Western skepticism at Iran's nuclear invite
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The United States and some of its Western allies have reacted with skepticism
to Iran's invitation to several countries to tour its nuclear facilities,
rather than view the move as a sign of goodwill and transparency in the run-up
to talks with world powers over the Islamic Republic's atomic program.
Iran's Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday it had sent invitations to countries
represented in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to visit nuclear
sites in Natanz and Arak, suggesting it take place on January 15 and 16, before
talks in Istanbul. Diplomats at the Vienna-based nuclear watchdog said Iran
only invited two of the six so-called "Iran Six" members - Russia and China -
who are scheduled to attend the talks in Istanbul later in the month, while the
United States, France, Britain and Germany were excluded. Tehran also invited
Egypt, Turkey, Brazil, Cuba
and Hungary, which currently holds the European Union presidency.
An EU spokesman said on Wednesday that the bloc had not answered the letter and
reiterated that the IAEA "are the people who have to inspect the Iranian
nuclear facilities".
Branding Iran's invitation as simply a tactical ploy to divide the
"international coalition" against Iran, Western media and various pundits have
for the most part dismissed the initiative, despite the protean value of a
gesture that ought to deepen the world community's confidence in the peaceful
nature of Iran's nuclear program.
Case in point, an article in Christian Science Monitor relies on an Iran
expert, Shahram Chubin, who repeats the line mentioned above and made no
mention that Iran may have other, less sinister, intentions than simply to
"divide and conquer".
Another example can be found in the New York Times. It mentions that the
Bushehr power plant in Iran is "less of a threat" because it is covered by IAEA
safeguards, without adding that according to the IAEA's own reports, the agency
has been fully monitoring enrichment activities, using surveillance cameras at
all the halls of Natanz enrichment plant, some 27 short-notice inspections in
the past couple of years, and regular inspections.
"We have not received any invitation in our mail box," Philip Crowley, the US
Department of State spokesperson, said tersely. But then again, why should Iran
invite the US, a country with which it has no diplomatic relations, to inspect
its nuclear facilities?
If the US is sincere about its Iran engagement policy, it should welcome such
positive steps by Iran to include the EU, Egypt, Cuba, and the Non-Aligned
Movement, which has praised Iran's initiative as further evidence of Tehran's
peaceful nuclear program.
A timely move on Iran's part, the invitation has also taken the steam out of
Israel's furnace of war-mongering against Iran, albeit to a limited extent
given Tel Aviv's addiction to hard power to neutralize perceived external
threats.
Israel's main dilemma is that any military strike on Iran would only have the
opposite effect of propelling Iran toward full nuclear proliferation with
backing of the entire nation. As a result, living with a nuclear potential
Iran, that self-limits well short of assembling the bomb in lieu of its various
moral, religious and national-security calculus, may be Israel's best option,
requiring the steady hands of diplomatic dealmaking with Iran via Israel's
patron state, America.
Weighing the US approach toward Iran
Confronted with a Republican-dominated, and arguably more hawkish, US Congress,
the Barack Obama administration's foreign policy, including its Iran policy, is
bound to be subjected to a greater degree of contentious partisan politics than
before.
With a widening divide on US national security issues all but a foregone
conclusion, from now on the White House's Iran policy will experience a new
level of complexity, partly due to the influence of such US senators as Mark
Kirk (Republican from Illinois) who advocates tougher sanctions on Iran.
For sure, a US president eyeing re-election two years from now will not risk
giving his opponents the opportunity to accuse him of "Iran appeasement". But,
with adequate nuance, Obama has at the same time a unique opportunity to turn
his foreign policy weaknesses into assets by crafting a timely breakthrough in
the Iran nuclear stalemate.
This breakthrough could well materialize at the upcoming nuclear talks in
Istanbul, assuming that both sides utilize all their resources, including
secret diplomacy, ahead of the meeting to clear the pathway for a successful
summit.
An important prerequisite would be the preparation of US public opinion, which
is lacking today, thus making it more difficult for the White House to ink an
agreement with Tehran, which according to the latest WikiLeaks releases prefers
to procure the nuclear fuel for its Tehran reactor from Washington rather than
Moscow. An important question is what Obama thinks on this issue at the moment?
Based on available public information, only a stab can be made at an answer.
Obama has not said much about Iran recently and he may be too domestic-focused
since the disastrous mid-term elections that changed the political equilibrium
in Washington to the detriment of the Democrats. Still, it is feasible to draw
on several observations that are key to how the US may conduct itself at the
Istanbul meeting:
The White House is no longer alarmist about any imminent Iran nuclear
proliferation, a view recently relayed to the Israelis by US officials, and we
can infer from this that Obama is at this point convinced that the evidence of
any clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iran is very thin.
In addition to the perception of Iran being several years away from commanding
nuclear weapons capability, including a viable delivery system, the White House
is equally satisfied at the rate of recent Iranian setbacks with its centrifuge
technology; the apparent lack of progress with the more advanced P2
centrifuges, partly due to export controls, resulting in a declining number of
spinning centrifuges compared to a year or so ago.
Also important from the US's point of view is the effect of cyber-warfare that
by Iran's own admission has affected its nuclear program, not to mention the
psychological effect of the well-coordinated campaigns of kidnapping and
assassination of Iran's nuclear scientists.
Given the above, the US, which relies on the functional utility of the Iran
threat to further the interests of its military-industrial complex, must
formulate a sound policy that can continue the main tenor of its containment
policy while moving toward detente with Iran.
This would be dictated by the requirements of regional security policy, given
Washington's and Tehran's backing the same political horses in Baghdad and
Kabul, as well as shared antipathy toward Wahhabi terrorism. Iran's former
ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Ghomi, in an interview with
www.IRDiplomacy.com, has stated that "contrary to the WikiLeaks claims, Iran's
role in Iraq has been constructive". Clearly, Obama cannot possibly be blind to
this fact, reflected in this week's Baghdad visit by Iran's new acting foreign
minister, Ali Akbar Salehi.
But, then again, the hawks in the White House, led by Dennis Ross, may still be
focusing on a maximalist approach, demanding the full suspension of Iran's
enrichment activities, in contrast to monitored and limited enrichment (at safe
levels), partly because of the US's recent successes in widening the net on
Iran sanctions.
Henceforth, threading the familiar "dual-track" approach, the White House must
decide if the diplomatic track should have real substance or a figment of the
other, coercive, track. A more healthy response to Iran's offer of a nuclear
tour would have provided a timely signal that the US president is inclined to
give diplomacy a genuine chance.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
