TEL AVIV - It's all over for the Egyptian president. Unless some major unexpected circumstance interferes, he has lost what two veteran analysts at the Israeli daily newspaper Ha'aretz called a "war of attrition".
On Tuesday, the opposition brought to the streets over a million people in what it had promised would be a "million man march", and Hosni Mubarak, under debilitating domestic and international pressure, announced that he would not run for re-election in September. He proclaimed his determination stay in power until then to "oversee the transition of power". It is
doubtful whether he will be able to do even that.
Once Mubarak failed to quash the protests that began last week, the ball was in his court to demonstrate his ability to survive. As I wrote in n The last trick up Mubarak's sleeve (Asia Times Online, January 31), "On Sunday morning, he seemed broken down ... Even the American administration had apparently written him off."
However, by Sunday evening he showed signs of recovery, and Monday, as police returned to the streets, it was again up to the opposition to prove its legitimacy. The president leaned heavily on the narrative that without him, lawlessness and chaos would take over Egypt, as happened in several main cities during the weekend.
The protesters retorted that the police was responsible for much of the chaos, and promised to demonstrate their popular mandate with a "million man march" the next day. When they delivered, despite severe limitations such as disruptions in train services and other means of transportation, and especially since the army promised not to interfere with their "legitimate" demands, Mubarak was apparently left with no more cards to play.
The president's offer to step down after the elections was not received well by the crowds, who demand that he leaves office, in the words of their de facto leader, Mohamed ElBaradei, "Now." International pressure also piled. "What I indicated tonight to President Mubarak, is my belief that an orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now," said US President Barack Obama on Tuesday.
Almost simultaneously, reports surfaced that a special American envoy, Frank Wisner (a former ambassador to Egypt), "told Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that the US saw his presidency at an end". [1] Other leaders joined the chorus. "Listen to people's outcries and extremely humanistic demands," Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged Mubarak. Even former Cuban president Fidel Castro, an unlikely supporter of democratic movements, spoke out against Mubarak in an attempt to blame the United States for "the blood of many people [which] is being shed on the streets".
It is increasingly likely that Mubarak will step down and somebody else will take his place as a caretaker of the transition until the elections. Influential American think-tank Stratfor, among others, has argued that the army is most likely to fill the vacuum. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the recently appointed vice president, General Omar Suleiman, is also unacceptable to the crowds. According to Maha Azzam, an expert in the Middle East at Chatham House, "It is possible that people might accept an interim military leader for a short period of time - although not Suleiman. But not for as long as six months."
The chief of staff of the army, General Sami Enan, could be a likely consensus candidate. In an interview with Reuters, a prominent exiled Muslim Brotherhood cleric, Kamel El-Helbawy, supported Enan, and described him as "a good, liberal man", even though not an Islamist. "I think he will be acceptable," El-Helbawy said. "He has enjoyed some good reputation. He is not involved in corruption. The people do not know him [as corrupt]."
Still, the uncertainties surrounding Egypt are tremendous. The situation is volatile, and there is no guarantee that the opposition will be able to hold together once it accomplishes its main goal, to oust Mubarak. What exact government will materialize at the end of the transition is unclear, and a number of analysts fear that the Muslim Brotherhood might come out on top.
The Brotherhood is certainly not as radical as some of its harshest critics claim; the specter of radical Islam, raised, among others, by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is probably a bit of an exaggeration. "The new head of the MB, Mohammed Badie, is more concerned with the social than the political arena," writes Pepe Escobar in The Brotherhood factor (Asia Times Online, February 1). He argues that the brotherhood is, essentially, "an antidote to al-Qaeda".
Nevertheless, there are some wings of the Muslim Brotherhood that are considerably more extreme than the mainstream, and a danger always exists that these will try to hijack the movement. Its broad popular support as well as efficient organizational structure makes it a formidable player that deserves close attention.
Furthermore, whatever the new government may be, it will have problems coping with the economic crisis which in many ways caused the protests. "What is certain is that [Egypt] will be a failed state," writes David Goldman (Food and failed Arab states, Asia Times Online, February 2.) "[A] handful of observers, for example economist Nourel Roubini, have pointed to the obvious: Wheat prices have almost doubled in the past year. Egypt is the world's largest wheat importer, beholden to foreign providers for nearly half its total food consumption."
Goldman argues that, in turn, Asian prosperity is causing a long-term increase in wheat prices, and that Egypt will invariably have trouble feeding its population. Many analysts, on the other hand, have pointed out that Mubarak's economic policies were outdated and ill-adapted to the global economy. A new government may be able to remedy this to a certain extent, and thus raise the standard of living in the country, but this will be no easy task. It is certainly conceivable that Egypt does, in fact, turn into a failed state.
The larger regional implications of the Egypt crisis are just as confusing. Israeli leaders and analysts, for example, are nervous about the status of the peace treaty once a new government takes over. In his story Iran wins, Israel loses in turmoil (Asia Times Online, January 31), M K Bhadrakumar focuses on the implications for the Israel-Iran confrontation. Though he cautions that "the winner cannot take it all", he argues that "for Iran, it all boils down to how big a winner it is going to be. For Israel, though, it is about cutting losses."
Robert Kaplan, writing for Foreign Policy, presents a different analysis:
It seems clear that Arabs and their new leaders will be focused for years to come on the imperfections within their own societies - perhaps to a greater degree than on injustices committed by Israel and the West abroad ... But the dangers to US interests of what comes next in the Arab world are hard to exaggerate. Were demonstrations to spread in a big way to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, a catastrophe could be looming. A more enlightened, pro-American regime than the one now in Jordan is hard to imagine. As for the Saudi royal family, it is probably the worst possible form of government for that country except for any other that might credibly replace it. Imagine all that weaponry the United States has sold the Saudis over the decades falling into the hands of Wahhabi radicals.
Israeli analyst Aluf Benn concurs with Kaplan, and argues that the fall of Mubarak will ultimately draw the United States and Israel closer together:
When Obama and his advisers look at a map of the region, they see only one state they can count on: Israel. The regime is stable, and support for America is well-entrenched. Obama may dislike Netanyahu and his policy toward the Palestinians, but after losing his allies in Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt, and with the uneasiness gripping his friends in Jordan and the Gulf, Washington can't afford to be choosy. It will have to move closer to Israel, and for another reason as well: An anxious Israel is an Israel that is prone to military adventures, and that's the last thing Obama needs right now ... Israel, too, can't be too choosy, after losing strategic alliances with both Turkey and Egypt within a year.
Stephen Walt, on the other hand, argues that this is an opportune moment to do away with the special relationship between Israel and the US. [2] "Change in Cairo might not threaten Israel's interests significantly, and might even help break the calcified diplomatic situation in the region," Walt writes. In light of the bad blood between Obama and Netanyahu and the American president's desire to resolve the intractable conflicts, it is important to have this argument in mind as well.
Walt's perspective finds some support in a Stratfor monogram from last summer titled "The Geopolitics of the Palestinians". The think-tank claims that part of the problem with having a Palestinian state is that Egypt and Jordan, among other Arab countries, are privately opposed to the idea.
"The Palestinians have always been a threat to other Arab states because the means for achieving their national aspiration require significant risk-taking by other states," Stratfor argues. "Paradoxically, while the ultimate enemy of Palestine is Israel, the immediate enemy is always other Arab countries. For there to be a Palestine, there must be a sea change not only in the region, but in the global power configuration and in Israel's strategic strength."
What is going on currently could well be described as a sea change. Jordan - among a number of Arab countries - has already seen some demonstrations, and though so far the regime there has not been threatened, there are reasons to doubt its longer-term stability. Over 70% of Jordanian citizens are ethnic Palestinians who are largely barred from positions of power. So far the ethnic division has not surfaced significantly in the protests there, but the situation is explosive, and the legitimacy of the government might face a challenge in the future.
All in all, Mubarak's time may be over, but it is impossible to make clear predictions about what will follow. There are many risks as well as opportunities inherent in the Egyptian crisis, and numerous forces which vie with each other to exploit both.
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