INTERVIEW Egypt's new guiding
lights Interview by Mahan
Abedin
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
(Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen) was formed in 1928.
Over the past eight decades, it has become a
political, social and religious organization of
unparalleled influence and depth in its Egyptian
homeland. The Muslim Brotherhood is also an
international movement with branches in most Arab
countries as well as in the West.
The
downfall of president Hosni Mubarak in February
and the onset of a transitional period in Egypt
herald the prospect of full-scale participation by
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian national life.
Having endured decades of repression, the
Brotherhood now stands to gain the most from the
emerging political system.
Ibrahim Mounir
was born in 1937 in Egypt. He studied law at
university and has practiced
as a lawyer for decades. Mounir joined the Muslim
Brotherhood in his teens and steadily rose through
the ranks. He is currently a member of the
Brotherhood's executive bureau known as the
Maktab Al-Irshad (Guidance Bureau) and is
widely considered to be one of the most senior
members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
Mahan Abedin: Do you think
the protests in Cairo and elsewhere climaxed too
soon?
Ibrahim Mounir: The
revolution hasn't fully unfolded yet. The mass
street protests were required to topple Mubarak.
The next stages of the revolution may require
different forms of protest and resistance.
MA: To what extent can we
talk of regime change in Egypt?
IM: Mubarak has departed the
arena but the structure of the regime remains in
place. However, this structure isn't strong
because it has no ideology or philosophy behind
it.
MA: It appears that the
Egyptian regime has fallen back onto its main
pillars, namely the armed forces. The Egyptian
army says that it will manage the transitional
process fairly and will prepare the grounds for
democracy. Do you take the army commanders at
their word?
IM: In principle
we trust the army. One important point that is
often missed by international observers is that
the Mubarak regime continuously employed the
divide and rule strategy. Mubarak created
divisions within the army, as well as divisions
between the army and other institutions, in
particular the various police and security forces.
The main security forces number 1.5
million whereas the army is only 0.5 million
strong. He conspired to create animosity between
Omar Suleiman [former chief of security] and Habib
el-Adly, the former interior minister and head of
the security forces. Mubarak even created
divisions within his own National Democratic
Party. The main goal of this policy was to keep
the institutions weak with a view to securing
Mubarak's power base. No single institution was
allowed to become too strong and as a result we
shouldn't overestimate the political and security
capabilities of the army.
MA: You say you trust the
army but are there adequate safeguards in place to
bind the army to its pledges?
IM: First the whole world
has set its gaze on the Egyptian army and expects
it to deliver on its promises. Second, there are
divisions between the top brass of the army and
junior officers. The younger officers are much
closer to the people and are loath to undertake
actions that undermine the fundamental interests
of the Egyptian people. Third, even if it wanted
to, the army, with half a million men, can't
control Egypt.
MA: Does that
mean that if the army reneges on its pledges the
people will go back to the streets?
IM: The Egyptian people have
overcome the fear barrier. They have shown that
they are serious about pursuing their legitimate
political aspirations.
MA:
There has been a lot of speculation in the Western
media about the role (or lack thereof) of the
Muslim Brotherhood in the protests. What was the
true extent of the Brotherhood's participation in
the revolution?
IM: It is
impossible to speak with precision about what was
happening on the streets. But the protests were
taking place all over the country, not just Tahrir
Square in Cairo. I can confirm that much of the
protests outside the capital was organized by the
Brotherhood and its affiliated networks and
organizations.
Moreover, most of the
logistical services in Tahrir Square were provided
by the Brotherhood. I've been told that even the
public toilets were constructed by Brotherhood
members and supporters. As you can imagine,
sanitary facilities are important when you are
conducting a prolonged protest movement in a
specific area.
MA: Much of
the attention is focussed on the army and very
little attention is being paid to the deep state,
namely the Egyptian intelligence services. It
appears that the revolution has failed to displace
these organizations from their privileged, albeit
secret, position on the political scene. What
plans do you have to overhaul these secret
organizations and bring them into line with
democratic norms and values?
IM: The entities you refer
to are still in place as you say and they are very
influential but not necessarily all that powerful.
Reforming these sensitive institutions requires
time. This is a program for all elements in
Egyptian politics, not just the Muslim
Brotherhood. All the main political actors,
including the army, have to participate in the
process of intelligence and security services
reform in Egypt.
MA: Some
observers are of the opinion that unless there is
root and branch institutional and cultural reform
of the security services, democracy will not take
root in Egypt.
IM: We are
talking about short- and long-term time frames
here. In the short term, the cancelation of the
Emergency Law, guaranteeing the independence of
the judiciary and securing media freedoms will go
a long way to making Egypt a more transparent and
accountable country. The media in particular
should be vigilant in the face of corruption and
abuses; this will put enormous pressure on the
security services to clean up their act. The
cultural reforms you allude to will take time. We
have to train our security and police officers to
think in terms of serving the people and
respecting international norms and standards of
human rights.
MA: What is
the precise legal status and circumstances of
veteran Ikhwan detainees, in particular
Khairat al-Shater; are these individuals still in
prison?
IM: Yes, they are
still in prison. More broadly, once the Emergency
Law has been lifted and the constitution has been
reformed, the Muslim Brotherhood will enter
politics in earnest.
MA:
Talking about the present, has the daily security
and judicial pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood
eased in the wake of Mubarak's downfall?
IM: It has to a large
extent. But there is still a cat-and-mouse game
between the Brotherhood and the security
establishment. Despite this one of our members,
Sobhi Saleh, was a member of the committee which
was tasked with reforming the constitution. This
reformed constitution will be put to a referendum
within two months.
MA:
Elections are scheduled in six months time; will
parliamentary and presidential elections take
place simultaneously?
IM: We
don't know. But we expect the army to hand over
power once the transitional period expires. Many
expect the army to withdraw from center stage at
that point, but still continue to watch
developments very carefully. This kind of
oversight role is not dissimilar to the role
played by the Turkish military over the past
decades.
MA: Will the Muslim
Brotherhood field an official candidate in the
forthcoming presidential elections?
IM: No!
MA: Why not?
IM: The mood, both
internally and externally, doesn't favor such a
move at this stage.
MA: Does
that mean you are afraid of winning the
presidential elections?!
IM:
For the past 60 years, the Egyptian people and
sections of the international community have been
bombarded with anti-Brotherhood propaganda. We are
not just looking for power, we want to change the
way the Egyptian people perceive us and think
about us. At this early stage it is not so
important who rules Egypt, the important point
being how we are governed.
MA: Provided the elections
are relatively free and fair, do you expect to
dominate the next parliament?
IM: We expect to secure
around 30% of the vote. We may secure more if we
contest the parliamentary elections as part of a
coalition with one or more parties. But this will
depend on the prevailing conditions.
MA: To what extent do you
aspire to change Egyptian foreign policy?
IM: This is a decision for
the Egyptian people. We will respect their wishes.
MA: But foreign policy is a
specialized sphere and as such it is crafted by
specialists and not directly by the people. My
question is once the Muslim Brotherhood secures a
strong position in the Egyptian political
landscape, to what extent do you wish to change
foreign policy?
IM: I can't
answer this type of question at this stage. In any
case, events are occurring at a very fast pace
across a range of sectors, including the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the relationship
between Palestinians themselves. But generally
speaking, our country's regional and global
policies will be decided by the people.
MA: Allow me to field a few
specific questions. Do you want to restructure
Egypt's relationship with the United States?
IM: We would like to stop
illegitimate American influence over Egyptian
affairs. Nobody in their right mind can ignore the
United States, particularly its cutting-edge
scientific and technological advances, but as with
any other independent country, we aspire to
curtail foreign influence over our affairs.
MA: Do you want the United
States to reduce or even cut off its annual aid to
the Egyptian military?
IM:
We reject the whole concept of aid as a matter of
principle. But as regards broader relations
between the two militaries, this will depend on
the democratic process in Egypt.
MA: So you don't rule out
the possibility of a future Egyptian government
asking the United States to cut off its annual aid
to the Egyptian military?
IM: Our answer to this
question is very clear. We won't ask for this aid!
Much of the corruption in our country is rooted in
this aid package.
MA: How
soon should Egypt break the siege of Gaza?
IM: From our point of view,
this siege should have been broken yesterday
rather than today.
MA: In
other words it can't happen soon enough?
IM: Yes!
MA: What are the likely
long-term scenarios with regards to
Egyptian-Israeli relations?
IM: Israel has posed a
threat and a set of deep and intricate challenges
to the entire region since 1948. But we don't have
access to much of the information relating to this
case. It is not fair of you to ask this question
when we don't have access to all the pertinent
information.
MA: What
category of information are you referring to? Are
you referring solely to classified information?
IM: I am referring to all
the existing information and facts that relate to
this case. We have to review everything before
arriving at conclusions and policy choices.
MA: So you don't rule out
the renegotiation of the Camp David peace treaty?
IM: It is meaningless to ask
this question now. As I said, we have to review
everything before we reach conclusions. Moreover,
the Egyptian people will be fully involved in the
process. Their values, beliefs and feelings
towards international conflicts and the world in
general will have to be taken into account.
Mahan Abedin is an analyst of
Middle East politics.
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