Page 1 of 2 ISPATCHES FROM AMERICA
The Year of the Assassin
By Tom Engelhardt and Nick Turse
According to the Chinese calendar, 2010 is the Year of the Tiger. The United
States does not name its years, but if it did, this one might prospectively be
called the Year of the Assassin.
Americans think of themselves as something like the peaceable kingdom. After
all, the shock of September 11, 2001, was that "war" came to "the homeland", a
mighty blow delivered against the very symbols of the US's economic, military
and - had Flight 93 not gone down in a field in Pennsylvania - political power.
Since that day, however, war has been a stranger in our land. With the rarest
of exceptions, like US Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan's massacre at Fort
Hood, Texas, this country has
remained a world without war or any kind of mobilization for war. No other
major terrorist attacks, not even victory gardens, scrap-metal collecting, or
rationing. And certainly no war tax to pay for the post-9/11 trillion-dollar
"expeditionary forces" sent into battle abroad. Had we the foresight to name
them, the last few years domestically might have reflected a different kind of
carnage - 2006, the Year of the Subprime Mortgage; 2007, the Year of the Bonus;
2008, the Year of the Meltdown; 2009, the Year of the Bailout. And perhaps some
would want to label 2010, prematurely or not, the Year of Recovery.
Although our country delivers war regularly to distant lands in the name of our
"safety", we don't really consider ourselves at war (despite the endless talk
of "supporting our troops"), and the money that has simply poured into Pentagon
coffers, and then into weaponry and conflicts is, with rare exceptions, never
linked to economic distress in this country. And yet, if we are no nation of
warriors, from the point of view of the rest of the world we are certainly the
planet's foremost war-makers. If money talks, then war may be what we care most
about as a society and fund above all else, with the least possible discussion
or debate.
In fact, according to a military expert, William Hartung, the Pentagon budget
has risen in every year of the new century, an unprecedented run in our
history. We dominate the global arms trade, monopolizing almost 70% of the arms
business in 2008, with Italy coming in a vanishingly distant second. We put
more money into the funding of war, our armed forces, and the weaponry of war
than the next 25 countries combined (and that's without even including Iraq and
Afghan war costs). We garrison the planet in a way no empire or nation in
history has ever done. And we plan for the future, for "the next war" - on the
ground, on the seas and in space - in a way that is surely unique. If our two
major wars of the 21st century in Iraq and Afghanistan are any measure, we also
get less bang for our buck than any nation in recent history.
So, let's pause a moment as the New Year begins and take stock of ourselves as
what we truly are: the pre-eminent war-making machine on planet Earth. Let's
peer into the future, and consider just what the American way of war might have
in store for us in 2010. Here are 10 questions, the answers to which might
offer reasonable hints as to just how much US war efforts are likely to
intensify in the Greater Middle East, as well as Central and South Asia, in the
year to come.
1. How busted will the largest defense budget in history be in 2010?
Strange, isn't it, that the debate about hundreds of billions of dollars in
health-care costs in the US Congress can last almost a year, filled with
turmoil and daily headlines, while a US$636 billion defense budget can pass in
a few days, as it did in late December, essentially without discussion and with
nary a headline in sight? And in case you think that $636 billion is an honest
figure, think again - and not just because funding for the US nuclear arsenal
and actual "homeland defense", among other things most countries would chalk up
as military costs, wasn't included.
If you want to put a finger to the winds of war in 2010, keep your eye on
something else not included in that budget: the Barack Obama administration's
upcoming supplemental funding request for the Afghan surge. In his West Point
speech announcing his surge decision, the president spoke of sending 30,000 new
troops to Afghanistan in 2010 at a cost of $30 billion. In news reports, that
figure quickly morphed into "$30-$40 billion", none of it in the just-passed
Pentagon budget.
To fund his widening war, sometime in the first months of the new year, the
president will have to submit a supplemental budget to congress - something the
George W Bush administration did repeatedly to pay for its wars, and something
this president, while still a candidate, swore he wouldn't do. Nonetheless, it
will happen. So keep your eye on that $30 billion figure. Even that distinctly
low-ball number is going to cause discomfort and opposition in the president's
party - and yet there's no way it will fully fund this year's striking
escalation of the war. The question is: How high will it go or, if the
president doesn't dare ask this congress for more all at once, how will the
extra funds be found? Keep your eye out, then, for hints of future supplemental
budgets, because fighting the Afghan war (forget Iraq) over the next decade
could prove a near trillion-dollar prospect.
Neither battles won nor al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders killed will be the true
measure of victory or defeat in the Afghan war. For Americans at home, even
victory as modestly defined by this administration - blunting the Taliban's
version of a surge - could prove disastrous in terms of our financial
capabilities. Guns and butter? That's going to be a surefire no-go. So keep
watching and asking: How busted could the US be by 2011?
2. Will the US Air Force be the final piece in the Afghan surge?
As 2010 begins, almost everything is in surge mode in Afghanistan, including
rising numbers of US troops, private contractors, US State Department
employees, and new bases. In this period, only the US Air Force (drones
excepted) has stood down. Under orders from Afghan war commander, General
Stanley McChrystal, based on the new make-nice counter-insurgency strategy he's
implementing, air power is anything but surging.
The use of the air force, even in close support of US troops in situations in
which Afghan civilians are anywhere nearby, has been severely restricted. There
has already been grumbling about this in and around the military. If things
don't go well - and quickly - in the expanding war, expect frustration to grow
and the pressure to rise to bring air power to bear.
Already, unnamed intelligence officials are leaking warnings that, with the
Taliban insurgency expanding its reach, "time is running out".
Counter-insurgency strategies are notorious for how long they take to bear
fruit (if they do at all). When Americans are dying, maintaining a surge
without a surge of air power is sure to be a test of will and patience (neither
of which is an American strong suit). So keep your eye on the air force next
year. If the planes start to fly more regularly and destructively, you'll know
that things aren't looking up for McChrystal and his campaign.
3. How big will the American presence in Pakistan be as 2010 ends?
Let's start with the fact that it's already bigger than most of us imagine.
Thanks to Nation magazine reporter, Jeremy Scahill, we know that, from a base
in Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, officers of the US Joint Special
Operations Command, with the help of hired hands from the notorious private
security contractor Xe (formerly Blackwater), "plan targeted assassinations of
suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives, 'snatch and grabs' of high-value
targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan."
Small numbers of US Special Forces operatives have also reportedly been sent in
to train Pakistan's special forces. US spies are in the country. US missile-
and bomb-armed drones, both Central Intelligence Agency- and air
force-controlled, have been conducting escalating operations in the country's
tribal borderlands.
US Special Operations forces have conducted at least four cross-border raids
into Pakistan's tribal borderlands unsanctioned by the Pakistani government or
military (only one of which was publicly reported in the US). And the CIA and
the State Department have been attempting (against some Pakistani resistance)
to build up their personnel and facilities in-country. This, mind you, is only
what we know in a situation in which secrecy is the order of the day and rumors
fly.
In the meantime, the Obama administration has been threatening to widen its
drone war (and possibly other operations) to the powder-keg province of
Balochistan, where most of the Afghan Taliban's leadership reportedly resides
(evidently under Pakistani protection) and to the fighters of the Haqqani
network, linked to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda, in the Pakistani border
province of North Waziristan.
Right now, these threats from Washington are clearly meant to motivate the
Pakistani military to do the job instead. But as that is unlikely - both groups
are seen by its military as key players in the country's future anti-Indian
policies in Afghanistan - they may not remain mere threats for long. Any such
US moves are only likely to widen the Af-Pak war and further destabilize
nuclear-armed Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistani military is not powerless
vis-a-vis the US. For one thing, as Robert Dreyfuss of the Nation's Dreyfuss
Report recently pointed out, it has a potential stranglehold on the tortuous US
supply lines into Afghanistan, already under attack by Taliban militants, that
make the war there possible.
Pakistan is the Catch-22 of Obama's surge. As in the Vietnam War years,
sanctuaries across the border ensure limited success in any escalating war
effort, but going after those sanctuaries in a major way would be a
war-widening move of genuine desperation. As with the air force in Afghanistan,
watch Pakistan not just for spreading drone operations, but for the use of US
troops. If by year's end, special operations forces or US troops are
periodically on the ground in that country, don't be shocked. However, it may
be explained, this will represent a dangerous failure of the first order.
4. How much smaller will the American presence in Iraq be?
Obama swept into office, in part, on a pledge to end the US war in Iraq. Almost
a year after he entered the White House, more than 100,000 US troops are still
deployed in that country (about the same number as in February 2004). Still,
plans developed at the end of the Bush presidency, and later confirmed by
Obama, have set the US on an apparent path of withdrawal. On this the president
has been unambiguous.
"Let me say this as plainly as I can," he told a military audience in February
2009. "By August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end ... I intend to
remove all US troops from Iraq by the end of 2011."
However, Robert Gates, his secretary of defense, has not been so unequivocal.
While recently visiting Iraq, he disclosed that the US Air Force would likely
continue to operate in that country well into the future. He also said: "I
wouldn't be a bit surprised to see agreements between ourselves and the Iraqis
that continues a train, equip and advise role beyond the end of 2011."
For 2010, expect platitudes about withdrawal from the president and other
administration spokespeople, while Defense Department officials and military
commanders offer more "pragmatic" (and realistic) assessments. Keep an eye out
for signs this year of a coming non-withdrawal withdrawal in 2011.
5. What will the year mean for the Pentagon's
base-building plans in war zones?
As the US war in Afghanistan ramps up, look for American bases there to
continue along last year's path, becoming bigger, harder, more numerous and
more permanent-looking. As estimates of the time it will take to get the
president's extra boots on the ground in Afghanistan increase, look as well for
the construction of more helipads, fuel pits, taxiways and tarmac space on the
forward operating bases sprouting especially across the southern parts of that
country. These will be meant to speed the movement of surge troops into rural
battle zones, while eschewing increasingly dangerous ground routes.
In Iraq, expect the further consolidation of a small number of US mega-bases as
American troops pull back to ever-fewer sites offering an ever-lower profile in
that country. Keep your eyes, in particular, on giant Balad Air Base and on
Camp Victory outside Baghdad. These were built for the long term. If Washington
doesn't begin preparing to turn them over to the Iraqis, then start thinking
2012 and beyond. Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region, look for the US military
to continue upgrading its many bases,
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