While appearing to reform to meet
protestors' demands, Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad is actually engaged in taqiyya, a
practice in Shi'ite Islam where adherents conceal
their faith when they are under threat,
persecution, or compulsion
Although the
origins of taqiyya are found in
fundamentalist dogma, Ba'athists and other
authoritarian regimes in the region have used it
for decades in propaganda. Once widespread
opposition to his one-party regime became evident,
Assad needed to shield himself from international
retribution. In an effort to buy time, the Syrian
dictator announced that he would cancel the
"emergency law" which forbids demonstrations and
limits free speech.
Assad's lack of
credibility immunizes Syrian protesters to his
"taqiyya." No
deception will convince them that the president's
intentions are good. Ma'moun Homsi, a former
member of Syria's parliament who has been jailed
several times for speaking out against the regime
said recently, "The dictator is gaining time and
playing the propagandist, nothing more."
In an April 16 speech, Assad made his
"reformist" stance clear, saying there will no
longer be "an excuse" for organizing protests
after Syria lifts the emergency law and implements
the reforms.
Emergency laws are lifted so
that protests can take place freely, not the other
way around. In fact, Assad's speech sought to gild
the rapidly deteriorating image of Damascus'
ruling elite. Dozens of citizens, mostly youths,
have been killed by hit teams and snipers since
the beginning of April. Reports have accused Assad
of importing Iranian and Hezbollah militias to
help suppress the protests. With such bloodshed -
media reports state that up to 200 have so far
been killed - the regime has been delegitimized
and its leaders will eventually face Syrian or
international justice, no matter how long it
takes, as is the case in other Arab countries
where rulers ordered protesters killed.
Assad's flanking maneuver to attack the
Syrian revolt's rearguard is not reform. He never
mentioned changing Article 8 of the Syrian
Constitution which states "The leading party in
the society and the state is the Socialist Arab
Ba'ath Party."
The protesters' main goal
is breaking the monopoly of Assad's ruling party.
There was never any mention of releasing all
political detainees. Equally important, there has
been no dismantling of the existing security
apparatus; and last but not least, there is no
intention of revising the Syrian constitution. The
only thing the dictator is doing is accusing
imaginary "foreign conspiracies" from Israel, the
United States, Arab Sunni governments and Lebanon.
His citizens do not buy these stories.
The
demonstrators, mostly from civil society groups,
were inspired by the "Damascus Declaration" issued
more than five years ago by dissidents, some of
whom remain in jail to this day. Most of the
protesters are young males, with female protesters
seen primarily on college campuses. Political
movements that oppose the regime (left wing,
liberals and others) support the uprising but
aren't moving to the front of the protests for
fear of being exposed. This also applies to the
Muslim Brotherhood of Syria, which is present on
the streets but prefers, for the time being, that
others be seen as taking the lead.
The
protests started initially in Daraa in the south,
where most of the killing took place. Gradually,
they spread to cities in the north and finally
Damascus. The demonstrators are mainly Sunnis,
Syria's numerical majority, but Kurds, Christians,
the Druze and even Alawites (Assad's own ruling
sect) have joined the marches.
The regime
is using security forces and militias to suppress
the revolt. Regular troops are only seeing limited
involvement, to avoid provoking troop defections.
In addition, Iran and Hezbollah have permanent
bases inside Syria and have been supplying the
Syrian regime with equipment to track and suppress
the communications of opposition groups that are
organizing the demonstrations.
Despite the
Assad regime's police state, the masses will not
retreat now. The demonstrators know all too well
that the son of Hafez Assad could surpass the Hama
massacres - a 1982 crackdown on a Sunni Muslim
community in Hama that saw an estimated 10,000
killed - if the revolt recedes.
Bashar
played his last card with hollow promises of legal
remedies rather than the principles of free
elections. The Syrian dictator's taqiyya
hasn't fooled the people on the streets; they are
well acquainted with the regime's methods, which
have been on display against Syria's enemies for
decades. Assad can't fool his own people; he can
only frustrate them further.
Dr
Walid Phares is the author of The Coming
Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle
East and a professor of Global Strategies. He
can be contacted at www.walidphares.com.
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