Scars show as Libya drowns in
blood By Victor Kotsev
TEL AVIV - Libya is not Tunisia or Egypt.
This is the new mantra of the international media
and the more prominent political analysts, after
at least a week spent in - largely fruitless -
attempts to apply a common denominator to all the
revolutions in the (often perceived as uniform)
"Arab world".
The sweeping generalizations
are tempting. Indeed, the comparisons between
Libya, Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia, are
unavoidable. If executed with caution and paired
with contrasts, they are also essential to
understanding the situation in North Africa. Egypt
has long served as a model of emulation in the
region - indeed, since pharaonic times. More
recently, and
relevantly, much of Libyan
leader Muammar Gaddafi's rule, as well as the
uprising against him, was modeled after events in
Egypt.
The coup that brought Gaddafi to
power in 1969 was largely fashioned after and
inspired by the one Gamal Abdel Nasser and his
associates executed in Egypt in 1952. Even the
fact that Gaddafi had promoted himself to the rank
of colonel (and never higher) was highly symbolic
- he saw himself as an intellectual and political
descendent of Nasser, who was himself a colonel.
Initially, Gaddafi attempted to set up political
structures in Libya after the Egyptian model. Even
when that failed, and he was forced to improvise,
he continued to insist that he was carrying on
Nasser's struggle.
Ironically, the
inspiration for the current popular uprising,
which has presented the biggest challenge to his
41-year rule, also came from Egypt. So did a few
of the tricks the Libyan dictator used to reassert
control: according to some reports, when he
realized he was losing, he withdrew his forces on
purpose and intentionally created chaos, in hopes
of rallying popular and international support with
the threat of anarchy and instability. If
confirmed, this would be straight out of the
Egyptian regime's toolbox.
Whatever
Gaddafi's fate, however, it will certainly be
different from that of former Egyptian president
Hosni Mubarak. This is in part due to the
conclusion the Libyan leader drew from the
latter's downfall. Whereas Mubarak, even during
his most defiant moments, refrained from ordering
a full-scale massacre of his people, Gaddafi did
not hesitate to push the proverbial red button. In
response, his opponents are demanding his death.
Libya is drowning in blood. The confirmed
death toll so far, cited by Human Rights Watch and
world media, is around 300, but in reality it is
certainly higher - according to estimates by the
Italian foreign minister, possibly 1,000.
Witnesses cited by The New York Times on Tuesday
claimed that pro-government militias were carting
away bodies of protesters; the capital Tripoli was
described as a "war zone", "littered with dead
bodies". Gaddafi allegedly used practically all
means available - including snipers, imported
militias roaming the streets and firing
indiscriminately, warplanes, helicopters and even
naval bombardment.
The violence may not
save the Libyan leader. While, according to most
reports, he is gradually consolidating his hold on
the capital and the western part of the country,
his overall situation is grave. He has lost
control over practically the entire eastern half
of Libya, where the greater part of the oil wealth
is concentrated.
Scores of his
international diplomats have denounced him - some
accusing him of "genocide" against his own people
- and the United Nations Security Council is
discussing measures that could theoretically
include shooting down of Libyan aircraft on
missions against the protesters.
A number
of tribes have turned on him, and parts of the
military have defected. Even members of the air
force - the most loyal branch of the military,
recruited largely from Gaddafi's own small tribe -
have abandoned him. According to a report by
prestigious American think-tank Stratfor, a
military coup is in the works - likely another
emulation of the events in Egypt.
However,
the similarities between Egypt and Libya are
limited, and it is way too early to predict what
will happen in the latter case.
Even if
the Libyan military carries out a successful coup
- which is uncertain, as a long string of
unsuccessful coup attempts over the years
indicates - it is hardly capable of stepping in to
fill the power vacuum, as the Egyptian military
did. Like Mubarak, Gaddafi sought to weaken his
military for fear of a coup; unlike the Egyptian
president, however, he was spectacularly
successful, and as a result his armed forces lack
unity, strength and popular support.
Moreover, there is another crucial
difference between Egypt and Libya: the structure
of the society and the state. Historians would
argue that this is part of the millennia-old
distinction between nomadic and agrarian
societies. Egypt has a long tradition of state
structure and agrarian urban classes, dating to
the pharaohs, and largely preserved during the
times of Roman, Arab and Ottoman domination.
The Libyan state, on the other hand, is a
relatively recent invention. Its society is made
up of traditionally nomadic Arab Bedouin and
Berber tribes whose basic structures, though
modified over the past century or so, have
survived.
This explains in part why
Gaddafi - himself a member of the fairly minor
Gaddafa tribe - was unsuccessful in his initial
attempts to tear down the tribal structures and to
create a state in the image of Nasser's Egypt. He
discovered that nomadic kinship structures and
often fluid tribal alliances cannot easily be
molded into a modern socialist state.
Thus, he incorporated them in his
Jamahiriyya - a concept he invented,
translated loosely as "state of the masses".
Subsequently, he ruled without any political
parties, relying on an imitation of traditional
mechanisms of reaching consensus, which, although
with time increasingly distorted and hypocritical,
for a while served him well.
In his book
Forgotten Voices, scholar Ali Abdullatif
Ahmida calls for "a critical re-examination of
both Western and nationalist African theories of
the state" with respect to Libya, and also has
some positive words to say about Gaddafi (whose
name is alternatively spelled as Qadhdhafi):
The Jamahiriyya government received
wide public support among the lower and middle
classes, which allowed the government to engage
in a major transformation of the economy as well
as the social and political structure ...
Qadhdhafi was able to articulate and transform
anticolonial resistance and Libyan nationalism
by translating these legacies into a
revolutionary ideology using down-to-earth
language understood by ordinary Libyans.
Qadhdhafi used his charisma brilliantly to
mobilize people and attack his opponents and
rivals inside and outside Libya.
Such
descriptions are almost completely absent from
contemporary analyses, and this is in part due to
the evolution of the regime, which, in the words
of an observer, more recently turned into a cruel
"cleptocracy". However, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that an eccentric dim-witted tyrant, as
many have described Gaddafi, could hardly keep in
power for over four decades, starting at the age
of 27. His fabled eccentricity, at the very least,
was mindful to the traditional power structures in
his country, and perhaps even reflected them to a
certain extent.
All this creates a
nightmare for most analysts and the international
media, which for the most part thrive on simple
models and straight-forward analogies. To give a
small example, when we hear the news of Libyan
border guards pulling back and being replaced by
popular committees, it is easy to assume the same
situation as in Egypt, where similar popular
committees were the exact antithesis of the
regime. In Libya, however, the prototype of the
popular committees was created by Gaddafi himself,
almost 40 years ago. It is unclear what their
status is currently, and it is possibly different
in different parts of the country.
Foreign
observers are gradually tuning into this complex
reality, yet more can be desired. "We should not
be fooled by Libya's geographic proximity to Egypt
and Tunisia," Professor Marc Lynch wrote on Monday
in his Foreign Policy blog. "The appropriate
comparison is Bosnia or Kosovo, or even Rwanda
where a massacre is unfolding on live television
and the world is challenged to act." On Tuesday,
Reuters quoted a London-based North Africa
scholar, according to whom "In Libya, it will be
the tribal system that will hold the balance of
power rather than the military".
What we
are confronted with is a complex multi-layered
conflict. There is popular discontent with
Gaddafi, but there are also tensions between
different population groups that have simmered
under the surface for years. There are exiled
opposition leaders, there are powerful economic
interests, and there is international outrage.
This is an extremely explosive mix, and it is very
difficult to predict which allegiances will
prevail and how the conflict will develop. If
Gaddafi is ousted, there are no structures ready
to fill in the vacuum, and a civil war is indeed
likely.
As mentioned, much depends on the
tribal balance. This balance is delicate and can
change quickly. Tribal structures, although
intact, have been weakened considerably over the
past century or so, and there is no guarantee that
all members of a tribe (especially the larger
tribes, which tend to have numerous branches) will
stick together.
Three main areas make up
modern-day Libya, and they largely - though not
precisely - correspond to tribal alliances. To the
east is Cyrenaica, which has almost entirely
fallen under rebel control. To the southwest is
Fezzan, which has comparatively few inhabitants.
To the northwest is Tripolitania, named after the
capital city Tripoli and home to over half of the
population. Though it has seen a lot of violence
and protests, Tripolitania is the only power base
Gaddafi could conceivably count on at the moment.
Thus, the main tribes of Tripolitania,
specifically the Warfalla and Megariha, are
crucial to observe. According to Stratfor, one of
the main conspirators against Gaddafi, Abdulsalam
Jalloud, is a member of the Warfalla tribe (adding
to the confusion, other sources name him as a
member of the Megariha). If the plot is confirmed,
and if Jalloud has the backing of his tribe, this
could spell the end of Gaddafi. However, for now
this is far from certain.
The Libyan
dictator still has a few tricks up his sleeve, and
can be expected to fight until the end. In an
interview on Tuesday, he promised to "die like a
martyr".
One thing he can count on is the
allegiance of tribal elders, some of whom have
much invested (including personal wealth and
power) in his regime. Indeed, over the past five
years, Gaddafi has made extensive attempts to
reach out to tribal leaders not only in Libya, but
in the region at large. This could explain partly
reports of large numbers of foreigners massing in
Tripoli to defend him. In Libya, at least, there
are also issues of honor - the Megariha, for
example, are allegedly indebted to Gaddafi for the
release of condemned Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset
Mohmed Ali al-Megrahi, a member of the tribe.
Another trump Gaddafi is apparently trying
to play is the fear of instability. A civil war is
hardly in the interest of anybody, and especially
of those who profit from lucrative oil exports.
The instability has already affected both Libya
and world markets significantly. According to one
report, as of Wednesday, supplies to Europe are
cut, possibly at the orders of Gaddafi.
It
is important to note that both Gaddafi and his
opponents at different times have had an interest
to portray the chaos as more extensive than it is,
in order to level accusations at each other. It is
telling that some foreigners are refusing to
evacuate, even when offered a free airlift. An
airplane sent to evacuate Bulgarian citizens on
Wednesday, for example, returned with only one
Bulgarian citizen on board (out of hundreds known
to be in Tripoli). Given all the uncertainty
on the ground, we can only guess at this point how
the relationships between Gaddafi and the tribes
will develop. There is more information about the
international repercussions of the crisis,
although these are not entirely certain either.
Gaddafi has few friends internationally.
His indiscriminate support for disparate terrorist
and "revolutionary" groups over the years has
earned him the hate of both the Arab world and
most of the West. The excesses of the past few
days added fuel to the fire. Thus, it is no
surprise that the Arab League suspended Libya's
membership on Tuesday in an effort to pressure the
regime, while a number of United Nations Security
Council members called for urgent action.
However, Gaddafi's scare tactics are at
least partially successful. According to Stratfor,
he has at least two major backers: Italy and the
Egyptian military. The Italians are heavily
invested in the Libyan oil infrastructure, and
receive 24% of their oil supply from Libya.
The Egyptians, on the other hand, fear
regional instability and an influx of refugees,
and thus offer tacit support. The United States,
although issuing strongly-worded statements, is
also largely waiting on the sidelines, eyeing
nervously the rapidly rising oil price in the wake
of the crisis. According to a New York Times
report, Saudi Arabia's attempts to compensate for
the loss of Libya's 1.8 million barrels per day of
oil have so far failed to calm the markets.
It is anybody's guess what will happen
next. However, it is worth mentioning that
although this is the most serious crisis Gaddafi
has faced, it is not the only major one, and not
even the bloodiest. The "mad dog of the Middle
East", as former US president Ronald Reagan once
called him, is used to soaking revolts in blood
and being an international pariah. In the prison
riots in 1996, for example, over 1,200 inmates
were shot to death. This left deep scars in
Libya's society (the international community
quickly forgot, as it is wont to), but the regime
survived.
Victor Kotsev is a
journalist and political analyst based in Tel
Aviv.
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