Generational rage in the House of
Saud By Brian M Downing
World attention is rightly fixed on the
fighting in Libya, but events in Saudi Arabia
slated for Friday, March 11, might well take
precedent. Young Saudis are mobilizing for "day of
rage" demonstrations calling for political reforms
but the regime has warned against any such
gatherings. A confrontation with immense
geopolitical and economic import is nearing.
Capitals and bourses are watching anxiously. The
outcome is of course unclear, but a look at the
dramatis personae and possible developments
might be attempted.
Generational
conflict Demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya and elsewhere have pitted educated young
people eager for a say in their futures against
aging if not decrepit regimes that denied them
that say. It
will be no different in Saudi
Arabia where over half the population is under the
age of 30. But the generational conflict will
resonate with politics and intrigues within the
large Saud family.
The Saudi government is
directed by the descendants of Abdul Aziz bin
Saud, the great warrior-king who conquered much of
the Arabian Peninsula following the demise of the
Ottoman Empire after World War I. Since his death
in 1953, his kingdom has been ruled by a line of
sons, as practice calls for the crown to pass down
to younger sons.
Only on the last son's
death - there are still over 10 of them - is it to
pass on to the next generation, though a council
formed in 2006 will shape future successions. King
Abdullah is 87, Crown Prince Sultan is perhaps
four years younger - a situation reminiscent of
the Soviet politburo a generation ago.
Discontent abounds within the ranks of the
old warrior-king's grandchildren, many of whom
bristle at being passed over for key positions in
favor of their better connected but less capable
cousins. Accordingly, public calls for change from
Saudi youths will likely resonate with resentments
within the younger princes - perhaps also within
the princesses.
One of the younger men,
Prince Bandar (the Crown Prince's son and former
ambassador to the United States), dropped from
sight a year ago - the result of a failed palace
intrigue according to some reports. Whatever
response to the demonstrations is being planned,
the elders will have to bear in mind the thinking
of their offspring and also the power their
offspring hold thanks to the positions they have
been granted in the state and in the military as
well.
Advisory councils In the
1990s, the government constructed consultative
bodies (Majlis-ash-Shura) in order to fend
off pressures that emerged during the first Gulf
War in 1991 from both modern reformers and
Wahhabist traditionalists. These councils are
non-elective; members are appointed by the king.
Nor do they have legislative powers; they are
consultative only. The councils nonetheless
express the views of tribal elders, professional
associations, and client-patron networks.
Historically, timid councils have
sometimes tossed aside the subordinate role their
creators envisioned and turned themselves into
ambitious assemblies. Edward I convened the Model
Parliament to do his bidding; they became a
powerful and enduring institution. Louis XVI
likely regretted convening an Estates-General as
he climbed the scaffold. The Soviet duma helped
thwart a military coup and bring down communism.
Amid these extraordinary times, Saudi
council members may well take sides with
reformers, either out of practical or ideological
concerns - perhaps to the extent of demanding
legislative powers and turning the country into a
constitutional monarchy. History seems to be on
their side.
Sunni and Shi'ite
Unlike events in Tunisia and Egypt, though
as with events in Bahrain, the calls for change in
Saudi Arabia have a Shi'ite versus Sunni dimension
and so the centuries-old schism will shape the
movement and perhaps distort the regime's
perceptions of it. Saudi Arabia's 28 million
people are approximately 10-15% Shi'ite. They
complain of systematic prejudice against their
faith and of discrimination in jobs and
governmental favors. They are primarily found in
the oil-producing Eastern province.
As
problematic as sectarianism is, it is worsened if
not poisoned by geopolitics. Iran and Saudi Arabia
have long vied for primacy in the Persian Gulf.
The contest was reasonably non-threatening under
the shah but became volatile once he was ousted
and a Shi'ite theocracy came to power.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for
Shi'ite uprisings but found very little response,
though in 1979 Saudi suppression of Ashura
mourning rites led to bloody riots in a few
eastern towns. The Saudis supported Saddam
Hussein's 1980 invasion of Iran and Saudi jets
dueled with Iranian ones on more than one
occasion. The Saudis play a key role in assembling
a Sunni-Arab coalition aimed at countering Iran
and pressing it to drop its nuclear weapons
program.
Saudi leaders today almost
certainly see events in Bahrain and impending ones
in their own realm to be the work of Iran,
especially its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC). Shi'ites do not need a foreign agent to
apprise them of their plight or inspire hope of a
better day, but the perception of the IRGC's hand
will be a critical part of shaping the Saudi
response and may cause some of Abdullah's advisers
to recommend a firm response.
Options
for repression Three armed forces are
available to the king. The national army is
commanded by senior princes but has a large number
of conscripts, whose willingness to come down hard
on their countrymen is uncertain - uncertain both
to foreign observers and to royal advisers as
well. Friday would be an inopportune time to
receive bad news on this regard so caution may be
in order.
The national guard comprises a
number of tribal levies. This is in some respects
the institutional legacy of Abdul Aziz's tribal
bands that conquered the land ninety years ago.
The national guard is generally considered to be
mainly a counterforce against any intrigue coming
from the regular army. There are a few tribes who
are hostile to the Saudi regime, but of course
those forces are unlikely to be deployed.
Neither the army nor the national guard is
built chiefly for internal security purposes;
neither brought accolades during the first Gulf
War or the uprising in Mecca in 1979.
The
Interior Ministry maintains security troops. It is
a professional force that performed remarkably
well in quashing al-Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula over
the past 10 years. Initial responses to terrorism
were heavy-handed and counterproductive. The
public resented the harsh methods and al-Qaeda
throve on public resentments.
When less
harsh methods were adopted in 1999, public support
plummeted and al-Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula was
effectively driven out of the realm and into the
wastelands of Yemen. It might be significant that
the shift away from harsh methods was done on the
orders of Abdullah, the present-day king. He is
ailing but perhaps still aware of the
counterproductive nature of his predecessor's
brutal methods.
Abdullah's defeat of
domestic terrorism may be instructive in another
regard. Al-Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula made the
blunder of calling for insurrection against the
House of Saud, which, at least back in 1999, was
not widely loathed. That is likely still the case
with most of the people as the government has been
generous though not necessarily equitable with the
petro-wealth.
An ill-advised crackdown,
however, could easily and irreparably change that
and make the transition to constitutional monarchy
longer and more painful than it needs to be.
Brian M Downing is a
political/military analyst and the author of
The Military Revolution and Political Change
and The Paths of Glory: War and Social
Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.
He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com
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