Ahmadinejad steps into a cauldron
By Victor Kotsev
Many observers have little respect for Israeli website Debka File, known for
publishing intelligence leaks as well as occasional wild rumors. When I
mentioned it to an Israeli analyst recently, he sneered at me. "This is where
you go if you want to get your yellow pages," he said. Thus, when Debka
cautioned a week ago that Iran was planning a military response to a recent
cyber-attack [1] and that Hezbollah was setting to overthrow the Beirut
government by force following the visit of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad
to the country [2], the reports did not immediately attract attention.
However, it is now clear that something serious is afoot in Lebanon. There are
rumors that Hezbollah will respond violently - even preemptively - to a widely
expected indictment of some of its members by the United Nations-backed
tribunal into the 2005
murder of ex-premier Rafik Hariri. These have become so widespread that even
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah felt the need to address them on Saturday. He
did this in a way that caused further alarm as it could be interpreted as a
veiled threat. "If we wanted to [stage a coup], we would've done that in 2005,"
he said, adding: "We would've taken over the country on August 15, 2006 [after
the Israel-Hezbollah summer war that year] if we wanted to, so these claims are
unfounded."
Amid reports that Lebanese civilians are arming themselves (according to an
interview with a Lebanese arms dealer published on the website Now Lebanon,
sales of light arms have gone up 60% in recent months) or leaving the country,
news outlets have picked up the scent. "Ahmadinejad's plan to visit Lebanon in
the coming weeks should be seen in the context of Hezbollah's plot to take over
the country", writes Arab-Israeli journalist Khaled Abu Toameh for the
Jerusalem Post [3]. Another Ha'aretz report describes the mood in the country
as "gloomy".
"Iran, through its association with groups like Hezbollah, is actively
undermining Lebanon's sovereignty," Reuters quotes US State Department Philip
Crowley as commenting on the Iranian president's trip.
While it is not clear that a Hezbollah coup d'etat is imminent, the Debka
report is partially corroborated by a consensus among most analysts that a
Sunni-Shi'ite confrontation is shaping up. The political realities in Lebanon
bode poorly as well. In the last year, two of the country's most powerful
anti-Syrian leaders, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Sunni Prime Minister Saad
Hariri, felt forced to reconcile with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and to
offer elaborate apologies for blaming Syria for their fathers' murders. In the
Middle East, such humiliation is usually a sign of a grave predicament.
It is hard to overlook that preparations for the Ahmadinejad visit have taken
on mythical proportions. "We call on [the masses] to welcome President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad on Wednesday all along the airport road," said Nasrallah in a
televised address. Not only the road to the airport, but also much of Beirut
and Lebanon is reportedly decorated with Iranian flags. This is particularly
visible in the south near the border with Israel, where a specially built
replica of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem will be inaugurated by Iran's
president. According to reports, he also plans to throw a "symbolic stone" at
Israel while touring the border, and thus to assume his much-more-than-symbolic
place at the helm of Hezbollah ("the resistance").
It is important to watch the behavior of Syria, which has a decisive influence
in Lebanon. On the one hand, Assad has tried to put on a moderate appearance: a
few weeks ago, he publicly asked the Iranian president to cancel his visit to
South Lebanon. He also offered to enter peace talks with Israel and reshuffled
his security agencies, a sign that he does not expect a war to be imminent.
When, in August, he visited Lebanon with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz,
there were indications that he was trying to curb Hezbollah, perhaps per a
secret understanding with the Saudis.
On the other hand, however, the Assad administration has repeatedly voiced
support for Hezbollah. Recently, it issued arrest warrants for a number of
Lebanese public figures implicated with the Hariri investigation - a bold move
and a blow against the Western- and Saudi-supported Lebanese government.
Regarding the security services reform, in some ways Syria gravitated closer to
Iran. Stratfor notes: "The most intriguing reshuffle concerns replacing [Major
General] Mamluk with Major General Hamad to become the head of state security.
Hamad, Stratfor has been told, is close to the Iranians, and Tehran had made
clear it wanted Hamad to replace Mamluk upon the latter's retirement."
According to Debka, the senior US diplomat, Frederic Hof, on Friday delivered
an ultimatum to Syria not to allow Hezbollah to use any violence in Lebanon
[4]. Such a move makes a lot of sense, and it even falls short of what some
analysts feel US President Barack Obama needs to do. "Obama must, at a minimum,
publicly state that he will hold Syria accountable for any bid to topple the
Lebanese government, whether by the Syrians or their proxies in Hezbollah,"
stated James Traub in Foreign Policy.
It is unclear how successful the Americans will be in averting a showdown in
Lebanon. One circumstance will likely play in their favor: it is not in Syria's
interest to see any single internal power consolidate control over the country.
This is because Syria wants to maintain its own grip on Lebanon, and it
includes even Hezbollah. Thus, at the minimum we could expect Syria to seek to
preserve the status quo in some form, whether by preventing Hezbollah from
using violence or through subsequent moves.
Moreover, according to some reports, Assad is growing wary of the Iranian
attempts to subject him to a bear hug. In these circumstances, and should a
good opportunity emerge, he might be tempted to jump ship completely. Such an
opportunity, for example, could present itself if Iran is weakened additionally
- either by internal strife [5] or by a successful foreign intervention - or
else if Assad perceives that he can get a particularly good bargain.
Obama is hard-pressed for some foreign-policy achievements, and according to
Stratfor this will likely be even more true after the November congressional
elections in the United States. Given the gloomy news coming from Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iraq, and the poor progress of the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations - going by Monday's developments [6] - the US administration might
be prepared to reward Syria generously for a peace agreement with Israel. Such
a move would have a precedent in president Jimmy Carter's decision, over three
decades ago, to give up on a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and to push for a separate treaty between Egypt and Israel.
For now, nevertheless, a Syrian defection from Iran is still in the realm of
speculation, and Assad appears set on vacillating. What that means for Lebanon
remains to be seen - perhaps very shortly.
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