Libya: calculated risk or reckless
adventure By Mahan Abedin
As the military conflict in Libya enters
its third month, global public opinion appears to
be increasingly skeptical as to the motives and
the outcome of the Western military intervention.
While at first glance the Western military
intervention appeared to be in response to the
coincidental convergence of a humanitarian crisis
with pressing strategic interests, a deeper
analysis would suggest a more complex calculus.
The downfall of the Tunisian and Egyptian
presidents earlier this year and the resulting
political changes in those countries, coupled with
a wider dynamic of revolt and insurrection across
North Africa and the Middle East, poses all manner
of problems to Western Strategic Intelligence
(STRATINT) planners. Revolutions are often
harbingers of both intra-state and inter-state
conflict, and
there is no immediate reason
to believe that North Africa is going to be spared
this recurring historical cycle.
Seen from
this perspective, the controversial intervention
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in favor of Libya's ragtag rebel army is designed
to influence the outcome of the Libyan conflict to
the greatest extent possible, with a view to
managing the overall risk posed by what appears to
be a tectonic shift in political power in North
Africa.
The key concern, at least from the
point of view of the citizens of south European
states, is whether, instead of minimizing the
risks, NATO's military intervention in fact ends
up fanning the flames of conflict on the shores of
the Mediterranean. The stakes are high, as a
portfolio of risks, ranging from extremism and war
to terrorism and mass migration, threaten to wreak
instability in southern Europe and beyond.
Revolution and war That
revolutionary upheaval tends to generate conflict,
both within states but particularly between
states, is a presupposition much favored by
academics. Its origins go back to the French
revolution of 1789 and the subsequent French
revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that engulfed
the European continent. In more recent times, the
Iranian Revolution of 1979, and the resulting
ideological challenge to rulers across the Middle
East, sparked the long-running Iran-Iraq War.
While Saddam Hussein committed an act of
aggression against Iran in September 1980, he only
did so after an approving nod from regional and
global powers anxious to contain the Iranian
Revolution.
In North Africa, in the space
of less than two months, two long-standing leaders
were brought down following weeks of unrest. While
it may be premature to label these significant
political moments as "revolutionary", in so far as
the underlying political systems haven't been
overthrown, there is still much potential for
further significant change, even of the
revolutionary kind.
The prospect for
revolutionary upheaval in Egypt is of far greater
concern to international observers because of that
country's size and its ability to influence events
and opinion across the Arab world. There is a
widespread feeling in Egypt, particularly amongst
the strata of society that were at the forefront
of the revolt against the Mubarak regime, that the
political gains made so far don't go nearly far
enough in satisfying the revolutionaries' demands.
If the crucial Egyptian political battles
in the decisive months ahead open up avenues for
real change and ultimately entrench a genuinely
new establishment in power, then Egypt will have
assumed the strategic profile of a fledgling
revolutionary power, not too dissimilar to the
dramatic changes to Iran's strategic profile more
than three decades ago. A revolutionary Egypt of
any ideological shade is bound to expend its newly
found energy by meddling in its immediate
environment. Indeed, had there been a
revolutionary administration in power in Cairo,
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi would have probably been
overthrown by now.
The prospect of Egypt
as a source and aggravator of tensions in North
Africa must surely be of great concern and
interest to Western STRATINT centers. Indeed, it
is not too far-fetched to speculate that the
military intervention in Libya is partly designed
to reduce the scope for Egyptian influence in
Libya in the years ahead by way of engineering the
transition in that country largely without
Egyptian help and input.
Libya's
unpredictable opposition One of the most
potent arguments against the Western powers'
thinly disguised military support to Libya's
rebels is centered on the latter being perceived
to be a largely unknown quantity. These fears were
stoked a few weeks ago following NATO's Supreme
Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James
Staviridis's statement that American intelligence
had identified "flickers" of al-Qaeda activity
amongst Libya's rebels.
Despite deploying
the full extent of their intelligence capability,
Western powers don't appear to know a great deal
about the people with whom they have entered into
an increasingly open military and political
alliance. It is this apparent lack of knowledge
that fuels anxiety and may yet usher all manner of
unforeseen consequences.
On the surface,
Libyan rebels appear to be a ragtag army with
little hope of achieving a military breakthrough
in the short-term even with the aid of substantial
Western air support. On the political front, the
Benghazi-based National Transitional Council
hardly instills much confidence or inspiration. On
the surface at least it appears to be an
uncharismatic mix of former Gaddafi regime
loyalists and local leaders thrown into the thick
of things by the sweeping vortex of change. Left
to their own devices the rebels would most likely
suffer a decisive military and political defeat at
the hands of Gaddafi, as they nearly did just over
four weeks ago, prior to the passing of United
Nations resolution 1973, authorizing a no-fly zone
over Libya.
But it would be a mistake to
write off the Libyan opposition, even though there
is little reliable information on the less visible
dimensions of the constellation of political and
social force ranged against Gaddafi. Three decades
ago, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya
was a major political force in the Arab world
(some say second only to the Palestine Liberation
Organization, in terms of size and resources) and
posed a serious challenge to Gaddafi's quixotic
regime before it fell into disarray in the
mid-1980s. It is prudent to assume that the NFSL,
both in its current form and by old members, is
deeply embedded within the emerging Benghazi-based
political elite, either inside the National
Transitional Council or independent of it.
On the military front, fighters formerly
affiliated with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG) are undoubtedly among the rebel ranks. But
the now defunct LIFG decisively distanced itself
from al-Qaeda prior to its dissolution. Much of
the leadership even made peace with the Gaddafi
regime. In any case, prior to the outbreak of the
Libyan revolt in February, the former LIFG
leadership, in particular the handful of cadres
based in Western Europe, appeared to be more
interested in self-promotion than engaging in
radical Islamist politics.
Nevertheless,
there are legitimate - if not exaggerated - fears
about Islamic militancy in Eastern Libya. It is
often pointed out by the Western media that the
eastern city of Derna produced the lion's share of
Arab suicide bombers that descended on Iraq in the
wake of the Anglo-American invasion of March-April
2003.
If there are a sizeable number of
Islamic militants in the ranks of the rebel forces
then that promises to complicate the transition
process, especially when Gaddafi is finally
removed. NATO planners along with Western
intelligence services and their political masters
may well be trying to reduce the radical elements
to the very margins by offering generous military
and political support to the rebels. But this
strategy also runs the risk of stoking tensions
within rebel ranks, with the more radical tendency
opposed to open Western support, particularly if
that involves Western boots on the ground.
Already numerous media reports have
alleged that Western Special Forces, in addition
to intelligence agents, are operating across the
length and breadth of Libya. It would be very
surprising if these stories were untrue.
Threat portfolio A particularly
worrying scenario for Western STRATINT centers is
the potential for Islamic militants to gain
prominent positions in the new Libyan military,
security and intelligence structures. This risk is
plausible in view of the nature of the transition
that awaits Libya in the months and years ahead.
Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Libya is set to
experience a root and branch regime change from
the outset, with plenty of potential for
instability, especially in view of the country's
shallow political culture and attendant
infrastructure.
Prolonged instability
could turn Libya into a failed state with an even
greater potential to attract local and foreign
Islamic militants than war-torn Somalia. A more
realistic scenario is that of a tentatively
radical regime in Tripoli over-extending itself
and sparking off conflict across the region,
drawing in neighboring Egypt and Algeria. The
knock-on effect of this instability could
adversely affect relations between Algerian and
Morocco, with the potential for the dispute over
Western Sahara sparking off hostilities between
the rival nations.
For the countries in
southern Europe, particularly Italy, the greatest
short- and mid-term threat is of mass migration
sparked by the prevailing instability and
uncertainly in North Africa. This threat carries a
multitude of attendant hazards, including
radicalism, crime and religious extremism, any one
of which can alter the balance of political forces
in these countries, with the far right emerging as
the chief beneficiary.
It is tempting, if
not reassuring, to conclude that NATO's
controversial military involvement in Libya
(premised on an expansive interpretation of UN
resolution 1973) is designed to engineer the
outcome in Libya in such a way that militates
against these risks and reduces them to a
manageable level. But the law of unintended
consequences looms large over the horizon.
While much of the world has been stunned by
the Western powers' dramatic shift away from
Gaddafi and their enthusiastic embrace of an
unpredictable force, the real surprises may yet be
in store. Those who are calling for the downfall
of the eccentric and mercurial Libyan tyrant
should be careful what they wish for.
Mahan Abedin is a senior
researcher in terrorism studies and a consultant
to independent media in Iran.
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