AMERICA VOTES, THE WORLD WAITS Iran will be back in the frame
By Victor Kotsev
TEL AVIV - As of late last month, the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks have
practically been on life support, in a vegetative state. United States
President Barack Obama tried to keep them going, but was stonewalled and opted
instead for a delay in pronouncing them dead - until after the mid-term
elections on November 2. Then, the predominant narrative goes, he could put
more pressure on Israel [1]. Rising tensions with Iran and its allies, however,
could interfere with this projection.
While, as many analysts have argued, for the duration of the mid-term-elections
campaign Obama needed badly some semblance of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
in order to shore up his foreign policy record and to help his fellow Democrats
get re-elected to the United States Congress, it is not entirely clear what
will
happen after the elections. The talks were suspended when the Israeli
moratorium on settlement construction expired [2] and an Arab League meeting
earlier this month decided to give Obama until the second week of November to
pressure Israel to extend the construction freeze.
If we judge by the behavior of both the Israeli and Palestinian
administrations, they seem to be digging in for a stormy diplomatic period.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu upped the bargaining ante several
times (asking for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a "Jewish" state,
approving a controversial loyalty oath, resuming construction in East
Jerusalem), but at the same time he stated that he might, under certain
circumstances, agree to continue the moratorium.
The Palestinians have been weighing their options, and in turn threatening
various unilateral steps. "Settlements are a unilateral step taken by Israel,"
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas proclaimed on Monday, implicitly suggesting
that he had every right to the same. The Palestinian Authority may in the
future prevent Israeli raids into Palestinian cities, the Israeli newspaper
Ha'aretz reported on Monday.
Moreover, an increasing number of reports suggest that Abbas and Palestinian
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are preparing to apply unilaterally to the United
Nations for recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.
On Tuesday, a high-ranking UN official added fuel to the speculations by
declaring that "all international players are now in agreement that the
Palestinians are ready for statehood at any point in the near future" [3]. (As
a side note, these revelations also further diminish the possibility that the
Palestinians will dismantle the Palestinian Authority and pursue a one-state
solution - something that I also judge highly unlikely [4].
There are many uncertainties on the road ahead. Much depends on Obama, and his
own domestic concerns are likely to factor in significantly. George Friedman,
chief executive officer of think-tank Stratfor, writes that for Obama, "the
2012 presidential campaign will begin next Wednesday on Nov 3 [the day after
the mid-term elections]."
If he loses a significant part of his support in congress - as the polls
project - he will be forced to re-evaluate both his domestic and his foreign
policy priorities. In fact, Friedman argues, Obama's ability to pass domestic
reforms will probably be largely blocked, and his attention might well shift to
the foreign policy arena, where the president by constitution holds more power
than congress.
Friedman claims that "the problem with Israel and the Palestinians is that
peace talks, such as those under Clinton at Camp David, have a nasty tendency
to end in chaos", and that "if Obama were to use foreign policy to enhance his
political standing through decisive action, and achieve some positive results
in relations with foreign governments, the one place he could do it would be
Iran".
While it is hasty to conclude that the peace process will take a back seat in
favor of the Iranian crisis - or to predict imminent war - the behavior of both
Israelis and Palestinians can also be interpreted as maneuvering for strategic
advantages while waiting for the worst of the storm to pass. There are numerous
indications, moreover, that tensions are rising rapidly between the American
and Iranian camps.
In an article published in The Berlin Journal, former Camp David negotiator and
high-ranking American diplomat Martin Indyk issues a somber prediction. "If
Obama eventually succeeds on the Palestinian issue," he writes, "it will impact
positively on his effort to convince Iran that its interests are not well
served by continuing to pursue nuclear weapons ... But if he fails, the United
States might well end up in a third war in the Middle East, this time with
Iran."
His assessment differs from Friedman's to the extent that he ties the peace
process and the Iran confrontation together (there is a general split among
analysts on this issue), but he similarly captures the rising friction.
In several of my previous articles, I have argued that Obama is unlikely to
order an attack on Iran before he conducts a massive public relations campaign
to justify this course of action. The warning signs have appeared; such efforts
now seem to be gaining momentum.
Take, for example, the WikiLeaks revelations on Iraq. So far, even the claims
of widespread police abuse do not appear to damage the United States a whole
lot [5], but they cast a shadow on the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki [6]. Maliki's increasingly successful bid to retain the premiership
irked the Americans as it was widely seen as a victory for a pro-Iranian
coalition [7]. Thus, the revelation of the documents was in effect a blow
against Iranian interests in Iraq. It is important to mention that the
WikiLeaks founder admitted recently to receiving information from America [8],
though this is not to claim that he is simply an outlet for American interests.
More importantly, some of the documents reveal direct Iranian involvement in
the killing of American soldiers [9], and this could legitimately serve even as
a casus belli. Separate reports point also to underhand Iranian dealings
in Afghanistan [10].
We must watch out for the emergence of an American narrative roughly along the
lines: "Iran is not only pursuing a nuclear weapon, but it is undermining our
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is actively engaged in killing our
soldiers." The next logical step in such a narrative would be: "We have no
choice but to intervene by force."
Apparent war preparations are also progressing in the entire Middle East.
The United Arab Emirates recently opened a new naval base, designed to help its
exports bypass the Strait of Hormuz in case of "natural and man-made
disasters". [11] Iran has threatened to block the strategic strait if attacked,
and its ability to do so is a key component of its deterrence.
On Friday, Israeli intelligence-analysis website the Debka File broke the news
of an unprecedented joint Egyptian-Saudi exercise geared to the "Iranian
threat" [12]. The same day, Le Figaro reported that a blast at a secret Iranian
base this month may have been an operation by Mossad to disable part of the
Iranian missiles aimed at Israel. [13]
Iran just announced plans for massive war games [14], and Israel, too has been
training intensively. A couple of weeks ago, the Israeli air force conducted an
exercise over Greece which, according to Debka, simulated an attack on Iran.
[15]
This is not even to mention Lebanon, where Iran's key ally Hezbollah, according
to many reports, is actively preparing to take over the pro-Western government
[16]. Syria, too, is restive, and on Wednesday Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
all but rejected American overtures to bring him out of the Iranian axis. [17]
Still, all this does not mean that war is unavoidable or imminent. An American
engagement with Iran can take many forms: Stratfor has even suggested that
Obama might consider a reversal with Iran on "the order of President Richard
Nixon's reversal on China".
Regardless, the crisis is escalating, and it will probably draw much of the
attention and many of the resources allocated for the Middle East in the near
future. It is unclear what exactly that means for the peace process. It remains
to be seen whether Martin Indyk's assessment that the talks are crucial to the
Iran confrontation is correct, or whether Obama will decide to focus on
whatever seems more urgent at the time.
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