As the street-level opposition to the Syrian regime shows no signs of abating,
there is growing pressure on strategic planners in Tehran to prepare for all
scenarios, including one that doesn't involve current Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad as the lynchpin of Syrian politics.
The perceived gravity of the problem, reinforced by region-wide changes, should
force the entire Iranian foreign policymaking establishment to re-think and
re-imagine the deepest dimensions of the country's regional diplomacy,
including the very idea of the so-called "resistance axis".
There are deep fears in Tehran that the downfall or emasculation of Assad and
the Alawite-led Ba'athist regime in Damascus will at
the very least complicate the intricate set of relations that Iran maintains
with Lebanese and Palestinian non-state actors, notably Hezbollah and Hamas,
and effectively set the Islamic Republic on the back foot in the great
strategic rivalry with the United States over influence and hegemony in the
Middle East.
While this anxiety is understandable and partly reflects the genuine balance of
forces and interests on the ground, it is ultimately myopic and the product of
unimaginative strategic thinking. The partial and (in the case of Libya) total
collapse of several Arab regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, is a
harbinger for a profound re-alignment of the strategic map of the region, and
specifically one where diplomacy is set to become more complex and entail
greater involvement by indigenous powers.
In this scenario, the so-called "resistance axis" will have to be re-configured
to respond to more complex diplomatic and strategic challenges, for while it
may not be rendered totally redundant, its rhetorical power may not be so
easily invoked to reduce all regional dynamics to a competition between Iran
and the United States.
Defining the resistance axis
In the journalistic and increasingly academic discourse, the resistance axis in
the Middle East is generally defined as an anti-Israeli and to some extent
anti-American political, military and diplomatic alliance between key states
and highly capable non-state political-military organizations.
The non-state actors, chiefly in the form of Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, assume the frontline burden of the nexus by directly confronting
Israel and heightening the Jewish state's threat perception; thus undermining
its ability to respond to more subtle and long-term challenges.
Syria is often described as the state with the most proximate relationship with
these groups and the country which forms their primary line of defense. Syria
in turn is described as being sustained and supported by the Islamic Republic
of Iran, whose material, political and spiritual support is all-important to
the preservation of the resistance axis.
From this point of view, both the software and hardware resides in Tehran, and
it is the Islamic Republic's political, economic and ideological might that
enables and empowers this nexus of resistance.
Most analysts describe the ultimate functionality of this resistance axis as a
proxy war between Iran and Israel and a suitable vehicle for both states to
avoid direct confrontation. More astute observers see it as a great game
between Iran and the United States, to determine the political and ideological
direction of the region.
What is remarkable is that Iranian, Arab and Western analysts are united in
their description of the form, nature and functionality of the resistance axis.
The most immediate consequence of this unity of perception and analysis is that
it skews understanding of the wider and deeper diplomatic nuances and dynamics
of the region by ignoring several existing and emerging factors that shape
regional diplomacy, including demographics, shifting public opinion and
democratization.
The notion of a resistance axis - and by extension a counter-axis - reduces the
region's diverse political and ideological forces to neatly defined pro-Iranian
and anti-American camps.
While there is more than just a kernel of truth to this description - and there
is no denying the fierce rivalry between Iran and the United States - the
region's political future is determined by a wider range of factors and state
actors like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and even the tiny Persian Gulf states cannot
be viewed solely as enablers of American foreign policy.
The Arab Spring, and the expected resulting shift in political and diplomatic
orientation, will bring the notion of a resistance axis, and the analytical
frameworks that sustain it, under greater scrutiny. In particular, the gradual
emergence of Egypt as a political, diplomatic and possibly even ideological
power in its own right will significantly complicate regional diplomacy and
might conceivably lead to the re-definition of the relationship between Iran
and America.
Strategic planning requires a clear definition of goals and means. In this
case, the most important question is why does the Islamic Republic of Iran
support non-state actors in the region? Officially, Iran supports Lebanese
Hezbollah and to a lesser extent Palestinian Hamas for primarily ideological
motives and as part of a broader ethical foreign policy which prioritizes
values over interests.
Unofficially, Tehran-based foreign policy experts produce a more sophisticated
and comprehensive defense of this policy, and one that takes sufficient stock
of the balance of power in the region, and the extent to which popular
non-state actors can tilt that balance in Iran's favor.
But the gradual emergence of more independent-minded regional powers, and by
extension the relative decline of American influence, call into question the
wisdom of extending considerable support to non-state actors indefinitely.
Rethinking regional diplomacy
As the noose gradually tightens around Assad's neck, there is increasing
indication that influential voices in Tehran are beginning to think about
contingency planning. But the essential problem remains Iran's inability to
imagine a Syria without the existing power structures and supporting ideology.
A recent interview with the well-informed and well-travelled Iranian lawmaker
Sirous Borna Baldaji, which appeared in the influential Iranian Diplomacy
website, is indicative of the depth of confusion that prevails in Tehran.
Entitled "If Assad goes the Salafis will seize power", the interview is based
on Baldaji's extensive recent field research in Syria.
The latter's insinuation that the cutting edge - if not the controlling brain -
of the Syrian demonstrators are hardline Salafi extremists, is not only
indicative of poor research but lack of imagination in terms of viewing a
post-Assad Syria.
Baldaji's argument appears to be that once these so-called Salafis seize
control of the reins of power in Damascus they will proceed to limit ties with
Iran and cut off the vital support line to Hezbollah. It is an argument that is
not only devoid of a deep understanding of Syria's strategic profile, but one
that takes insufficient stock of broader regional dynamics.
In view of these regional dynamics, namely the empowerment of potentially
pro-Iranian Islamists in Cairo and the emergence of a volatile and
inexperienced regime in Tripoli, Iran should look to cultivating deeper ties
with these states and by extension de-emphasizing the relationship with
non-state actors.
The resistance axis needs to be rethought and reconfigured to adapt to emerging
political and strategic developments and ultimately tied to a more lucid
definition of Iranian national interests.
If Iran's primary national interest in the region is the expulsion of foreign
military forces from the Persian Gulf area, then the emergence of more
democratic regimes, whose chief sensitivity is their own public opinion, is
supportive of this long-term strategic goal.
From this point of view, the downfall of Assad, however unlikely it may appear
at this stage, is not necessarily the disaster imagined by many in Tehran's
policymaking circles.
Mahan Abedin is an analyst of Middle East politics.
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