Some years ago, a well-known Middle East analyst briefed a conservative
audience at a private seminar in New York City. "A Palestinian state," he said,
"might achieve the modest prosperity and political stability of a Tunisia."
Tunisia, long a byword for stable secular governance in the Muslim world, isn't
Tunisia anymore. We well may see the future of many Muslim countries in a
Tunisian mirror: neither secular or authoritarian, nor democratic, nor
Islamist, but merely chaotic. The one thing we may say with certainty about the
Tunisians is that there won't be very many of them a generation or two from
now.
Tunisia's young population may fall by half
Although Islamists seem eager to exploit the revolution that booted out
President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali last week, there is no evidence that the
Muslim Brotherhood or other radicals had much of a role. It is quite possible
that the Islamic Renaissance Party, led by the exiled Tunisian Islamist Rachid
al-Gannouchi (no relation to the interim prime minister), might exploit the
chaos. But it doesn't seem likely that the jobless university graduates of
Tunisia will look for a solution in burkas and sharia courts. Tunisia is
the most aggressively secular of Arab countries, and it will be hard for the
Islamists to lure the genie of secularism back into its bottle.
The demographic profile of Tunisia - along with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey,
Iran and most Muslim countries - resembles a train wreck in slow motion. The
front car hits an obstacle, and the rear cars collapse accordion-style with the
momentum. The average young Tunisian woman - like her Iranian or Turkish
counterpart - grew up in a family of seven children, but will bear only one or
two herself. Her mother was born into traditional society, and could barely
read and write; the daughter may have attended university, and has neither the
inclination nor the income to raise a large family.
Tunisia: Fertility vs elderly dependent rate
(Fertility Rate is a blend of UN "medium" and "low" variants)
By 2000, Tunisia's fertility rate had already fallen below replacement, and is
likely to fall much further (the UN "low variant" scenario puts it at only 1.35
women per child by 2015). One out of 10 Tunisians is an elderly dependent
today; as the present generation ages, the ratio will rise to about the same
level as in Western Europe, or two out of five. Even for wealthy Western
Europe, caring for this army of pensioners will strain resources to the limit.
A poor country simply has no way to manage.
Tunisia was supposed to be the poster-child for Arab economic success. An
October 27, 2010, evaluation on the website of the World Bank gushes with
enthusiasm for the country's economic performance:
Through a range of
development policy loan programs with IBRD, Tunisia has boosted its global
competitiveness and seen exports double over a little more than 10 years. The
best illustration of Tunisia's improved competitiveness is its total factor
productivity growth, which often drives investment. Total factor productivity
rebounded from a negative rate in the 1980s to 1.24% in the 1990s and 1.4% in
2000-2006. While productivity growth in 2000-2006 remained below South Korea's
and Malaysia's, it represented one of the best performances in the Middle East
and North Africa region.
Furthermore, exports of goods doubled in value between 1996 and 2007, while
annual foreign direct investment flows increased steadily, averaging 2.2% of
GDP in 1996-00, 2.6% in 2002-05 and 5% in 2006-2008. Tunisia ranked as Africa's
most competitive country in Davos' 2009 Global Competitiveness Report. All this
translated into a 5% growth since the mid-1990s despite recurrent internal
(e.g., droughts) and external shocks.
It seemed like Tunisia
was doing all the right things. The country spends 7.3% of GDP on education, a
higher proportion than the U.S., Finland, or Israel. Of course, GDP is far
lower so absolute education expenditures are lower as well. Nonetheless,
Tunisia's education effort exceeds that of any other Muslim country, including
2% of GDP for university education. About 30% of secondary school graduates go
onto university although 60% of them fail exams. The trouble is that their
diplomas are largely worthless. Like most developing countries, Tunisia teems
with diploma mills that issue worthless degrees to half-trained graduates.
Even in India and China, the majority of engineering graduates do not meet
international standards, although the elite universities produce a huge number
of first-rate engineers. No Arab country produces graduates who can compete
with their Asian counterparts; the only Muslim country whose graduates meet
world standards is Turkey.
Tunisia had attracted a modest amount of foreign investment, most importantly
in tech-support call centers for French-language customers of hardware and
software companies. Outsourcing added perhaps 2,000 jobs in 2010, or one for
every 180 university students. Although Tunisian engineers will work for a
fifth of the cost of their European counterparts, there aren't enough good
engineers and not enough jobs even for the good ones. And the most qualified
university graduates seek greener pastures overseas
Today's bulge of young Tunisian university graduates is a day late and a dollar
short for the global world economy. If a new government were to cast off the
constraints of bureaucracy and bribery that weigh so heavily on the Tunisian
economy, it is conceivable that this country of just 10 million people might
achieve a somewhat higher growth rate then Ben Ali's 5% per annum, and absorb a
few more of its army of university graduates.
Everywhere in the Islamic world, though, education appears to cause a fertility
collapse. There is a close correlation between literacy and fertility
throughout the Muslim world. Illiterate women still tend to have very large
families, while university-educated women have one child or none at all.
Literacy vs fertility across the universe of Muslim countries
There is no practical way to interrupt the train wreck. Muslim countries that
invest heavily in education, of which Tunisia is the best example, never
achieve a critical mass of trained graduates. The main consequence of more
education appears to be a plunge in fertility rates within a single generation,
from the very large families associated with traditional society, to the
depopulation levels observed in Western Europe. Only Turkey has had a long
enough head start to build a credible university system.
The numbers don't add up. There aren't any good choices in Tunisia, and that
fact is of greater significance than the next round of political improvisation
after the fall of the Ben Ali government.
Spengler is channeled by David P Goldman, senior editor at First Things
magazine.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
