Syrian unrest dries Lebanese
tinderbox By Chris Zambelis
As the turmoil affecting Syria persists
with no apparent end in sight, fears about the
potential impact of the crisis on its neighbors
remain at the fore.
Among all the
neighbors, the complexity that defines Syria's
relationship with Lebanon and the characteristics
of Lebanese society and politics - linked
inextricably in so many respects to Syria - leave
Lebanon especially vulnerable to a spillover of
violence and instability from Syria, which
continues to enjoy tremendous influence in Lebanon
even after withdrawing its troops from the country
in 2005.
Since the state launched its
crackdown against opposition protestors demanding
the end of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's
reign, thousands of refugees fleeing the unrest at home
have fled into northern
Lebanon as well as Turkey and Jordan. While some
Syrian refugees who made the journey have returned
home, approximately 2300 remain in Lebanon. At
least 1,700 people have been killed in Syria since
March, according to human-rights groups.
With a sizeable Syrian community in
Lebanon - a popular destination for Syrian guest
workers - the nation has experienced public
displays of solidarity organized by Syrians both
in support of and against Damascus. Rallies
organized by pro- and anti-Syrian Lebanese
factions in Beirut and elsewhere have also raised
the political temperature across Lebanon.
The most alarming repercussions of the
crisis in Syria for Lebanon to date occurred on
June 17 in Lebanon's northern city of Tripoli.
Anti-Syrian demonstrations organized by Sunnis
there degenerated into armed clashes between Sunni
militias and gunmen from Tripoli's minority
Alawite community.
It remains unclear
which side initiated the violence that left six
men dead and several others wounded. Members of
both factions accuse each other of shooting first.
The clashes occurred during a protest staged by an
estimated 600 Sunnis in support of Syria's
opposition forces.
Tripoli's predominantly
Sunni community is aligned with Lebanon's March 14
Alliance, a US and Saudi Arabian-backed bloc
featuring Saad al-Hariri's Future Movement. The
March 14 Alliance opposes Syria and its Lebanese
allies, namely the ruling March 8 Alliance that
includes Hezbollah and its benefactor, Iran.
In contrast, Tripoli's Alawite minority is
allied with the March 8 Alliance and looks to
Syria for support. Alawites, a tiny minority in
Lebanon who number between 50,000 to 60,000
members and are largely clustered in Tripoli and
its environs, are a Muslim sect viewed as
heretical by many Muslims. [1] Yet in spite of
their minority status in Syria - Alawites make up
about 12% of Syria's population - Alawites tend to
dominate Syrian political life; President Assad,
among other leading figures in Syria, is an
Alawite.
Tripoli has witnessed a number of
sectarian clashes and other bursts of political
violence in recent years, including incidents
involving Sunnis and Alawites. Coming during a
period of turmoil in Syria, the latest episode of
violence in Tripoli exemplifies how events in
Syria can impact Lebanon, inciting old rivalries
and instigating new tensions.
Flashpoint Tripoli Tripoli, the
second largest city in Lebanon, is a microcosm of
the treacherous field of Lebanese politics. Due to
its volatile sectarian character and its role as a
stage for an array of fickle allegiances and
feuding rivalries between Lebanese and foreign
actors, Tripoli has often served as a dangerous
flashpoint, the June 2011 clashes being a case in
point.
Sectarian tensions between Sunnis
and Alawites erupted into days of violence in 2008
in the form of acts of arson, armed gun battles,
sniper fire, mortar and rocket propelled grenade
(RPG) attacks, all taking place against the
backdrop of the heightened antagonism between
partisans of the March 14 Alliance and the March 8
umbrella group in Tripoli.
The ensuing
strife left eight dead and scores more wounded
before a Beirut-brokered ceasefire enforced by
Lebanese security forces was put into effect.
Sectarian tensions between Tripoli's Sunni
majority and its Alawite minority are particularly
evident along neighborhood fault lines drawn up
during the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War, namely
the Sunni-dominated Bab Tabbaneh quarter and the
adjacently located Jabal Mohsen district, which is
home to a mostly Alawite community.
Tripoli is also ground zero for Lebanon's
radical Salafist movement, a trend that has gained
a following among the city's Sunnis. In 2007,
Tripoli saw clashes between Salafist militants
associated with groups such as Fatah al-Islam
(Victory of Islam - FAI) and Jund al-Sham
(Soldiers of the Levant - JaS), rival militias,
and Lebanese security forces.
Salafist
radicals were also implicated in a series of
terrorist attacks in Tripoli and neighboring areas
as well as bank robberies. Lebanese security
forces fought the Salafists in the Nahr al-Bared
Palestinian refugee camp located just outside of
the city, eventually laying siege to the camp
following months of conflict.
The
noticeable rise of Salafist influence in Tripoli
in recent years, a pattern that includes the
appearance of foreign-born militants in the area
with experience fighting in Iraq and other
theaters, has added a dangerous ingredient to the
city's already combustible mix. The most extreme
Salafists view Alawites, as well as the Shi'a and
other sects, as heretics and apostates. Salafist
militiamen in Bab Tabbaneh are implicated in the
most recent clashes against their Alawite rivals.
Tripoli's very public politics Visitors to Tripoli are quickly struck by the
display of posters and banners fastened to the
city's walls, utility poles, and storefronts, all
broadcasting the political allegiances and
ideological affinities of its denizens. As an
essentially Sunni city that is among the most
religiously conservative by Lebanese standards,
posters and banners lauding prominent Sunni
figures, including the late Lebanese Prime
Minister Rifik al-Hariri and Saad al-Hariri, are
readily apparent.
It is also common to
encounter images of the late Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi Ba'athist officials
associated with the Sunni insurgency. The flag of
Lebanon crossed with the flag of Saudi Arabia - a
key supporter of the March 14 Alliance and the
Lebanese Salafist movement - is also evident
throughout the city.
The Islamic flag
known as al-Raya, featuring a black background and
the Arabic inscription of the shahada (the
Islamic creed) in white, is popular among the
city's Salafists. In contrast, those who make
their way through Jabal Mohsen and other Alawite
areas will encounter posters and banners
showcasing the allegiances of the local Alawites.
Syrian flags and images of President Assad
are displayed proudly alongside the familiar
yellow and green Hezbollah flag and images of
Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah. The
logo of the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), an
Alawite party that supports the March 8 Alliance
and Syria, is also displayed throughout the area.
[2]
The undertones of sectarianism in
Tripoli were expressed through a claim by ADP
leader Rifaat Eid, who accused Saad Hariri's
Future Movement of involvement in the recent
violence: "Tripoli has become like Kandahar. They
[the Future Movement] distribute weapons to incite
Sunni-Alawite clashes ... We accuse Hariri of
having personally led the fighting in Tripoli, and
we believe that he funds the Salafist terrorist
groups that attacked us."
A July 29
demonstration in Tripoli saw Sunnis set ablaze the
flags of Syria, Hezbollah and Israel. The
protestors also chanted slogans in support of the
opposition in Syria and called for Beirut to rein
in Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon.
The Syrian angle According to
the logic expressed by the ADP leader, the March
14 Alliance, along with Saudi Arabia, view the
Salafists in Tripoli and other Sunni militants in
Lebanon as a useful check against the influence of
Hezbollah, the powerful Shi'ite militia and
political party, and its patrons, Syria and Iran.
In this context, the current turmoil in
Syria provides the March 14 Alliance with an
opportunity to undermine Syria's influence in
Lebanon and, by extension, Hezbollah and the
ruling March 8 Alliance that engineered the ouster
of Saad Hariri from the prime minister's role in
January 2011.
For its part, Damascus may
also sense an opportunity in Tripoli to bolster
its embattled domestic position and help stave off
international pressure stemming from its crackdown
against the opposition forces. Syria's capacity to
destabilize Lebanon is well known, as are the
regional and international fears of such a
scenario.
Given the present circumstances,
Damascus may view a crisis in Lebanon culminating
in sectarian conflict as a possible way to
redirect attention away from its own predicament
and strengthen its case that the fall of the
Ba'athist regime will be felt far and beyond
Syria's borders, namely in the form of a renewed
civil war in Lebanon.
Rami Makhlouf, a
first cousin of President Assad and powerful
business mogul who, in the eyes of the opposition,
personifies the corruption of the regime, seemed
to play on these concerns regarding the future of
the region if the regime in Damascus were to fall:
"They should know when we suffer, we will not
suffer alone."
The Hezbollah factor The ouster of Egyptian president Hosni
Mubarak, a bitter enemy of Hezbollah and ally of
Israel, reinforced Hezbollah's position. Hezbollah
was quick to throw its weight behind the
opposition forces who struggled against Mubarak in
pursuit of political freedom and democracy,
portraying their efforts through a narrative of
resistance akin to its own mission.
The
upsurge of opposition against the Ba'athist regime
in Syria, which is led by a sizeable segment of
Syrian society who are echoing demands analogous
to those voiced by the Egyptians previously
endorsed by Hezbollah, has presented the group
with a dangerous dilemma.
After initially
opting to ignore the crackdown by Damascus, the
escalating breadth of the demonstrations coupled
with the concomitant resort to repression by the
Syrian security forces has prompted Hezbollah to
address the unrest threatening its ally.
Emphasizing Syria's role in regional
affairs, particularly in supporting the resistance
against Israel, Nasrallah affirmed Hezbollah's
support for Damascus: "We, in Lebanon and
especially in Hezbollah, are highly grateful to
Syria, its leadership, its President Hafiz
al-Assad and President Bashar al-Assad ... We
believe - I personally believe and this is not
built on analysis but rather on direct discussions
and declarations - that Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad believes and is serious and determined
about reform ... I know that he is ready to take
very great reform steps but with serenity, care
and responsibility."
Responding to
accusations by Syrian protesters and their
Lebanese supporters that the movement was aiding
Damascus in its crackdown, Hezbollah retorted:
"Repeating these lies is an attempt to justify and
persuade Western intervention in the internal
Syrian situation ... it [Hezbollah] completely
rejects such interventions, and supports reform
and stability, which would secure the development
and welfare of the Syrian people."
Regional geopolitics dictates that
Hezbollah stand by Damascus. In contrast,
Hezbollah's rivals in Lebanon, namely the March 14
Alliance and its Salafist allies in Tripoli, as
well as foreign actors including the United
States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, see Hezbollah's
dilemma in regards to Syria as an opportunity to
weaken its position and that of its allies -
Syria, Iran, and Hamas (the so-called "Resistance
Axis") - in Lebanon and the broader Middle East.
Conclusion As the
protests and violent counter-protests continue
across Syria, the results for Lebanon will be
dire. The recent sectarian clashes in Tripoli
illustrate that sectarianism in Lebanon remains a
tinderbox. Moreover, competing factions in Lebanon
and beyond appear keen to enter the fray through
local and transnational proxy forces eager to
resort to violence and other forms of hostility to
further their respective agendas at each other's
expense.
Notes 1. Some
estimates place the number of Alawites in Lebanon
as high as 150,000. Demographic data in Lebanon is
often politicized to bolster and/or diminish the
perceived influence of certain ethnic and
sectarian communities. 2. Observations gleaned
from author's visit to Tripoli, Lebanon, December
2010.
Chris Zambelis is an
author and researcher with Helios Global, Inc, a
risk management group based in the Washington, DC
area. The opinions expressed here are the author's
alone and do not necessarily reflect the position
of Helios Global, Inc.
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