TEL AVIV - "Let Obama come
and take Syria," a resident of the city of Daraa
told the BBC in despair on Tuesday in reference to
United States President Barack Obama. "Let Israel
come and take Syria. Let the Jews come - anything
is better than [Syrian President] Bashar Assad."
Nobody acquainted with Arab rhetorical
traditions would take this quote at face value,
even though it speaks volumes about the post-Arab
uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East, where the
tall story of Israel being the source of all evil
was among the greatest casualties. It also speaks
volumes about the dire situation in Syria and the
American predicament there.
From the point
of view of the White House, it all seems to come
down to leverage. "The view inside the
administration is that Syria
is a particularly complicated
problem because the United States does not have
good relationships with either the government or
the opposition and lacks the leverage to affect
events in the country," writes Josh Rogin in
Foreign Policy.
In Egypt, the United
States had leverage. In Libya, less so, but it
felt that the stakes were low enough to put on a
half-hearted (and so far vain) attempt to gain it
by brute force. In Syria, it is too scared to do
much and embarrassed by its former attempts to
gain leverage.
The Obama administration
tried very hard to obtain leverage in Syria, in
fact. It even sent an ambassador there by
circumventing congress in what was considered by
many a dirty trick. [1] It made an effort to
restart the Israeli-Syrian peace track, which can
also be regarded as a way to get closer to both,
and to gain additional traction with Syria. "For
both Syria and Israel, the 'secret peace talks'
between them have proven to be the best button
they can press to reset their relations with
Washington. The trick has always worked," writes
the website Now Lebanon.
Now, however, the
administration is caught in a bind - between the
conflicting interests of its allies, but also
between ideological forces that govern American
political thought. In a sense, it is a
manifestation of what American think-tank Stratfor
calls "the relation of the American Empire to the
American Republic and the threat the empire poses
to the republic" - [2] it juxtaposes the need for
foreign policy expansion (or at least prevention
of contraction) with the democratic ideal that
teaches that sovereignty rests with the people,
both at home and abroad.
For all his
goodwill towards Assad (or addiction to
non-confrontational leverage), Obama cannot simply
overlook the brutal repressions - at least not
while they are happening and while he is bombing
Libya in order to "save civilians" from another
repressive government.
Beside that, he
would lose any remnant of international
credibility in that arrangement of events, the
American president would face a serious internal
challenge from within his own power base in the
Democratic Party. Tanks rolling over crowds and
snipers shooting protesters are the kinds of
things that the Soviet Union was once famous for,
and that a sincere Democrat could not live with.
Foreign pressures are also pulling the
White House in opposing directions. Saudi Arabia,
which Syrian and Iranian sources have accused of
stirring the unrest, seems intent on taking
advantage of it to weaken Iran and Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Egypt is quietly benefiting as well.
Israel and Turkey, two other close American
allies, cringe at the possibility of Syria falling
into anarchy, justifiably worried that the
violence could spill in some form into their own
territories.
The European Union is pushing
for sanctions, France once again leading with
calls for "strong measures". (Surprise? At least
the French show consistency.) This time, however,
Russia and China took no chances and vetoed
outright on Wednesday a United Nations Security
Council statement condemning the crackdown. "A
real threat to regional security could come from
outside interference," the Russian deputy UN
ambassador, Alexander Pankin, said during the
discussions, quoted by al-Jazeera.
Russia
has a lot at stake in Syria - not least its only
naval port in the Mediterranean, Tartus, is in
Syria and Russia has been expanding and renovating
it for some years now. Syria is a long-standing
Russian (previously Soviet) ally in the Middle
East, and a Russian weapons client. Besides, the
Russians (and the Chinese) are incensed by how the
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was stretched
endlessly to justify operations aimed effectively
at regime change in Libya, and are looking for a
way to get back at the Europeans and the
Americans.
According to some sources,
there is also a growing domestic pressure on
Russian leaders to respond more forcefully to the
Arab uprisings and to assert a Russian brand of
imperialist policies.
So far, the Obama
administration has been threading carefully and
uncertainly, in its own version of foreign policy
consistency. It called for "targeted sanctions"
against the Syrian regime, but stopped short of
pulling out its ambassador - something that is
certain to generate further domestic controversy.
It also pointed a finger at Iran for helping quell
the protests in a move that was probably aimed to
shift some of the blame for the crackdown onto the
Islamic Republic and to drive a wedge between it
and whoever comes on top in Syria.
In
support of this position stands the circumstance
that it is unclear what exactly is going on in
Syria. The situation is murky and fraught with
tensions, giving rise to many conspiracy theories
(some of which are at least partially true, in all
likelihood). Besides the alleged Saudi, Jordanian,
American or Israeli plots (depending on whom you
ask), information is circulating about Iranian
officers commanding Syrian troops in the
crackdowns.
A source in Syria told
Stratfor that "Many are still placing hope in
Habibna [literally "Our Love", a nickname for the
president] to bring about enough reforms to
placate the demonstrators," even though privately
they acknowledged that this would be a tall order
and "major, major concessions" would be needed
"quickly". The source, however, cast doubts on the
protesters as well:
Support for the protests is mixed.
Many of those out in the streets are there
because someone close to them was killed. Think
tribal mentality: I wasn't mad at you before but
you killed my cousin/brother/friend and now I am
mad. People are gathering to defend their honor
... There is almost no organization inside Syria
among the protesters. I asked several people and
they agreed that the Muslim Brotherhood was
almost non-present in the country. All that is
coordinated is information being leaked out
about the responses by the security forces
against the protesters.
This report,
although considered unconfirmed by Stratfor,
resonates loosely with many other reports that are
coming through the tight informational blockade on
the country. It deserves noting that the
opposition mastered just enough unity and
organization on Wednesday to threaten to "destroy"
the regime, and that some more speculative reports
suggest that it has gotten hold of anti-tank
missiles.
Meanwhile, as the crackdown
intensifies (night raids, tank fire, snipers,
gangs, to mention a few types of terror to which
Syrians are subjected), the army has held its
discipline and obedience to the regime remarkably,
but signs of dissent have emerged in the political
ranks.
According to reports, some 200
members of the ruling Ba'ath party resigned on
Wednesday. Tribalism also rears its ugly head:
according to the Stratfor source quoted above,
"Everyone is thinking along their sect even if
they aren't open about it." All this casts doubts
on the army's continued loyalty to the regime
should the unrest continue for much longer,
especially given that the majority of the soldiers
are Sunni Muslims serving a minority Alawite
regime.
Given that such powerful players
as Russia, China, Israel and Turkey are opposed to
an intervention of any form, the wait-and-see
approach makes sense as short-term tactics, even
though it is morally dubious and cannot replace a
longer-term strategy that so far has not emerged
from the White House. This approach, moreover,
while it also carries dangers, has attracted a
number of other followers.
For example,
Egypt could expect to gain from a prolonged crisis
- not least in traction with the Palestinians,
whom it apparently managed to convince to
reconcile on Wednesday. Hamas is shaken by the
instability of its main patron, Syria - some
analysts speculate it might even be looking for
alternative locations for its headquarters.
It is also pulled apart by its solidarity
with its kin Muslim Brotherhood movement in the
country and by its own needs for protection and
sponsorship against Israel. This would
theoretically push it closer to Egypt's orbit (not
least now that the Muslim Brotherhood is a
prominent power in Egypt as well), and would
explain why it would be more accommodating to its
rival Fatah.
Egypt would gain vis-a-vis
Iran as well, but after Hosni Mubarak's departure
that relationship has moved away from a
straight-forward enmity. Last week, Iran appointed
an ambassador to Egypt after a hiatus of more than
30 years. In another report, Stratfor commented:
"Establishing ties with Iran also allows Egypt to
undercut Syria, which thus far is the only Arab
state to have close relations with the Persian
Islamist state."
Finally, Egypt would gain
with respect to Turkey (Syria is key to Turkey's
influence in the Arab world), on the one hand, and
Israel and Jordan (via the Palestinians; among
other things, Egypt has been seeking to
renegotiate a natural gas contract with both
countries).
Lebanon also must be
mentioned. For it, the wait-and-see approach is
the only viable option. Hezbollah, in particular,
faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it is
undoubtedly threatened, because Syria is crucial
for resupplying it with arms from it main patron,
Iran.
On the other hand, however, over the
past months and years the relationship between
Assad and the Lebanese militant organization has
gradually soured. On several occasions, Damascus
reportedly pulled it in so as to prevent it from
taking over the country by force.
The
Syrian regime has always seen Lebanon as "its"
territory and tried to prevent any player in the
country from becoming too powerful. This would
explain also the alleged hesitations that Assad
had when considering using Hezbollah's help to
quell the protests - this would give the militant
organization an unwelcome foothold in Syria.
The Syrian crisis further intensifies a
growing identity dilemma that Hezbollah faces.
According to many sources, the organization is
pulled apart by its Lebanese and its pro-Iranian
Shi'ite identities, not least in the context of a
Sunni-Shi'ite crisis emerging in the entire
region. Moreover, despite its military and
organizational strength, Hezbollah has not fared
very well in its political ambitions. After it
toppled the government of prime minister Saad
Hariri (a close Saudi ally) earlier this year, it
was unable to help the candidate it supported,
Najib Mikati, to form a new one.
"This
crisis," writes journalist Zvi Bar'el in the
Israeli daily Ha'aretz, "has put Hezbollah in an
uncomfortable political position; when there is no
government, there is no one on whom to exert
pressure, there is no one from whom to 'demand a
price', and there is no way to promote its
political interests."
If the Syrian crisis
continues, however, and unless Hezbollah's
military strength is degraded by some sort of
military campaign, exposing its weakened supply
line, the organization stands to gain. It would
most likely get a window of opportunity to reshape
realities inside Lebanon, not so much by brute
force (there are two many trigger-happy
peacekeepers out there with a responsibility to
protect) as by covert actions and threats.
It could also, in a more fanciful
scenario, expand into Syria proper, and why not
even in North Africa (from where consistent
reports of its activity arrive). All this,
however, would require a careful planning process
and a redefinition of the organization's core
identity of a local resistance movement, which
would take some time.
It is important to
watch the behavior of Iran with respect to this
process, as Hezbollah is an important part of
Iranian deterrence vis-a-vis any potential attack,
and it will invariably try to draw the militant
organization closer into its orbit.
As a
whole, the intensifying Syrian unrest is sending
shockwaves throughout the entire Middle East and
beyond. For now, most of the big players have
adopted a wait-and-see policy, but it is a silence
fraught with tension that is untenable beyond the
short run. Meanwhile, there is a considerable risk
of a regional escalation, and that Syria soaks in
blood. Competent global leadership seems nowhere
in sight.
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