Neo-Ottomans discover new Middle East
By M K Bhadrakumar
To emphasize commonalities and to marginalize differences is the overall drift
of diplomacy in inter-state relationships. But there could also be
extraordinary times when good diplomacy needs to accentuate differences in a
relationship characterized by growing commonalities.
Turkish diplomacy focused during the recent years on building up "zero-problem"
relationships with Iran and Syria. But even as stunning results have begun
appearing, a need has arisen for Ankara to mark a certain distance from its
neighbors. The Arab
revolt threatens to bring to the surface new templates of regional rivalry.
The Middle East was the arena where the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry played out for
over half a millennia all the way up to the beginning of the 20th century. The
prospect of the birth of a New Middle East finds the two regional powers
jockeying for leadership. Arguably, there are third parties - Western powers on
the whole and some among Arabs - who may actually hope to gain out from a
replay of the historical rivalry in the contemporary regional setting, which by
common reckoning is working to the advantage of Iran's rise.
Unfinished business in Gaza
The alacrity with which Turkey filed a report to the United Nations in New York
regarding its seizure of a cache of weapons from a transiting Iranian aircraft
en route to Syria on March 21 and the attendant media "leaks" - all this
happening in a fast-forward mode within the week - underscores an interplay of
regional rivalries.
Indeed, Turkey acted as a responsible member of the international community
when it apprehended the Iranian aircraft violating the United Nations Security
Council sanctions against Iran - although the "prohibited military items"
ferried across to Aleppo in Syria consisted of just 60 Kalashnikov rifles, 14
machine guns, 8,000 rounds of ammunition and 2,000 mortar shells.
What matters is that Colombia, which is a staunch ally of the United States and
heads the Iran sanctions committee, promptly told the Security Council that the
incident is a "matter of serious concern" and Western diplomats rushed to
comment that the episode "reflected positively on Turkey".
An element of discord has indeed appeared in Turkish-Iranian-Syrian ties, which
had been on a steady upward curve. The issue also likely involves Hezbollah and
(or) Hamas, and we may not have heard the last word. Yesterday, former Israeli
prime minister Ehud Olmert said ominously that an all-out war against the Gaza
Strip is inevitable.
To quote Olmert, "If there's one thing I regret - it's that we didn't finish
the job back then - we cannot avoid the need to complete the job. Israel cannot
accept the presence of a terror entity in Gaza, which threatens the citizens of
Israel, without taking action. Not random action, but controlled, precise and
organized action with enough force to bring a change to the reality in Gaza."
Turks are some of the oldest practitioners of modern diplomacy. They know
tensions are building up in Syria, and Ankara has taken a prescriptive approach
toward Damascus by openly and repeatedly calling on President Bashar Assad to
reform. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke to Assad twice. President
Abdullah Gul reiterated Turkey's call for reforms within a day of Assad's
address on Wednesday where he said the Syrian protests were the result of a
"foreign plot".
Gul used uncharacteristically strong language: "Whatever needs [to be done]
should be done. There can be no closed regime on the Mediterranean coast. Assad
is aware of this, too ... We are sharing our experiences with him and we do not
want chaos in Syria." Gul's adviser Ersat Hurmuzlu demanded: "Waiting for the
protests to end to make reforms is a wrong approach. Necessary reforms should
be made now, not later. Leaders should be brave ... It would be an easy
transformation if the Syrian administration can make significant reforms on
human rights and democracy and find solutions in the struggle against
corruption."
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told Reuters: "It is like Eastern Europe in
the late 1990s ... Those who try to prevent this process will face more
difficulties like in Libya ... We don't have any evidence [of a "foreign plot"]
... We're supporting reforms and democratization [in Syria] but it should be a
peaceful transformation, not through violence, attacks against civilians or by
trying to keep the status quo or by creating instability."
Marked shift in attitudes
The sudden Turkish belligerence toward Syria has a complex backdrop. No Arab
state was more anti-Turkish than Ba'athist Syria. In the Syrian folklore,
Ottomans are cast as villains, and just below the surface lies a territorial
dispute dating back to 1939 when Turks annexed Hatay province from Syria. This
is also where the hidden meaning of the Turkish seizure of Iranian aircraft
carrying weapons en route to Syria probably lies.
Again, Turkey has been reaching out to Hezbollah and Hamas, bypassing Syria's
(and Iran's) claim to be their interlocutor, in an effort to enhance its
regional credentials and burnish its standing with Saudi Arabia and the other
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
The GCC states, on their part, regard it a good thing that Ankara is willing to
shoot across Tehran's bow. Unlike the case with Iran, whose objectives
vis-a-vis Hezbollah and Hamas are viewed in zero-sum terms by Saudi Arabia,
Turkey's efforts to advance its political status are not perceived as aimed at
threatening or marginalizing Riyadh's interests.
Therefore, the visit by the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal to
Ankara last week assumes great significance. The Saudis have been apprehensive
about the flowering of Turkish-Iranian ties. Riyadh is deeply concerned that
Tehran may turn out to be the real beneficiary of the current turmoil in the
Middle East.
The Saudis see that only Turkey can act as a counterweight to Iran in the
emergent scenario where Egypt is in a shambles and US regional policies are in
disarray. But at the same time, Saudis were disenchanted that Erdogan's
ebullient "Third Worldism" was becoming too radical whereas in the end
everything in the New Middle East ought to come down to sectarianism - Turkey
is Sunni (and Salafi), so is Saudi Arabia, but Iran is Shi'ite.
Conceivably, Faisal reminded the Turkish leadership - Gul lived in Jeddah for
eight years and knows how the Saudi mind works - that amidst the euphoria of
the Arab revolt for democratization, it shouldn't be forgotten that, at the end
of the day, through the Ottoman era Arabs preferred Sublime Porte (the open
court of the sultan) to Persian hegemony. But Turkey doesn't need to be
particularly reminded of that. The Ottomans had a thorough grasp of
sectarianism in the Muslim Middle East and they played up confessional
differences, encouraged sectarianism and propped up minorities with great skill
and aplomb. Anyway, there has been a marked shift in the Turkish attitudes
since Faisal flew back home from Ankara.
A bullish, proactive mood
Turkey seems to weigh in that with the dramatic decline in the US' influence
and profile, the Middle East is returning to its historical divides and there
is a flock waiting to be led despite Iran's manifest desire to surge. Turkey
also factors in that the returns for carrying the burden of leadership in the
oil-rich Persian Gulf region promise to be fabulous - wealth, influence, power
and glory. At its most audacious level, Turkey can even aspire to be an
intermediary between its Arab "wards" and the West, which has been ignoring it.
Thus, while on the one hand, Ankara has brazenly intruded into the Iran-Syrian
alliance and is dictating to Damascus to come back into the Sunni Arab fold
(which the Alawaite regime cannot easily do), on the other hand, Davutoglu is
heading for Manama next week to "see the situation on the ground" and follow up
on the consultations he has had with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,
which have been alleging an Iranian hand behind the Shi'ite uprising in
Bahrain.
Davutoglu said, "An escalation of tension in Bahrain may create an escalation
of tension in the Gulf." In sharp contrast with the Iranian stance, Turkey does
not object to the Saudi intervention in Bahrain. (Initially it did, but no
longer.)
Turkey also appreciates that the GCC is funding Bahrain to help it carry out
reforms. Turkey feels that the GCC (read Saudi Arabia) should solve the
problems within its region. As Hurmuzlu put it, "They [GCC states] should not
seek solutions outside the region by delegating to powerful countries as
sub-contractors."
Davutoglu faces a tough challenge to navigate between the Saudi and Iranian
interests in Bahrain. It is highly unlikely that Tehran will be pleased with
the sight of the Turkish diplomat wading into its Shi'ite backyard.
Again, the Turkish position on the situation in Yemen ("quite critical") is
close to Saudi Arabia's and diverges from Iran's. Turkey agrees with Saudi
Arabia that the priority should be to keep Yemen united and to avoid sectarian
conflict. Turkey is only guardedly supportive of change of leadership in Yemen.
How realistic are Turkey's neo-Ottoman ambitions? The hard reality is that
despite sustained efforts Turkey is far from becoming a dominant factor in the
Middle East. On the contrary, Turkey's proactive mode might end up generating
anxiety in the region that it is intervening in intra-Arab politics.
However, Turkey is in a bullish mood. Its economy grew by 8.9% in 2010 and its
gross domestic product per capita has just burst through the magical US$10,000
threshold. And it is convinced of its credentials as a shining example of
democracy for Muslim nations anywhere.
But Turks don't care to look at life from others' perspective. In the Arab
memory, Ottoman legacy consists in a mere clutch of habits that Turks left
behind and nothing more - coffee and waterpipes, or baksheesh (bribery)
and the khazouk (a crude metal spike used by Ottomans to torture Arab
subjects).
Turkey's Sunni Arab co-religionists resent the Ottoman era. No one speaks
Turkish in the Arab world and everyone is keen to learn English or French.
Simply put, there is a mountain load to forget in half a millennium of history.
Erdogan is a regional celebrity, but then it is largely a matter of the
sultan's personal charisma.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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