South Korea let off for nuclear deceptions
By Gareth Porter
WASHINGTON - In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed
that a member state had violated its Safeguards Agreement by carrying out
covert uranium conversion and enrichment activities and plutonium experiments
for more than two decades. The nature of some of those enrichment activities,
moreover, raised legitimate suspicions of interest in a nuclear weapons
program.
The state was found to have lied to the IAEA even when the authority began
investigating these suspicious activities, with the country concerned claiming
that its laser enrichment research did not involve any use of nuclear material.
If that sounds like a description of Iran's troubled relationship with
the IAEA up to 2004, that's because it bears striking resemblance to it. In
fact, it is a description of the deception of the IAEA by the government of
South Korea.
There was just one major difference between the South Korean and Iranian cases:
Iran never enriched uranium at a level that could only represent an interest in
nuclear weapons - but South Korea did.
Yet the IAEA treated Iran as a state to be investigated indefinitely, after
failing to give South Korea even a slap on the wrist.
Even more remarkable is the fact that the two cases were the subject of IAEA
reports issued within the same week in November 2004.
Three months before the report on its nuclear activities was published, South
Korea admitted to doing everything in violation of its Safeguards Agreement
that Iran was found to have done up to 2003.
In the early 1980s, South Korea carried out uranium conversion in a facility
that was kept secret from the IAEA. It also secretly extracted plutonium from a
hot cell, and had carried out at least 10 covert uranium enrichment experiments
from 1993 through 2000 using undeclared natural uranium metal.
South Korea used 3.5kg of natural uranium metal for its unreported enrichment
experiments; Iran used 8.0kg of natural uranium for the same kind of
experiments.
But by the far most important finding by the IAEA was that, during a series of
covert experiments in uranium enrichment using atomic vapor laser isolate
separation (AVLIS) in 2000, Korean scientists enriched the uranium to 77%.
South Korea finally admitted that experiment in its August 2004 declaration to
the IAEA.
"Not only did they have an undeclared uranium-enrichment program, but they were
actually making something close to bomb-grade, so you have to conclude someone
wanted to develop a capability to make nuclear weapons," said David Albright of
the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security after the
Korean violations were revealed.
Despite covert activities that could only be reasonably interpreted as evidence
of an intention to develop nuclear weapons, however, Seoul was given what
amounted to a free pass.
After its August 2004 confidential admission to its covert activities, South
Korea mounted an aggressive diplomatic offensive, aimed at avoiding any legal
consequences.
First, South Korean officials put pressure on IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei not to disclose the enrichment in his report to the Governing Board.
The South Koreans threatened to undermine ElBaradei's reelection bid, according
to a November 25, 2004 Washington Post story.
ElBaradei was well aware that South Korea's ally, the George W Bush
administration, was seeking to oust ElBaradei because of his refusal to conform
to US policies toward Iraq and Iran.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration made no secret of the fact it wanted the
IAEA Board of Governors to call for Iran to be reported to the UN Security
Council.
US officials understood that the South Korean covert enrichment and other
violations were, if anything, worse than those of Iran. At least some officials
were prepared to support a resolution in the IAEA Governing Board to send
Korea's case to the Security Council in order to establish a precedent that
could then be applied to Iran, according to the Post story.
But the British, French and Germans were negotiating with Iran on an agreement
under which Tehran would maintain its suspension of uranium enrichment, and
they were threatening to send the Iranian file to the Security Council if Iran
did not agree.
Given those negotiations, ElBaradei felt no need to write a report that would
be the basis of a resolution from the IAEA Board of Governors in late November
2004 to refer the South Korean case to the UN Security Council.
ElBaradei's November 11, 2004, report on South Korea confirmed that enrichment
had gone as high as 77% but did not raise the obvious question of whether its
covert nuclear activities had been military-related.
It recounted without comment the South Korean authorities' explanation that
both the plutonium and uranium enrichment experiments had been "performed
without the knowledge or authorization of the government".
Given the fact South Korea admitted the covert uranium enrichment was carried
out by no less than 14 government scientists, an IAEA investigation was
obviously in order. But the report gave no hint that there was any need to find
out who authorized it and why.
In effect, ElBaradei's report on South Korea effectively eliminated the issue
from the agency's agenda.
Three days after the report, Iran reached agreement with the Europeans on a
voluntary suspension of enrichment and more negotiations. Since there was no
chance of getting the Iranian case referred to the UN Security Council,
Secretary of State Colin Powell told the South Koreans at a meeting in Chile
that the United States was now prepared to "accept Seoul's explanation" for its
covert enrichment to bomb-grade levels.
That clearly signaled that the United States had decided against a resolution
to send the South Korean case to the Security Council after the European
agreement with Iran.
The subject of South Korea's violations of its Safeguards Agreement was never
raised again at an IAEA meeting. In 2007, an IAEA Safeguards report said the
agency was "able to clarify all issues relating to past undeclared activities".
It offered no explanation for the enrichment to bomb-grade levels and the
obvious official falsehoods surrounding the activities, or for its own
acquiescence in it.
In contrast to ElBaradei's lack of curiosity about the obviously suspect
official South Korean explanations for its bomb-grade enrichment, his report on
Iran, issued four days later, concluded that it would "take longer than in
normal circumstances" to "conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear
materials or activities in Iran".
The report suggested the IAEA would continue to pursue what it called "open
source reports relating to dual use equipment and materials" in Iran. That
meant that any technology, no matter how innocent, would now be treated as
evidence of an Iranian covert nuclear weapons program.
The double standard of treatment of the South Korean and Iranian cases implied
that the United States had hard intelligence that Iran had exhibited an
interest in nuclear weapons, whereas South Korea had not.
However, the closest thing to such evidence in US possession was a set of
documents of uncertain provenance and authenticity.
On the other hand, nuclear physicists working in the Korean nuclear program,
who had been recruited by the CIA, had reported in the mid-1970s that South
Korea was carrying out a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
The stark contrast between the treatment of the Iranian and South Korean cases
by the IAEA Secretariat and its Board of Governors is the most dramatic
evidence of a politically motivated nuclear double standard practiced by the
agency and its Governing Board, dominated by the United States.
And as the episode showed, that double standard essentially reflected the
political-military interests of the US government.
Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US
national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, Perils
of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published
in 2006.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
