BOOK REVIEW Al-Qaeda and counter-terrorism Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 by Thomas
Hegghammer
Reviewed by Brian M Downing
Thomas Hegghammer, a research fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research
Establishment, looks at al-Qaeda with an eye trained in international affairs,
statistical analysis, and sociology. His book is an outstanding, engagingly
written study of the rise of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the methods
used by the Saudi state to defeat it.
Phase One: 1979-1990
The movement in Saudi Arabia, which in 1988 would form into al-Qaeda, began
with Pan-Islamic sentiment in the late 1970s and 1980s. Despite differences and
antagonisms between Islamic peoples and their leaders, there was a significant
sense of
community among fellow believers and an attendant conviction that oppressed
brethren around the world had to be helped. Assistance took the form of
charities, relief agencies, and of course, armed fighters.
Bosnia and Chechnya were prominent fronts, but the most significant one emerged
when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979. The war there created
the personal contacts, organizational structure, and beliefs of the jihadi
movement in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere). No Afghanistan, no al-Qaeda.
Volunteers flowed into Afghanistan, often with the help of the Egyptian-based
Muslim Brotherhood and other religious networks.
Who were these Saudi volunteers? They were urban, typically from the cities of
the Red Sea coast (Hijaz), as that is where influential religious networks
existed. They ranged broadly across the social structure from working class to
well-to-do. Few were poor or especially religious.
Why did they volunteer? Mainly to help oppressed Muslims - often to compensate
for an inability to help the Palestinians in their plight. Many felt that
taking part in the war was a religious duty and a purification for past sins.
Others wanted adventure (a motivation of young men since time began). In
addition to the religious networks in the Hijaz, heroic stories by returning
veterans were cited as inspirations, as was the coaxing of family members.
Phase Two: 1990-2001
The second phase saw the shift from "classical jihadism", which sought to help
oppressed brethren around the world, to "global jihadism", which went beyond
that and sought to attack the West and overthrow pro-Western governments.
Islamist movements in Algeria and Egypt had failed and classical jihadism had
gone nowhere in Bosnia and Chechnya. The build-up of US troops in Saudi Arabia
following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and American flailing in Somalia as
well, energized some in this new generation to attack American targets.
On return from victory in Afghanistan and with fewer attractive theaters
abroad, jihadis formed common cause with Sahwa - a moderate moral reform and
anti-Westernization movement. Though Sahwa itself was not radical, many
jihadists turned to violence, attacking the headquarters of a US contractor in
1995 and a US barracks the following year. The Saudi government responded with
a crackdown on Sahwa and veterans of jihad. The net was wide, the methods
harsh.
The crackdown eased in 1999 as Crown Prince Abdullah took the reins from his
ailing half-brother King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud. Abdullah enacted prison
reforms and even compensated many of those who had been mistreated. But
repression had embittered veterans, their families, and others who felt the
heavy hand fall upon them, many of whom were innocent. The relaxation gave them
the opportunity to plan revenge.
Events inside Saudi Arabia meshed with this sentiment. The arrests of moderate
Sahwa clerics opened the door for the more militant clerics of al-Shuaybi to
assume more prominence. The al-Shuaybi clerics called for and justified “mass
casualty” attacks on Western targets around the world - especially American
ones.
These jihadis were less educated and their social origins less broad than their
predecessors in the 1980s. Religion and the quest for adventure were again main
motivations. They were not overtly hostile to the US upon recruitment; that
came with the training/indoctrination process abroad in al-Qaeda camps. Nor was
this cohort hostile to the Saudi government, only to the harsher elements of
the security forces.
Phase Three: 2001-present
The September 11, 2001 attacks and ensuing events led to an upsurge of al-Qaeda
actions in Saudi Arabia. Al-Shuaybi clerics praised the 9/11 crews and endowed
them with martyr status. The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the
continuing Palestinian Intifada, the Guantanamo internment camp, and of course
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 all strengthened al-Qaeda.
Several hundred al-Qaeda fighters made their way back to Saudi Arabia following
their (and the Taliban's) ouster in late 2001/early 2002. They allied with
local elements and planned jihad on the Arabian Peninsula. This group was
mostly Saudi but had a number of other Arabs who had also fled Afghanistan.
South Asian migrant workers might have made for eager recruits but Saudi
condescension toward them precluded that.
This third group's education was lower and their employment more tenuous than
the two cohorts that preceded them. Ties to religious organizations were more
significant. Fifty-five percent had previously taken part in foreign jihads.
Many of them had been roughed up during Saudi crackdowns. Many seethed with
anger toward the Saudi government - a new development as earlier hostility had
been directed against security forces, not the regime itself.
Many of them had experienced difficulties in readjusting to daily life after
the war and they sought to re-find the sense of purpose and brotherhood that
jihad had provided.
Counter-terrorism and the decline of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
The influx of hundreds of veterans and the rise of anti-American sentiment
would suggest deep trouble for the kingdom. There were indeed bombings and
shootouts, yet the movement fared badly.
The leadership of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was high in ardor but low
in quality of judgment. Their operational and support networks were loose and
many proved unreliable. The leadership was unaware or disdainful of prevailing
public sentiments against jihad inside the kingdom. Most Saudis preferred to
see holy war waged in Baghdad, Kabul, and Grozny, not in their own cities.
The movement's aim of overthrowing the Saudi government found little resonance
in the public. This hindered recruitment efforts and financial support and made
many Saudis willing to inform on suspect activity. The deaths of fellow Saudis
in al-Qaeda attacks made the public become hostile to the movement.
And the war in nearby Iraq enjoyed far greater support than the one at home.
Recruits and money went there instead of into al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula.
Perhaps most importantly - and of most interest - the Saudi government's
counter-measures were highly effective. The government eschewed the harsh
methods of earlier efforts, which fueled anger and aided al-Qaeda support, and
instead opted for soft methods. Intelligence identified and closed off
financial support; border forces reduced the influx of firearms and bomb-making
materials. In time, confidence and esprit de corps grew within Saudi security
forces.
Religious leaders were used to discourage recruitment and encourage desertion.
Deserters were put into reeducation centers, not prison cells. Propaganda
campaigns depicted al-Qaeda personnel as confused young men or senseless
killers. They brought nothing to the nation but disorder and chaos. The Saudi
government made little if any use of torture.
Though specific aspects of Saudi society might limit the effectiveness of this
approach in other parts of the world, the methods described by Hegghammer
should command the attention of those in other countries interested in
countering al-Qaeda and kindred groups. In pointing out the role of Western
policies in the region in building jihadi sentiment, Hegghammer also
demonstrates the problematic nature of American troop deployments, firepower,
and use of torture.
Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 by Thomas
Hegghammer. Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (May 17, 2010). ISBN-10:
0521732360. Price US$29.99, 302 pages.
Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author of The
Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and
Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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Who were these Saudi volunteers? They were urban, typically from the cities of
the Red Sea coast (Hijaz), as that is where influential religious networks
existed. They ranged broadly across the social structure from working class to
well-to-do. Few were poor or especially religious.
