Economy alone can't explain
success By Ramzy Baroud
Many commentators base the success of
Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) in
the June 12 elections largely on its ability to
guide the country through a decade of remarkable
growth.
Economic indicators are often seen
as the obvious logic behind economic stability.
However, they are not enough on their own to reach
such sweeping conclusions.
In an article
entitled, "Look toward Turkey's economy to
understand Erdogan's re-election", Ibrahim Ozturk
opined: "From 2002 to 2007, Turkey experienced its
longest period of uninterrupted economic growth,
which averaged 6-7% year on
year, while annual inflation
plummeted. Moreover, the economy proved resilient
following the global financial crisis, with growth
recovering rapidly."
According to Ozturk's
perceptive analysis, the AKP's success in picking
up the pieces of a shattered economy (as a result
of the 2001 severe economic "crisis"), and the
ever-popular Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
"appear to have secured democratic political
control of Turkey's military and bureaucracy". The
powerful Turkish military had repeatedly
interfered in the country's politics, leading
three military coups which all but destroyed
Turkish democracy.
The very promising
Turkish political experience, now branded the
"Turkish model", has overcome many challenges. It
took a new generation of Turkish leaders to
position their country as a politically stable
regional power with a rising economy (gross
domestic product (GDP) registered an increase of
9% in 2010).
Did sound, self-assured
policies engender a strong economy, or was
economic growth responsible for the political
stability (by keeping the military at bay, thus
further solidifying Turkey's democratic
experience)?
Libya is an interesting
example to consider while reflecting on this
question. The North African country, which is
currently undergoing an armed revolt and
Western-led war, had been scoring high in terms of
sheer numbers. Thanks to petroleum-generated
revenues, and a small population, Libya has the
highest per capita GDP in Africa. Its economic
growth has been relatively stunning from 2000
onwards. In 2010, GDP grew by over 10%.
For many Libyans however, social justice,
distribution of wealth, political freedom and
other issues proved of greater relevance than
gratifying GDP charts.
In Egypt too,
despite the greater poverty experienced by the
much larger population (compared to Libya), the
youth of the January 25 revolution came from
varied economic backgrounds. For many of them,
freedom seemed to top mere economic sustenance.
Turkey's case is not dissimilar to these.
In fact, a discussion of Turkey's success cannot
be reduced to one decade of economic growth and
political stability.
More, "modern Turkey"
cannot be reduced to the palpable successes of the
AKP. It goes back to earlier generations, starting
with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the
Republic of Turkey. A larger-than-life figure in
the eyes of several generations of Turks, Ataturk
was able to win Turkey's independence - no easy
feat, considering the challenges of the time.
However, neither he nor his style of
politics resolved the question of Turkey's
cultural and political identity as a majority
Muslim country that defined modernity based almost
exclusively on Western values. This question
actually lingered in the country for decades.
One could argue that situating Turkey in
suitable socioeconomic, cultural and political
contexts was one of the greatest challenges facing
modern Turkish politicians.
For decades,
Turkey was torn between its historical ties to
Muslim and Arab countries on the one hand, and the
impulsive drive towards Westernization on the
other. The latter seemed much more influential in
forming the new Turkish identity in its
individual, collective, and thus foreign policy
manifestation and outlook.
Even during the
push and pull, Turkey grew in import as a
political and economic player. It also grew into a
nation with a decisive sense of sovereignty, a
growing sense of pride and a daring capacity for
asserting itself as a regional power.
In
the 1970s, when "political Islam" was on the rise
throughout the region, Turkey was experiencing its
own rethink. Various politicians and groups began
grappling with the idea of taking political Islam
to a whole new level.
In fact, it was the
late Dr Necmettin Erbakan, prime minister of
Turkey between 1996 and 1997, who began
challenging the conventional notion of Turkey as a
second-class North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) member desperate to identify with
everything Western.
In the late 1980s,
Erbakan's Rafah Party (the Welfare Party) took
Turkey by storm. The party was hardly apologetic
about its Islamic roots and attitude. Its rise to
power as a result of the 1995 general elections
raised alarm, as the securely "pro-Western" Turkey
was deviating from the very the rigid script that
wrote off the country's regional role as that of a
"lackey of NATO", (a phrase used by Salama A
Salama in an al-Ahram Weekly article last year).
The days of Erbakan might be long gone,
but the man's legacy never departed Turkish
national consciousness. He began the process of
repositioning Turkey - politically, as well as
economically - with the creation of the Developing
Eight (D-8), which united the most politically
significant Arab and Muslim countries. When
Erbakan was forced to step down in a
"post-modernist" military coup, it was understood
as the end of short-lived political experiment.
But the 2002 election win of the (AKP)
rekindled Erbakan's efforts through a young and
savvy new political leadership. This has just been
awarded yet a third mandate to continue its
program of economic growth, political and
constitutional reforms.
Now Turkey seems
to be offering more than stability at home. It is
also serving as a regional model to its neighbors,
an important contribution in the age of Arab
revolutions and potential political
transformations.
It is essential that the
Turkish experience is not reduced to only charts
and numbers delineating economic growth. Some very
wealthy countries are politically restless. The
success of the Turkish model supersedes the
economy to sensible political governance,
democracy, the revitalization of civil society and
its many institutions.
Good economic
indicators can be promising, but without
responsible leadership to guide growth and
distribute wealth, political stability is never
guaranteed.
Ramzy Baroud
(www.ramzybaroud.net) is an
internationally-syndicated columnist and the
editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book
is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's
Untold Story (Pluto Press, London), available
on Amazon.com.
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