Iran's 'special' naval threat dissected
By Nima Adelkhah
When the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution on June 9
authorizing a fourth round of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran
for its controversial nuclear program, the risk of conflict in the Persian Gulf
also escalated considerably.
One of the potential points of tension is the resolution's explicit call for
cargo inspection. Iran has warned vehemently against such a move. According to
Brigadier Ali Fadavi, Iran's military forces, especially the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN), maintain a "special and suitable
response to the inspection of Iranian vessels".
However, a major military move to challenge this particular regime of sanctions
in the Persian Gulf would probably involve an attempt to close off the Strait
of Hormuz, a strategic waterway between
Iran and Oman through which nearly 40% of crude oil supplies pass, including
88% of Saudi Arabian and 98% of Iraqi oil exports.
Since 2008, Tehran has warned bluntly of its potential to seal off the Strait
of Hormuz, together with targeting US shipping, to create turmoil in the oil
market with a consequent major impact on the global economy. As an Iranian
analyst puts it, the Strait of Hormuz is the "hanging rope" of the American
economy. But to what extent is Iran militarily capable of bringing about these
tactical objectives in response to a possible US attack? Could Iran effectively
close the Strait of Hormuz?
Iran's main military goal in the Persian Gulf is to exploit the vulnerability
of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage over possible Israeli or US attacks on its
nuclear facilities and Iran's air defense system, which would be the main
target of the initial assault. Since Iran is fully aware of American military
superiority, the key to Iranian success is not to impair of US naval forces
through conventional military means, but to disrupt, dislocate and confuse the
adversary in order to deter further attacks on its land-based strategic sites -
nuclear or otherwise.
Defensive military operations of this sort could be effective insofar as
slowing down the progress of the opposing forces and, in psychological terms,
allowing Iran to claim victory by surviving a conventional military assault -
similar to Hezbollah following the 33-day war with Israel in 2006.
In the event of an attack, both the Iranian navy and the IRGCN (which operates
its own force of small boats in parallel with the national navy) would rely on
coastal defense forces and asymmetrical warfare, with the aim of limiting the
activities of US naval forces from either a far distance (with missiles) or in
close proximity (using speed boats or mines).
In terms of coastal defense, Iran has recently acquired a number of
surface-launched fixed and mobile anti-ship missiles like the Ghased-1 and
Nasr-1 (most likely bought from China). In conventional military operations,
these missiles could be used in addition to the anti-submarine torpedoes and
Noor C-802 surface-to-surface missiles deployed on newly built frigates like
the Jamaran. [1]
Meanwhile, the presence of mines also poses a major threat to the US Navy,
which is busy, along with British naval forces, in a constant minesweeping
mission throughout the Gulf. [2] The target of such coastal missile and mine
operations would most likely include oil rigs, oil tankers, commercial ships
(from Arab states in the Gulf) and other possible soft targets with the
objective of disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
In terms of asymmetrical warfare, the IRGCN would lead the charge in operations
in the strait. This aspect of Iranian naval warfare entails the highest risk
for military conflict, since the IRGCN is typically undisciplined in its
organizational and tactical operations.
The unruly tactics of the Revolutionary Guards in the Strait of Hormuz could
increase the possibility of misinterpretation and miscalculation on both sides,
as was the case with the near confrontation of Iranian fast boats and a
flotilla of American naval forces in early 2008. [3]
In many ways, the 2008 introduction of 74 domestically built missile boats
(based on the North Korean Peykaap ISP-16 model), effectively used in war
exercises, indicates Iran is turning toward reliance on asymmetrical tactics.
These missile boats can be the deadliest form of naval warfare against US
forces, particularly if used in unconventional operations such as suicide
attacks.
In spite of structural shortcomings and its role as the smallest branch of
Iran's armed forces, the Islamic Republic's navy and particularly the IRGCN
remain a substantial threat to US forces in the Persian Gulf. With the new wave
of sanctions and US President Barack Obama indicating that Iran may not be
included in Washington's new commitment not to attack non-nuclear states with
nuclear weapons, the Islamic Republic is becoming considerably alarmed by the
prospect of war.
These fears are making Iran more aggressive in its military policy in the
Persian Gulf, with a possible increase in the presence of the IRGCN in the
Strait of Hormuz in the months to come. In light of the element of
miscalculation, the prospect looms large of a military conflict in a vital
maritime region, with consequences for economic security on a global scale.
Notes
1. The Jamaran and other ships in her class are classified as destroyers
by Iran, which habitually exaggerates the size of its warships.
2. Author's interview with a senior US navy officer, July 7, 2010.
3. Ibid.
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