BOOK REVIEW British secret state reaches out Securing the State by David Omand
Reviewed by Mahan Abedin
As the academic study of Western intelligence services continues to make
advances, a new addition deserves special attention. Sir David Omand's Securing
the State is an impressive exposition of the intelligence process.
A former director of the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ),
Britain's electronic eavesdropping agency, and former permanent secretary and
security intelligence coordinator at the cabinet office, Omand is steeped in
the traditions and myths of the British secret state, and is thus in a unique
position to
illuminate the commanding heights of the secret world.
Securing the State is a must-read for students and scholars of secret
intelligence as well as tradecraft practitioners. However, the book is not
without serious shortcomings. It is heavily biased towards the analytic
processes at the expense of collection techniques and dynamics. And whilst
Omand makes some genuine attempts to outline and explain the complex and deep
contradictions between secret state and democratic society, his conclusions and
prescriptions come down heavily on the side of the secret world.
De-mystifying
Intelligence
Throughout his book Omand makes extensive use of European historical examples
and analogies. He starts by showcasing the prosperous Tuscan city-state of
Siena in the late 14th century and what its rulers considered to be good and
bad government. The key word is Securitas, which also happens to constitute
the underlying theme of Omand's book, that security enables and underpins good
government.
While this is not in itself controversial the real question is what type and
level of costs can and should be absorbed to achieve an acceptable level of
security. Considerable portions of Omand's book are dedicated to tacking this
question and true to his professional background Omand is understandably
security-conscious, but nonetheless he does stake out ethical and moral
positions. For instance, he unequivocally condemns torture and claims that this
practice has no place in the intelligence processes of a civilized state.
Three chapters in particular should be read very carefully as they are a
masterful exposition of the entire intelligence process. The Intelligence Cycle
(chapter 5, pp 113-137) describes the demands and pressures that create the
need for secret intelligence activity, as well the processes and dynamics which
characterize that activity. Elucidation (chapter 6, pp 139-169) explains the
analytical techniques that are used to validate secret intelligence and
moreover the effort that is required to marry-up different strands of secret
information.
Furthermore, it explains in great detail the difficulties involved in forming
overall intelligence assessments, the core product which is delivered to
policy-makers and other customers. Analysts and policymakers: Idealists and
Realists (chapter 7, pp 171-208) is a shrewd discussion on the intricate and
sometimes difficult relationship between the intelligence and policy making
communities. Omand draws on his own extensive experience as well as a wide
range of academic literature (from psychology to military doctrines) to
illuminate these specialized domains.
The only notable factual error in the book is Omand's discussion of GCHQ
veteran Doug Nicoll's study in the late 1970s on behalf of the UK's Joint
Intelligence Committee, examining this strategic assessment body's performance
in warning government about foreign acts of aggression. According to Omand,
Nicoll examined seven case-studies, including the "Soviet attack on Iran in
1980". No such attack took place and it is not clear whether this was an error
on the part of Nicoll or Omand.
The final two chapters of the book are repetitive and depict the author in a
negative light. In a forlorn attempt to create templates for the future Omand
appears less creative and imaginative than he would like his readers to
believe. These unconvincing attempts at devising conceptual breakthroughs
confirm Omand in his position as senior mandarin and fatally undercut his
attempt at projecting a serious intellectual image.
One of the more glaring conceptual weaknesses of the book is the lack of a
rigorous discussion on the role of the British intelligence community in
21st-century Britain. Although Omand defends the avowal of the British
intelligence services from the 1980s onwards, he also appears adamant that
openness has gone far enough and in any case should not breach the legal and
constitutional guidelines set down by the Security Service Act of 1989 and the
subsequent Intelligence Services Act of 1994, which together comprise the
statutory status of the British intelligence community.
A theme that undermines Omand's objectivity is his thinly disguised agenda of
ensuring the fat budgets of the UK's security and intelligence services in the
years ahead. Omand's predictive capacity does not let him down in this area, as
one might surmise that he is worried that the economic downturn coupled with
the subsiding of the terrorism mania that has gripped Western nations in recent
years, will exert a deflationary impact on the overall intelligence budget.
However, the predictive capacity is nowhere to be seen when Omand speculates on
the emergence of new threats in the years and decades ahead (again in order to
justify the enlarged size of the intelligence services) but fails to adequately
discuss how non-intelligence methods and processes could be used to tackle
these potential risks.
Securing the State by David Omand. Columbia University Press (August 15,
2010). ISBN-10: 0231701845. Price US$46, 320 pages.
Mahan Abedin is an analyst of Middle East politics. He has been writing
on intelligence and security issues for 10 years.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110