That Israel would be the main beneficiary of any damage done to Tehran's
nuclear program - which some suspect is designed to develop nuclear weapons -
by the deaths of a number of senior Iranian scientists and engineers cannot
seriously be doubted.
However, whether these killings were actually carried out by the Mossad hit
squad reportedly known as the Kidon or its Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
equivalent the Sayeret Matkal "Caesarea" is far less certain.
The Kidon (Hebrew for bayonet or dagger) reputedly has about 40 trained
officers, including a small number of women. The main operational and training
base is supposedly hidden deep within
the Negev desert in southern Israel.
They are hand-picked from within the already elite special forces units such as
the IDF's Sayeret Matkal and S13. All are on short-term contracts, in their
twenties or very early thirties and are highly trained marksmen, explosives
experts and silent killers.
While all the members of Kidon are expert linguists, mainly in Arabic, Kurdish
and Turkish, a small number are also fluent in Persian. They would undoubtedly
be considered far too important to risk in covert operations, but would prove
to be invaluable as trainers and controllers for dissident groups tasked with
conducting operations within Iran.
One of the most recent killings of an Iranian scientist occurred early on
November 29, 2010, when Dr Majid Shahriari was killed when attackers on a
motorbike attached an explosive device similar to a World War II "sticky bomb"
to his car.
Shahriari was the director of the team developing the design for a nuclear
reactor core and had been described by the US magazine Time as the
"highest-ranking non-appointed individual working on the project".
This is but the latest of a number of killings of scientists linked to Iran's
nuclear program. In 2007, Dr Ardeshir Hassanpour was allegedly poisoned, which
according to the United States think-tank Stratfor had all the hallmarks of an
Israeli operation.
In January 2010, Dr Massoud Ali-Mohammadi was killed by a bomb attached to his
car as he was driving to work in the morning. Despite rumors that he may have
been targeted by MOIS (Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security) because of
his reported connections to opposition groups, the modus operendi of his
attackers is far too similar to that of numerous other incidents to give those
rumors too much credence.
There is, however, growing suspicion and with some anecdotal evidence for
support, that the actual attacks on the Iranian nuclear infrastructure are
being carried out by Kurds and quite probably Balochs trained by Mossad.
Neither group has any love for the mullahs in Tehran and indeed both have been
regularly in open conflict with the Iranian regime. There are unconfirmed
reports that the Baloch insurgency in eastern Iran has recently reignited.
It cannot be denied that it would be very difficult for any foreign agent to
operate effectively or for any length of time in the paranoid, high-security
and repressive environment of modern Iran.
Even the well-trained and well-prepared Mossad operatives have had only limited
success, while the much vaunted US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been
largely bereft of serious HUMINT (HUMan INTelligence) resources in Iran
following a number of intelligence blunders.
The CIA lost its entire agent network in Iran in 2004 when, according to US
intelligence sources, "a CIA headquarters communications officer was about to
send instructions to an agent via its Immarsat transmitter/receivers. The CIA
officer attempted to download data intended for a single operative, but
accidentally hit a button that sent it to the entire US spy network in Iran."
In what turned out to be an unmitigated intelligence disaster, the information
was received by a double agent who forwarded it to MOIS), which was then
quickly able to wrap up the entire US network, leaving Washington completely
blind in HUMINT terms.
The CIA has still not recovered from this or several other setbacks at the
hands of Iranian counter-Intelligence.
Most Western intelligence services have struggled to maintain any foothold
within Iran, barring perhaps the German BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst or Federal
Intelligence Service), which reputedly has managed to run several small but
effective rings for a number of years.
MOIS and its foreign espionage department VEVAK are rated by many observers as
one of the most effective intelligence organizations in the Middle East today.
It is widely accepted that the Iranian national security services run deadly
anti-dissident and highly effective counter-intelligence operations around the
world, while they have a justified reputation for their fearsome and
wide-ranging powers to suppress dissent within Iran.
It is unlikely that MOIS would ever tolerate the lax levels of security found
in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, where Mossad was widely suspected of
assassinating a senior Hamas leader, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, in January 2010.
It would be both difficult and dangerous for foreign intelligence services to
attempt to deploy their own officers inside Iran for the long periods needed to
acquire the targeting and surveillance information necessary to carry out a
successful attack, even with the help and local knowledge of an in-country
support network.
So again it is likely that the most effective intelligence assets along with
the probable culprits for the recent killings are drawn mainly from dissident
nationalities such as those in the Kurdish and Baloch regions.
There are persistent reports that Israel does still maintain surveillance
facilities and SIGINT (SIGnals INTelligence) sites run by the highly secretive
Unit-8200 in northern Iraq and it would not therefore be too surprising if
Iranian Kurds in particular, found it possible to slip across the border into
Kurdish controlled Iraqi territory to receive training and arms from Mossad.
The recent attacks on the Iranian nuclear infrastructure by sabotage and the
targeted use of a computer worm (Stuxnet) have reportedly caused significant
disruption, while the deaths of leading scientists may well have slowed down
the overall research and development program. All such claims are usually
denied by the authorities in Tehran.
More attacks can now be expected as Israel is becoming ever-more frustrated at
being prevented by the current US administration from taking unilateral
military action and by a Washington that many Israelis see as seemingly
unwilling to countenance direct action themselves.
It has been reported that Israel has also faced considerable US opposition to
Mossad-instigated assassinations not only in Iran but in Lebanon and elsewhere.
Despite Washington's reservations, Israel is believed to remain determined to
continue its attempts to further delay Iran's nuclear program by killing key
scientists.
The covert operations also extend to disrupting and sabotaging Iran's nuclear
technology purchasing network abroad and its vital research and development
infrastructure within Iran, US Intelligence sources have confirmed.
It is undeniable that anything short of a massive and prolonged air and missile
attack would be sufficient to seriously degrade, let alone destroy, a
significant part of the Iranian nuclear facilities' infrastructure.
Despite occasional bouts of saber-rattling by Washington, there appears to be
little chance of effective military action being taken any time soon by the
Barack Obama administration.
Yet the US lease on trust in the Middle East is fast running out.
For it is not only Israel, but Saudi Arabia and quietly behind the scenes
Kuwait, some of the other smaller Gulf States, Jordan and even Egypt, which
have constantly been pressing a reluctant Washington to finally take decisive
military action.
Many of the Arab states - for a number of individual reasons - see a confident,
expansionist, nuclear-armed Iran as a far greater long-term threat to their own
security than Israel could ever be.
However Obama is widely perceived in certain circles in the Middle East as no
longer listening to his closest allies in the region, whether Jewish or Muslim.
Iran can therefore expect its enemies, Israeli or Arab from without and the
Kurds and Balochs from within, to redouble their attempts to both delay the
possible development of a nuclear weapons capability and attempt to further
destabilize an already shaky regime in the continuing absence of serious US
military intervention.
The often controversial Meir Dagan was the memun or director of Mossad
largely credited with developing assassination as a significant part of
Israel's operations to cripple any Iranian attempts to build a nuclear weapon.
Gordon Thomas writing in the British Daily Telegraph on the December 5, 2010,
states that on his first day in office eight years ago, Dagan promised to
support any operation against any of Israel's enemies, with every means he had
- legal or illegal.
He reportedly said that he would allow his field agents to use nerve toxins,
dumdum bullets and methods of killing that even the Russian or Chinese secret
services would not use.
"We are like the hangman, or the doctor on death row who administers the lethal
injection," Dagan continued, "Our actions are all endorsed by the state of
Israel. When we kill we are not breaking the law. We are fulfilling a sentence
sanctioned by the prime minister of the day."
Dagan, who retired as Mossad director last December, has apparently stated his
belief recently that it is unlikely that Iran would be able to produce even a
crude nuclear device before 2015.
There are a number of increasingly worried Middle Eastern leaders who will be
hoping that Dagan is correct in his prediction and also that a far more
responsive US president just might be in the White House several years before
that deadline is finally reached.
Richard M Bennett, intelligence analyst, AFI Research.
Courtesy of AFI
Research, which provides information resources for the world's news
media, major commercial concerns, universities and government departments and
is designed specifically for researchers, journalists, editors, producers,
publishers, security managers, risk assessors and the intelligence community.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
