Palestinian reconciliation sends
shock waves By Victor Kotsev
TEL AVIV - When Palestinian President
Mahmud Abbas directed harsh accusations against
United States President Barack Obama and his team
in what looked like a carefully prepared public
relations stunt (letting "Newsweek into his
personal space" for five days, as the magazine put
it), the writing was already on the wall.
"It was Obama who suggested a full
settlement freeze," Abbas told Newsweek's Dan
Ephron. "I said OK, I accept. We both went up the
tree. After that, he came down with a ladder and
he removed the ladder and said to me, jump. Three
times he did it." Among other criticism, Abbas
complained about the "impolite" way in which
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was pushed out,
and about the recent American veto on a United
Nation Security
Council resolution draft
which would have condemned Israeli settlement
construction. [1]
There were indications
for over a month that something big was brewing
(see my article Jerusalem
bomb seeds gathering conflict, Asia Times
Online March 24, 2011). Few, however, expected
Wednesday's announcement that a Palestinian
reconciliation agreement had been forged with
Egyptian mediation between rival factions Fatah
and Hamas, and a national unity government was to
be announced soon. Those taken by surprise
reportedly included the Israelis, the Americans,
the Turks, and indeed most of the international
community.
While the announcement of a
vague Palestinian unity deal falls far short of
speculations that the Palestinian Authority would
rush a declaration of independence (the meeting of
the Quartet for the Middle East scheduled for
mid-April was in fact postponed), it is certainly
a big step in the direction of independence.
According Israeli analyst Ron Ben-Yishai:
The Palestinian president has been
granted renewed political legitimacy for his
rule in the Palestinian street, because formally
his term as president ended a while ago. Now,
Abbas is the president in every why, until the
next elections are held. This also enables him
to appear at the United Nations as a legitimate
representative of the Palestinians in Gaza and
the West Bank and demand recognition of a
Palestinian state ... The unity deal take away
an important bargaining chip from Israel, which
has consistently told UN members that Abbas only
represents the West Bank.
To expand on
these observations, the reconciliation move
signals also that Abbas made a very specific
choice of his path to Palestinian independence,
most likely forsaking his relationship with the
United States. While the White House issued a
muted response, supporting Palestinian
reconciliation but expressing concern that Hamas
"is a terrorist organization which targets
civilians", members of the US Congress bluntly
threatened to cut aid to the Palestinian Authority
if the deal is implemented. [2]
Hamas,
meanwhile, appeared set on keeping up with its
hardline image. "Our program does not include
negotiations with Israel or recognizing it,"
commented one of its leaders, Mahmud az-Zahar. "It
will not be possible for the interim national
government to participate or bet on or work on the
peace process with Israel." These comments throw a
shadow on Abbas' assertion that he would continue
to be in charge of the peace talks.
One
compelling interpretation of Abbas' actions, in
line with the Newsweek interviews, is that he
finally lost faith in Washington. Up until now the
possibility remained open that he would choose to
isolate and disregard Hamas as he pushed for a
recognition of Palestinian statehood at the UN in
September; the campaign has already started, and
so far it was conducted without the militant
rulers of the Gaza Strip.
This option had
its allures, not least since the Palestinian
Authority, dominated by Abbas' Fatah party, has a
lot more international legitimacy than does Hamas;
the latter's failure to accept the Quartet
Principles and use of terrorist tactics could
undermine the PA's case that it is offering peace.
However, the American administration's
refusal to abandon Israel at the UN Security
Council, coupled with pressure from Egypt, seems
to have tipped the scales and pushed him into a
more confrontational stance. Abbas apparently
calculated that his legitimacy with the rest of
the international community - specifically at the
General Assembly of the UN - would be improved by
the move, and that he had less to lose than to
gain.
What appears odd, however, is that
he does stand to lose quite a bit - not least in
financial assistance from the United States. It is
hard to imagine that Abbas would embark on such an
adventure without having secured alternative
sources of funding to make up for the loss.
European and Persian Gulf donors top the list of
suspects, and it is important to watch the
behavior of Saudi Arabia, which is rumored to be
quite active throughout the Middle East recently.
The precise parameters of the agreement
are unclear - and possibly are not finalized yet.
Different sources have written about "a government
of experts" that would rule both the West Bank and
Gaza, about integration of security services,
about the release of prisoners, and general
elections within a year. How exactly any of these
stipulations is to be achieved is another matter;
not only is the devil in the details, but these
details have managed to derail repeated attempts
at reconciliation for at least two years now.
The basic outlines of the deal are nothing
new - Egypt had drafted them in 2009. What is new
is that Egypt was able to apply pressure
efficiently on both sides. This is partly a result
of the Arab uprisings - in the face of Hosni
Mubarak, Abbas lost an ally, while Hamas' main
base in Syria is endangered due to the escalating
unrest there. Both were weakened, making them more
amenable to compromise.
In addition, Egypt
applied some carrots - for example, it promised to
open "permanently" its border crossing with Gaza
at the town of Rafah, effectively ending the
blockade on the strip. It is unclear what Abbas
received, but some analysts speculate that he
would retain the greater share of power in the new
government.
For the Palestinian president,
a major risk is that the deal might collapse, as
previous agreements with Hamas have collapsed -
many Palestinians [3] and Israeli observers [4]
are reportedly skeptical that it will last long.
This would leave Abbas once again without full
legitimacy but further isolated from both the
United States and Israel. Hamas will beyond doubt
reap enormous benefits from the opening of the
Rafah crossing; once the border opens, Egypt is
unlikely to close it again due to domestic
pressure.
The militant organization could
also use the reconciliation to strengthen its
position on the West Bank and eventually to try to
take it over, as it did in Gaza. The Palestinian
Authority and Israel have worked together to
prevent such a scenario over the past years,
arresting numerous Hamas activists.
In
light of all the uncertainties surrounding the
deal, it is hard to completely rule out the
possibility that it is an elaborate bluff of some
sort (perhaps in order to extract concessions from
the United States and Israel or to suit the needs
of an external power). Even in this case, however,
it will have a profound effect on the regional
relationships.
Israel's reaction will be
particularly important. Israeli politicians across
the board ruled out the possibility of talks with
Hamas, unless the latter "undergoes a deep and
fundamental change". The greatest fear of the
Jewish state is that Hamas will re-establish
terror bases in the West Bank, from where it could
strike at the Israeli heartland. A secondary
problem is that if a Palestinian unity government
gains international legitimacy, this would come at
Israel's expense. Thus, Israel cannot be expected
to stand by passively for long.
A number
of apocalyptic scenarios circulate. If the
agreement is implemented and Hamas forces are
integrated into the security apparatus in the West
Bank, this would mean the end of security
cooperation with Israel (and also the United
States). While some analysts have spoken about a
third intifada (Palestinian uprising), however,
and the peace process is buried for the near
future, violence is not necessarily imminent.
The initial Israeli response, at least,
was non-violent. On Friday morning, the Israeli
daily Ha'aretz reported that Israel planned to
"launch a diplomatic campaign, with particular
emphasis on the European Union, to thwart
international recognition of the unified
Fatah-Hamas government".
It is important
to note that aside from dangers, the
reconciliation deal also carries some important
benefits for the Benjamin Netanyahu government,
and strengthens its security-related arguments
both domestically and internationally. According
to Israeli journalist Aluf Benn:
The Palestinian reconciliation deal,
if realized, heralds the takeover of the
Palestinian national movement by Hamas,
providing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with
an escape from the rut he has fallen into
because of the deadlock in the peace process.
This is just what Netanyahu needed to unite the
Israeli public behind him and thwart
international pressure to withdraw from the West
Bank. ... From here on, the pressure will mount
on [leader of the opposition Kadima party] Tzipi
Livni to join an Israeli unity government to
stand against the Palestinians and international
community. When Mahmoud Abbas joins Hamas,
Kadima cannot say it has a peace partner and
cannot propose an alternative policy. Why should
Kadima stay in opposition now? ... The
reconciliation has also saved Netanyahu's trip
to Washington to speak at the AIPAC [American
Israel Public Affairs Committee] convention and
in Congress. He no longer has to line the trip
with concessions to the Palestinians. The
pressure is off.
Indeed, Netanyahu's
relationship with Washington might just have taken
a turn for the better. If Obama wants to be
re-elected as president, and he does, he cannot
afford to be seen supporting Hamas against Israel.
The European Union, as the Palestinian news agency
Ma'an observes, is "more open than [the] US on
[the] unity deal", but even there Netanyahu could
gain some traction. Alternatively - though
unlikely - Hamas could mitigate its stance and
renounce violence, which would grant it
international legitimacy, but would also serve the
Jewish state well.
In addition, now that
the Rafah crossing is about to open, Israel will
face a greater danger from smuggled weapons into
the Strip, but will also have another option open
to deal with Hamas. It could seek to disengage
from Gaza fully, cutting off electricity, food and
fuel supplies, and leave Egypt to deal with the
situation. A number of Israeli politicians and
analysts have advocated this course of action, and
it is important to note that it would also allow
the Jewish state greater military freedom there,
since it would no longer have the status of an
occupying power according to international law.
Overall, the Palestinian reconciliation
deal is a major gambit, especially for Abbas. If
implemented, it would have a profound and complex
impact on the basic relationships in the Levant,
and in the Middle East in general. Even before it
has been signed, it is sending shockwaves
throughout the region.
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