Is an
attack on Iran in the works? By
Victor Kotsev
TEL AVIV - In contrast to,
say, a year ago, few analysts now dare to consider
a military strike on Iran in the near future as a
serious possibility. On the contrary, most are
dismissive of the idea, especially in as much as
Israel is concerned. "One of the great bluffs in
the foreign policy community in the previous
decade was that Israel would have no choice but to
attack Iran's nuclear facilities unless Washington
stepped up and took military action first," writes
Trita Parsi in Foreign Policy, offering a lucid
analysis to explain why such an option is not
feasible. [1]
Yet, despite all the good
arguments, the Iranian front is becoming more
complicated every week and month. Israel is by far
not the only foreign threat to the ayatollahs, and
its silence and apparent weaknesses can be
misleading, as the past 44 years (since the 1967
war) have taught. It is seldom safe to call what
may appear
to be an Israeli bluff.
The advice of a prominent military
historian stands out in this respect. Two years
ago, during a period of heightened Israeli
rhetoric against the Islamic Republic, I asked him
privately for his opinion. He responded: "What
seems to be different this time is all the
[Israeli] public arm-waving in advance of any
action. Usually they act first, as they did
recently [in 2007 against an alleged nuclear
reactor] in Syria, and say very little afterward.
This inclines me to believe that there is more
rhetoric than reality here."
In the past
month or so, there has been some important debate
in Israeli political and media circles about a
strike on the Islamic Republic, but as a whole, it
has been remarkably muted compared to the bluster
of, say, a year ago. Back then, Jeffrey Goldberg,
among others, stirred the spirits by predicting
that "there is a better than 50% chance that
Israel will launch a strike by next July". He drew
that conclusion on the basis of his discussions
with Israeli politicians and defense officials.
[2]
In the past few months, ostensibly in
the wake of the Arab Spring, discussion of a war
with Iran has been relegated to the back-burner.
The logic of waiting to see what happens
prevailed, and more pressing problems, such as
Egypt's instability and the Palestinian intention
to declare statehood this year, took the
center-stage in Israel. Splits on the Iranian
issue became increasingly visible inside the
Israeli establishment, and even some politicians
previously seen as hawks, such as the influential
Defense Minister Ehud Barak, softened their
rhetoric.
It is worth noting, however,
that Goldberg's deadline has not yet passed, and
could even be stretched due to unpredictable
circumstances such as the Arab Spring. The most
important red flag since the beginning of the year
came in the form of an emphatic warning issued a
month ago by Mossad's legendary former chief Meir
Dagan, who said that an Israeli attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities was "the stupidest thing I have
ever heard". He later added, "If anyone seriously
considers [a strike] he needs to understand that
he's dragging Israel into a regional war that it
would not know how to get out of. The security
challenge would become unbearable." [3]
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
also alluded to the possibility of striking Iran,
for example in his speech before the US Congress
last month. "When I last stood here, I spoke of
the consequences of Iran developing nuclear
weapons," he said. "Now time is running out. The
hinge of history may soon turn, for the greatest
danger of all could soon be upon us: a militant
Islamic regime armed with nuclear weapons."
Subsequently, Deputy Prime Minister in charge of
strategic affairs, Moshe Ya'alon, said that "the
civilized world" must take action against Iran,
including military action "if necessary".
As mentioned above, heating up the
rhetoric could mean a delay in any Israeli
timeline for an actual strike. At present,
discussion is muted, but it could escalate any
moment. It could also subside, perhaps in
anticipation of a strike. It is important to watch
the warning signs.
Israeli analyst Amir
Oren argues that "between the end of June and [US
Defense Secretary Robert] Gates' retirement, and
the end of September and [chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike] Mullen's retirement,
the danger that Netanyahu and Barak will aim at a
surprise in Iran is especially great, especially
since this would divert attention from the
Palestinian issue." [4] Right now, Oren's
arguments and his conclusion appear speculative,
but it is important to watch the
Palestinian-Israeli sub-plot, among others.
Even speculation about an imminent
prisoner swap deal for the release of captive
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit [5] can be
interpreted to point to a danger of conflagration.
In the past, Israeli analysts have speculated that
the government would try very hard to free Shalit
before any attack on Iran, because a regional war
could mean that a deal is put off indefinitely.
It is important to mention that a couple
of months ago, Israel released detailed maps of
Hezbollah bunkers in South Lebanon , in what was
widely seen as a warning to the militant
organization to stay out of any confrontation with
the Jewish state [6]. Hezbollah is widely
perceived as a fundamental part of Iran's
deterrent against Israel.
Both Dagan's
comments, the release of (perhaps outdated)
Hezbollah maps, and the Shalit negotiations serve
their own complex goals; they do not necessarily
come in genuine anticipation of a strike on Iran.
Taken together, they raise significant questions,
but these can also be interpreted in different
ways.
It could be, for example, that
Israel is preparing for the eventuality of
somebody else's attack on the Islamic Republic and
the repercussions that would almost inevitably
reach it. Dagan could also be warning against
Israeli involvement with a strike rather than the
possibility of unilateral action.
From a
more global perspective, tensions involving Iran
are clearly at a high, even though the known facts
fail to implicate convincingly the Jewish state. A
source close to Russia reports that the Kremlin
has started to pull out significant numbers of
nuclear technicians and other specialists from the
Islamic Republic; if confirmed, this information
could mean that Russia anticipates a military
campaign in the near future.
The same
source speculates that a military operation
against Iran could be seen as a necessity in order
to suppress the Arab Spring, or to further the
interests of the alleged counter-revolution. "A
hit against a big country could do the job," he
says.
Some analysts have applied a similar
logic to the campaign against Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi, but the Libyan debacle has
clearly not done the job. Moreover, the now
increasingly possible ouster of Yemen's President
Ali Abdullah Saleh could rekindle the protests
throughout the Arab world. As a prominent figure
in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood told Reuters,
"The departure of Saleh is a turning point not
just for the Yemeni revolution but also is a huge
push for the current changes in the Arab region
and is the start of the real victory."
Necessarily, this shifts the focus of the
discussion to the fabled maestro of the
counter-revolution, Saudi Arabia. Much has been
made of the Saudi Arabian foreign legion and the
Gulf Cooperation Council's militancy. In an
extensive analysis for Asia Times Online, Brian
Downing discusses the recruitment of Sunni former
Pakistani and Iraqi soldiers for the Saudi private
army. [7]
Saudi Arabia's bitter feud with
Iran is long-known, as is the "cut off the head of
the snake" comment that Saudi Arabian King
Abdullah made to American officials a few years
ago. [8] It is hard to imagine that Saudi Arabia
is militarily prepared for an imminent attack on
Iran, and a full-blown private war involving
Pakistan seems much to speculative to be discussed
in detail, but in this part of the world, it is
good to expect the unexpected.
Moreover,
it is equally hard to imagine that, should
hostilities break out, the United States would be
able to stay out of the fray for long. The reality
is that its dependence on Saudi oil is simply too
high.
It does not help that the Iranian
nuclear crisis is deepening. Despite assurances by
Iran's nuclear envoy Ali Ashgar Soltanieh that
building a nuclear weapon would be a "strategic
mistake", the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) issued warnings last month that one of its
seals in the "feed and withdrawal area" of the
Natanz enrichment plant was broken. This would
mean, according to experts, that Iran is trying to
conceal how much enriched uranium it has on stock.
Last month, the IAEA also accused Iran of hacking
into its inspectors' computers and cell phones
during visits to the facilities. [9]
Moreover, the Arab Spring has clearly
failed the expectations of some observers,
including Israeli experts, that it could spread to
Iran and topple the regime. The internal rifts in
the Islamic Republic have only deepened recently,
but this may actually make the nuclear stand-off
more entrenched. According to a recent report by
the Institute for Science and International
Security:
Much has been made in the media
about the power struggle between Iranian Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - with the backing
of the Iranian parliament (Majlis) - and
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. The struggle may
make less likely the prospect that Iran will be
able (if it is indeed willing at all) to
negotiate a diplomatic deal over the nuclear
crisis in the near future, though it may still
be willing to meet with the P5+1 [Five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Councils
plus Germany]. Iran has thus far been unwilling
to suspend its enrichment program as called for
by the United Nations Security Council or answer
questions about its past work on nuclear weapons
... [S]ince the Supreme Leader has shown a
willingness to publicly and forcefully assert
his authority over Ahmadinejad, and appears
unwilling to negotiate an end to the nuclear
issue, any deal is unlikely. This could make any
meetings with the P5+1 simply an empty exercise
on Iran's end. [10]
In brief, while
there are many good reasons why a war with Iran is
unlikely at the moment, dark clouds are quietly
gathering, and in the Middle East, appearances
could be misleading. Both the Iranian and the
anti-Iranian camps are arming and preparing
themselves militarily, and in military science as
in theater, Anton Chekhov's maximum often applies
that a gun in the first act is bound to go off at
some point later.
Rhetoric, in fact, is
often inversely proportional to the probability of
action. Summer is the time to watch, both because
it has historically been the season of war in the
Middle East, and because according to most
experts, this summer Iran will likely reach the
nuclear point of no-return. So will, in all
likelihood, the Arab revolutions.
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