AN ATOL SPECIAL REPORT Iran's spies show how it's done
By Mahan Abedin
The dramatic arrest of Abdulmalik Rigi, Iran's most wanted man, on February 23
continues to be shrouded in mystery. But with information and insights gleaned
from security sources in Tehran, Asia Times Online can reveal some of the most
intricate background details leading to this stunning arrest.
The imagery - and the concomitant political message - was compelling. The image
of a young man being surrounded by balaclava-clad security officers by the side
of a small commercial plane was designed to send the strongest possible message
to Western intelligence services, their political masters and the Western
public in general. If the West led by the mighty United States has failed in
its nearly nine-year pursuit of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his deputy
Ayman al-Zawahiri, embattled
Iran managed to get its man with minimal political and economic cost.
Aside from frustrating American subversion efforts in Iran's southeast, the
capture of the Jundallah leader sends an unmistakable message that in the
intelligence wars of the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran has once
again seized the initiative. The repercussions of this will be felt across all
spheres and at all levels, boosting Iran's diplomatic and political posture in
the region, and thus making the country less vulnerable to American and Israeli
bullying.
Rigi: Downfall of a terrorist
How a young man of 31 years with little formal education became the most
serious and proximate security threat to the Islamic Republic is undoubtedly
the most interesting dimension of ethnic politics in post-revolutionary Iran.
The story of Rigi is still littered with unanswered questions. Security sources
in Tehran contend that he has been cooperative in custody and surely enough
there was no obvious hint of duress or coercion in his hastily-arranged
"confession" that was aired on Iran's Press TV two days after his arrest. (See
The demise of a 'good-for-nothing bandit', Asia Times Online, March
13.)
From an ideological point of view, the emergence of the Sunni militant
Jundallah group is undoubtedly tied to the geopolitical and ideological
concussions that have engulfed the region since the terrorist attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent American-led military
intervention in Afghanistan.
Iranian authorities believed their country to be immune from the kind of Sunni
militant terrorism that had plagued neighboring countries, in particular
Pakistan and Iraq. The idea that Shi'ite-majority Iran with its deep-rooted
culture and civilization and strong sense of national identity and cohesion
could fall victim to indigenous practitioners of this retrograde and savage
form of terrorism hadn't even crossed the minds of many Iranian security
officials. This is not so much a failure at the intelligence and security
levels, but an indication of profound cultural arrogance and misplaced
self-assuredness.
Jundallah is believed to have emerged in a coherent form in 2003, its
organizational origins rooted in the twin security threats unique to the Sistan
and Balochistan province, namely organized crime and a small but vocal
secessionist movement. Balochi separatism, in different forms and guises, has
been an irritant to the modern Iranian nation-state since the 19th century.
In recent decades what started out as a tribal revolt against the perceived
intrusions of the central government developed distinctly ethnic and religious
overtones, with self-declared champions of the Baloch people bemoaning the
so-called Persian and Shi'ite character of the Iranian state.
On the surface, the victory of the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the country's
transition from an absolute monarchy to a semi-democratic Islamic Republic was
a body-blow to the small numbers of militant secessionists in Balochistan, as
well as elsewhere, in particular Iran's Kurdish regions in the northwest,
insofar as the Islamic Republic promoted more inclusive notions of nationality
and citizenship.
But beneath the surface old grievances continued to fester - reinforced by
years of central government neglect of local infrastructure - and accentuated
by perceived sectarian policies. This is the backdrop to the emergence of
Jundallah, which unlike previous generations of Baloch nationalists, openly
embraced a religious and at times sectarian rhetoric, projecting itself as a
Sunni Islamic movement at war with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Jundallah's strong religious and sectarian rhetoric, coupled with its tactics
of suicide bombings and beheadings (painfully reminiscent of the atrocities
perpetrated by Sunni jihadi groups in neighboring Iraq, Pakistan and
Afghanistan), was a major shock to Iranian security officials, who by 2004 had
begun to realize the extent of the problem, and quickly took remedial action.
The Islamic Republic prides itself on having efficient and adaptive security
and intelligence services. Iranian officials often cite the successful
experience of these agencies in countering a broad range of security and
intelligence threats, including terrorism by left-wing and secessionist groups
and intense espionage and subversion activities by Western intelligence
services, over the past 30 years to underscore their skills and capabilities.
It seems that the full gamut of these capabilities was deployed against
Jundallah and its local allies in Iran and Pakistan to great effect, to the
extent that the group is now for all intents and purposes decapitated and
probably a spent force.
Using old tribal espionage networks established decades ago, the Ministry of
Intelligence successfully penetrated Jundallah, recruiting many of its members,
including top commanders. Although security sources in Tehran decline to
comment on the matter, sources close to Jundallah-centered investigations in
Tehran and Zahedan (capital of Sistan and Balochistan province) claim that the
Ministry of Intelligence had recruited Rigi's younger brother, Abdulhamid.
Certainly, the behavior of Abdulhamid Rigi and the leniency afforded him by
Iranian security and judicial authorities has raised many questions and lends
credence to the suspicion that Abdulhamid was recruited as an agent, probably
in late 2007.
Despite having been tried and sentenced to death for several murders,
Abdulhamid has regularly given interviews to Iranian media since his ostensible
"arrest" in 2008. In these interviews he has claimed to have met American
diplomats and secret agents in Karachi and Islamabad in Pakistan, thus
buttressing the unflinching belief of Iranian intelligence chiefs that
Jundallah has had a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tail all along.
Skillfully using former senior leaders of terrorist and insurgent groups as a
means of putting pressure on these groups and sabotaging their morale is a
tried and tested trademark of the Iranian intelligence services. The same
tactics have been used extensively and highly effectively against a number of
other terrorist organizations, most notably the Mujahideen-e-Khalq
Organization, which ranked as the country's number one security threat during
the 1980s and much of the 1990s.
But there is something distinctly unusual about Abdulhamid Rigi's media
appearances insofar as he seems more like an enthusiastic and skillful prop for
his new masters rather than a captured and broken terrorist leader.
While security sources in Tehran decline to be drawn on Abdulhamid's precise
relationship with the Ministry of Intelligence, they admit that his help was
invaluable in tracking his brother's movements and unearthing his extensive
ties to the CIA. According to these sources, Iranian intelligence had been
monitoring Abdulmalik Rigi round the clock since August 2009, but moving
against him was difficult due to strong American backing and the fear of
exposing invaluable methods and agents.
But the major suicide bombing on October 18, 2009, which targeted a conference
hall in the Pishin area of Sistan and Balochistan where senior Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders were hosting a reconciliation
meeting with local tribal elders, killing dozens of IRGC officers, including
the deputy commander of the Guards' land forces, forced a decisive move against
Rigi.
While the Ministry of Intelligence was not overly enthusiastic about ensnaring
Rigi prematurely - for fear of compromising intelligence operations targeting
Rigi's American masters in Pakistan and Afghanistan - the IRGC (which is now
the dominant power in Sistan and Balochistan) brought sufficient pressure to
bear, finally resulting in Rigi's capture in late February.
Security sources in Tehran are keen to highlight Abdulmalik Rigi's jet-set
lifestyle, describing constant travel between Dubai in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), Islamabad, Kabul and Central Asian capitals since early 2006. On the day
of Rigi's arrest, Minister of Intelligence Heidar Moslehi appeared at a
carefully arranged press conference giving details on Rigi's contacts and
movements.
According to the intelligence minister, Rigi had even traveled to the British
overseas territory of Gibraltar, from where he was allegedly moved to a
European country, presumably to meet top Western intelligence chiefs. While
independent verification of these claims is next to impossible, these carefully
managed leaks are best understood as a means of inflicting sufficient public
relations damage to Western intelligence without revealing anything solid by
way of methods and knowledge.
In any event, security sources in Tehran tell Asia Times Online that they have
"massive" amounts of information and documents in their possession that link
Jundallah to the CIA and specialized branches of the United States military
operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They also claim that the CIA had prior
knowledge of the suicide bombing in Pishin in October (which was a massive blow
against the IRGC) but there is an ongoing debate within security circles in
Tehran as to whether the Americans had actively instigated the terrorist
attack.
The outcome of this debate may well have serious repercussions, possibly
prompting IRGC Qods force retaliation against American secret agents operating
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The IRGC Qods force is believed to have identified
every noteworthy component of American intelligence activity in the region and
the Qods force has the capability to strike a deadly blow against American
intelligence assets in the region and beyond.
The precise details surrounding Abdulmalik Rigi's arrest are the subject of
considerable debate. The Iranian government is content for confusion to
prevail, especially since it feels it has succeeded in achieving two immediate
post-arrest public relations objectives; to depict the operation as an
all-Iranian affair (with no assistance rendered by any foreign intelligence
service) and to paint Rigi as an American agent.
Notwithstanding the existence of several plausible theories surrounding Rigi's
arrest, the bulk of the speculation has centered on Kyrgyzstan Airways flight
QH454 en route to Bishkek from Dubai. According to most Iranian media reports,
Iranian jets forced the plane to land before arresting Rigi with at least one
accomplice. Kyrgyz authorities initially confirmed the arrests but then
protested to Iran for forcing the plane to land and denied that any passengers
were missing once the plane had landed at its destination.
Security sources in Tehran depict Abdulmalik Rigi as quiet and withdrawn. They
describe a resourceful operative who despite lack of any formal education was
able to develop a sophisticated relationship with the CIA and the US military,
as well as the intelligence services of Pakistan, the UAE and "several" Central
Asian states.
But they are also keen to downplay his physical daring and maintain that Rigi
lacks physical courage and that his reluctance to place himself in "dangerous
scenarios" had caused friction in Jundallah. This information ties in with
accounts from journalist sources in Tehran who claim that Rigi's brother,
Abdulhamid, fell out with him because of his increasing penchant for the "good"
life and his reluctance to take part in operations.
Iran strikes back
By any standard, Abdulmalik Rigi's arrest is a major success for the Islamic
Republic's intelligence services. This dramatic operation has boosted the
morale of Islamic Republic loyalists throughout the Middle East and caused
considerable dismay and embarrassment to Iran's Western enemies.
The arrest came in the wake of the assassinations of Iranian physicist Massoud
Ali Mohammadi in Tehran in early January and legendary Hamas commander Mahmoud
al-Mabhouh in Dubai later that month. While investigations into Mohammadi's
assassination (by a remote-controlled bomb) are ongoing, Iranian authorities
have already pointed an accusing finger at America and Israel, without
providing much by way of evidence.
In the case of Mabhouh, although the Dubai police moved quickly to identify the
assassins (who are widely believed to belong to the Israeli intelligence
service Mossad), Iranian security chiefs believe the assassination could not
have occurred without some complicity by UAE political and security chiefs.
The Iranians believe that at the very least high UAE officials had enabled the
Mossad operation by creating a permissive operational environment for the
Israeli spy service in Dubai. Although Mabhouh was not scheduled to meet
Iranians in Dubai, he is believed to have had strong ties to the Iranian
security establishment and this same establishment believes that the
assassination was designed to send a strong signal to Iran and its allies.
Despite the amateurish way the assassination was carried out, it was
nonetheless a morale boost for the Israelis and the Americans and was
interpreted as such in Tehran. However, Rigi's arrest once again tipped the
balance of confidence in favor of the Iranians, especially since, unlike
Mabhouh's assassination, the operation was carried out with flawless precision
and efficiency and moreover it was neither immoral nor did it violate any
international laws.
Whether the Islamic Republic will be able to reap the full political and
diplomatic dividends of this major intelligence success will depend on large
measure to what extent Iranian policymakers can think imaginatively about all
the conflict points between Iran and the United States, especially in regards
to policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan and the nuclear standoff. It will
also depend on to what extent Iran can keep up the momentum of this success in
the intelligence and security sphere with a view to continuing to deter Israeli
military aggression, either against Lebanon or Syria, or far less likely
against Iran itself.
Mahan Abedin is a senior researcher in terrorism studies and a consultant
to independent media in Iran.
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