In a new report, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggests for the
first time that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear-weapons capability.
Shannon Kile, a senior non-proliferation expert at the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, discussed the report and the tougher mood at the UN
watchdog agency with RFE/RL correspondent Charles Recknagel.
RFE/RL: The new IAEA report is the first issued since the
agency's new chief, Yukiya Amano, took over from his predecessor, Mohammad
ElBafradei. The report presents new evidence to suggest for the first time that
Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear-weapons capability. Do you detect a tougher
tone
developing toward Tehran?
Shannon Kile: Obviously there had been a lot of curiosity about
how [Amano's] reporting would compare to that of the former director general,
Mohammad ElBaradei. I must confess I am a bit surprised. The language of the
report is franker, it is more direct, it uses less of the circumlocutions that
we had perhaps come to expect with ElBaradei.
I think that actually puts the Iranians in a difficult position in terms of
being able to find a positive spin on what is in the contents of the new
report. I think it actually reflects an increasing suspicion at the IAEA about
the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program. I think there is a
greater sense of urgency and also a greater sense of concern about some of the
activities that Iran has been known to be engaged in and they still haven't
been proactively cooperating with the agency in trying to resolve those issues.
RFE/RL: What's most striking about this report, of course, is the
statement that Iran seems to have continued beyond 2004 parts of its research
work into how to explode fissile material and deliver payloads with missiles.
Why exactly is that so significant, and what more has the IAEA learned about
this work?
SK: That's what's new about this report, that the IAEA seems to
be suggesting that Iran may have an active program to at least develop a
nuclear-weapon capability. And that does contradict the US National
Intelligence Estimate of 2007, which concluded that Iran had actually stopped
these activities sometime in the autumn of 2003.
The specific issues that the latest IAEA report takes up, most of them are well
known. I mean, it has to do with the design work on a nuclear warhead that has
to fit into - or some sort of payload we should say - that could fit into a
ballistic missile; it has to do with work on high-explosives testing.
But what strikes me as new this time is that there are very specific references
to a neutron initiation [trigger] system that would be necessary to actually
start a nuclear explosion, and [there also are references to] work on the
wiring systems that would be needed for a high-explosives implosion device, and
that is specifically mentioned in this report but hasn't been mentioned in
previous reports, at least not with such specificity.
RFE/RL: The report also confirms that Iran has produced its first
batch of enriched uranium to 20%, which Tehran did by further enriching some of
its current stock of 3.5%-enriched uranium. Iran says it is doing this further
enrichment in order to produce fuel assemblies that can be used in its Tehran
research reactor to produce medical isotopes. But does Iran in fact have the
whole chain of highly specialized technology needed to domestically produce
these isotopes? Is it a realistic program?
SK: As far as we know, Iran does not have the ability to
fabricate the fuel assemblies. It can certainly enrich the uranium to 19.75%,
which is what is required for the fuel assemblies, but actually fabricating
that into something that would be useful for the Tehran research reactor, there
is no evidence that suggests Iran has the ability to do that, at least today.
RFE/RL: Equally, Iran is reported to have moved its entire stock
of 3.5%-enriched uranium to its enrichment facility at Natanz, suggesting that
all of it will be involved in this "upgrade" effort to produce isotopes. Does
Iran need to enrich that much material to a 20% level?
SK: Assuming that's true that they have moved all 1,950
kilograms, that is much, much, much more than the Tehran research reactor would
ever need for nuclear fuel.
RFE/RL: What are some of the other surprises in the new IAEA
report?
SK: Now we know, for example, that the Iranians are opening
production lines in Isfahan to put the low-enriched uranium into metallic form
- this is the other main point that comes out of the latest IAEA reports. There
are some civilian applications for [low-enriched uranium in metallic form] but
I think everyone also understands that is an essential step towards making
uranium into a form that is usable in a nuclear weapon. So, it is a dual-use
capability, and I think that is also one of the big concerns that is driving
this new tone behind the IAEA report.
RFE/RL: There is certainly enough in the new IAEA report to
suggest Iran is moving ahead energetically with its nuclear program - which it
claims is for peaceful purposes. But the report also mentions the Iranian
enrichment program appears to continue to struggle with technical problems, for
example, the mechanical problems of keeping hundreds of mostly 1970s-designed
centrifuges running in unison. How do you assess the difficulties?
SK: One of the consoling points of the IAEA report is that it
does indicate Iran is having a lot of problems with the centrifuge cascades at
Natanz, they actually have fewer centrifuges running today than they did, say,
a year or year and a half ago. [But] at the same time, the centrifuges that are
running, the so-called P-1s, the first generation, are actually running more
efficiently than they were before, so it is a mixed picture.
I think the problem is that if Iran were looking for a breakout capability to
manufacture a nuclear weapon, you don't need to have all the centrifuges that
are already in place. You could do that with some subset of those centrifuges,
assuming that they operate efficiently.
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