proliferation misuse in such an endeavor.
"This is a litmus test for the international community, to live up to its NPT
[nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] obligations to help a developing nation with
its purely civilian nuclear needs," the Tehran professor said.
"That is of the highest priority for the population, and if the West fails,
then the world should expect less and not more Iranian nuclear transparency and
cooperation with the IAEA."
Multilateral cooperation on this subject will provide a timely benchmark of
success that could be used for confidence-building measures to bridge larger
nuclear issues. As with the Obama administration, though, the international
community speaks in different voices.
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has been particularly outspoken in
calling on Iran to "come clean". London has also escalated sanctions on Iran by
targeting Iran's Bank Melli and an Iranian shipping company, accusing both of
being conduits for Iran's missile industry.
The timing of this is another reminder of the importance of the US not taking
cues for its Iran policy from Britain. As long as the US allows so much
third-party influence, it will remain hostage to the whims and interests of
those parties.
The half-hearted reorientation of US foreign policy on Iran observed in the
contradictory moves of the Obama administration results from a semi-formulated
approach that while moving a healthy distance from the unrealistic expectations
of "zero centrifuges", is still rooted to geostrategic "contain Iran"
objectives.
Only once this stumbling block is overcome can the US fully appreciate the
realities on the ground that increasingly point to a "complex interdependence"
between the two countries, and truly open the way for a resolution of the Iran
nuclear problem.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
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