FBI account of 'terror plot' suggests sting
By Gareth Porter
WASHINGTON - While the Barack Obama administration vows to hold the Iranian
government "accountable" for the alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador in Washington, the legal document describing evidence in the case
provides multiple indications that it was mainly the result of a Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) sting operation.
Although the document, called an amended criminal complaint, implicates
Iranian-American Mansour Arabsiar and his cousin Ali Gholam Shakuri, an officer
in the Iranian Qods force, in a plan to assassinate Saudi Arabian ambassador
Adel al-Jubeir, it also suggests that the idea "originated with and was
strongly pushed
by an undercover DEA [Department of Drug Enforcement] informant, at the
direction of the FBI".
On May 24, when Arabsiar first met with the DEA informant he thought was part
of a Mexican drug cartel, it was not to hire a hit squad to kill the
ambassador. Rather, there is reason to believe that the main purpose was to
arrange a deal to sell large amounts of opium from Afghanistan.
In the complaint, the closest to a semblance of evidence that Arabsiar sought
help during that first meeting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador is the
allegation, attributed to the DEA informant, that Arabsiar said he was
"interested in, among other things, attacking an embassy of Saudi Arabia".
Among the "other things" was almost certainly a deal on heroin controlled by
officers in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Three Bloomberg
reporters, citing a "federal law enforcement official", wrote that Arabsiar
told the DEA informant he represented Iranians who "controlled drug smuggling
and could provide tons of opium".
Because of opium entering Iran from Afghanistan, Iranian authorities hold 85%
of the world's opium seizures, according to Iran's Fars News Agency. Iranian
security personnel, including those in the IRGC and its Qods force, then have
the opportunity to sell the opium to traffickers in the Middle East, Europe and
now Mexico.
Mexican drug cartels have begun connecting with Middle Eastern drug
traffickers, in many cases stationing operatives in Middle East locations to
facilitate heroin production and sales, according to a report last January in
Border Beat, an online news service run by University of Arizona journalism
students.
But the FBI account of the contacts between Arabsiar and the DEA informant does
not reference any discussions of drugs.
The criminal complaint refers to an unspecified number of meetings between
Arabsiar and the DEA informant in late June and the first two weeks of July.
What transpired in those meetings remains the central mystery surrounding the
case.
The official account of the investigation cites the testimony of the informant
(referred to in the document as "CS-1") in stating, "Over the course of a
series of meetings, Arabsiar explained to CS-1 that his associates in Iran had
discussed a number of violent missions for CS-1 and CIS-1's purported criminal
associates to perform."
The account claims that the mission discussed included murdering the
ambassador. But no specific statement proposing or agreeing to the act is
attributed to Arabsiar. "Prior to the July 14 meeting, CS-1 had reported that
he and Arabsiar had discussed the possibility of attacks on a number of other
targets," the account states.
The targets are described as involving "foreign government facilities
associated with Saudi Arabia and with another country located either in or
outside the United States", without mentioning any discussion of the Saudi
ambassador.
Both that language and the absence of any statement attributed to Arabsiar
imply that the Iranian-American said nothing about assassinating the Saudi
ambassador except in response to suggestions by the informant, who was already
part of an FBI undercover operation.
The DEA informant, as the FBI account acknowledges in a footnote, had
previously been charged with a narcotics offence by a state in the US and had
been cooperating in narcotics investigations - apparently posing as a drug
cartel operative - in return for dropping the charges. The document is notably
silent on whether the conversation was recorded.
A former FBI official familiar with procedures in such cases, who spoke to
Inter Press Service (IPS) anonymously, said the FBI would normally have
recorded all such conversations touching on the possibility of terrorism.
The absence of quotes from any of those meetings suggests that they do not
support the case being made by the FBI and the Obama administration.
The account is quite explicit, on the other hand, that the July 14 and July 17
meetings were recorded at FBI direction. Statements quoted from those
transcripts show the DEA informant trying to induce Arabsiar to indicate
agreement to assassinating the Saudi ambassador.
The informant is quoted as saying he would need "at least four guys" and would
"take the one point five for the Saudi Arabia". He declared that he "go ahead
and work on the Saudi Arabia, get all the information we can".
At one point the informant says, "You just want the, the main guy." And at the
end of the meeting, he declares, "[W]e're gonna start doing the guy."
The fact that not a single quote from Arabsiar shows that he agreed to
assassinating the ambassador, much less proposed it, suggests that he was
either non-committal or linking the issue to something else, such as the
prospect of a major drug deal with the cartel.
Arabsiar's quotes from a September 2 phone conversation referring to the cartel
as "having the number for the safe" and "once you open the door that's it"
could refer to a drug transaction that had been discussed, while the FBI
account suggest those quotes refer to the assassination and "other projects"
with the Iranian group.
At the July 17 meeting, the DEA informant presented a plan to blow up a
restaurant to kill the ambassador, with the possible deaths of 100-150 people,
eliciting a lack of concern on the part of Arabsiar about such deaths.
During a visit to Iran in August, Arabsiar wired two equal payments totaling
$100,000 to a bank account in New York. But he was still under the impression
that he was about to cash in on a deal with the cartel.
The Washington Post reported on Thursday that Arabsiar had told an
Iranian-American friend from Corpus Christie, Texas, "I'm going to make good
money."
There is also circumstantial evidence that Arabsiar may have even been brought
into the sting operation to help further implicate his cousin Gholam Shakuri in
the terrorist plot.
Arabsiar met with his cousin Shakuri in late September and told him that the
cartel was demanding that he, Arabsiar, go to Mexico personally to guarantee
payment. That demand from the DEA was an obvious device by the FBI to get
Shakuri and his associates in Tehran to demonstrate their commitment to the
assassination.
The FBI account indicates that Shakuri told Arabsiar that he was responsible
for himself if he went to Mexico. That statement would have been a warning sign
for Arabsiar, if he still believed he was dealing with one of the most
murderous drug cartels in Mexico, that he would be risking his own life for a
group that was no longer taking responsibility for him.
Yet Arabsiar flew to Mexico as if unconcerned about that risk.
After his arrest on September 29, Arabsiar waived the right to a lawyer and
proceeded to provide a complete confession. A few days later, he placed a phone
call to Shakuri which was recorded "at the direction of federal enforcement
agents", according to the FBI.
Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing
in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book,
Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was
published in 2006.
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