Obama totes his Iranian smoking gun
By Victor Kotsev
Regardless of what we believe about the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the
Saudi ambassador in Washington, it has attracted a lot of attention. The
specifics are less important than the highly charged context in which the news
broke - with tensions running so high in so many parts of the Middle East, Iran
is involved practically everywhere, locked in an intense power struggle with
its American-backed arch-enemies, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
In the immediate future, the charges can serve to further isolate the Islamic
Republic in the international community. The United States has been trying to
do just that (supported by Saudi Arabia, which officially notified the United
Nations of the alleged conspiracy), and despite initial skepticism, [1] the
debate seems
to be picking up.
Different observers have compared it to the hostage crisis at the United States
Embassy in Tehran in 1979, the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in
1992, and numerous other attacks worldwide, many on diplomatic targets, that
were attributed to Iran, the Lebanese Shi'ite militant group Hezbollah (closely
allied with Iran), or both.
Israeli analyst Yossi Melman points out, "Saudi Arabia's ambassador Adel
al-Jubeir is considered a bitter rival of Iran and his actions have been
loathed by the ayatollah regime for years ... al-Jubeir maintains close ties
with the Saudi king, and according to WikiLeaks documents he was one of the
people who succeeded in toughening the king's stance toward Iran." [2]
Investigative journalist Gareth Porter suggests that the American secret
services may have practically entrapped the main suspect, Mansour Arabsiar, and
influenced him heavily to pursue the terrorist track with his Iranian handlers
(See FBI account of
'terror plot' suggests sting, Asia Times Online, October 14, 2011). "On
May 24, when Arabsiar first met with the [Drug Enforcement Administration] DEA
informant he thought was part of a Mexican drug cartel, it was not to hire a
hit squad to kill the ambassador," writes Porter. "Rather, there is reason to
believe that the main purpose was to arrange a deal to sell large amounts of
opium from Afghanistan." [3]
Others, such as former high-ranking American diplomat Martin Indyk, find the
Iranian plot convincing. "Seldom is the Iranian hand in terrorism revealed as
clearly as it was Tuesday in the careful details provided by the US Justice
Department," writes Indyk. He goes even further, linking the plot to the
prisoner swap deal between Israel and Hamas last week, and arguing that the
latter was a blow to Tehran.
"The best way for Iran to spread its influence into the Arab heartland is to
stoke the flames of conflict with Israel. Any prisoner swap deal between Hamas
and Israel would take fuel off the fire." [4]
Given how clumsily the Washington plot was reportedly executed, it is hard to
imagine that it was specifically coordinated with another complex process that
lasted for months (the Shalit deal). Still, there is reason to believe that the
Iranian regime is on the defensive, and Indyk's reasoning that "[w]hen the
Iranian regime finds itself in a corner, it typically lashes out" may not be
too far off.
Not that the United States, Israel or Saudi Arabia are doing very well in the
Arab Spring revolutions - the events in Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen attest to that
- but Iran has suffered several particularly bad setbacks recently.
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Syria is burning in a slow civil war;
the government of Bashar al-Assad, a close Iranian ally, still appears to be
strong, barring a foreign intervention [5], but the situation in the country is
so bad that, according to US ambassador there Robert Ford, people cannot even
afford to buy eggs. [6]
Syria is a crucial part of Iran's defensive network in the Middle East, and its
loss would be a major blow to both Iran and Hezbollah. As a result of the civil
war there, Iran has already lost a lot of influence with Hamas.
If Francesco Sisci's analysis is correct, a great fear of the Iranians may well
be that, should relations between Israel and the Palestinians warm, Arabs and
Israelis could cooperate against the Islamic Republic (and other powers that
seek to dominate the Islamic world, such as Turkey). Sisci writes:
...
Arabs and Israelis could have common ground, and Palestinians could be in the
golden position of being able to mediate between Arabs and Israelis - and
between the Arab-Israeli front and Turkish or Persian ambitions. This could
change forever the shape of the Middle East, and potentially bring about a more
integrated market where Muslims, Christians and Jews could co-exist and thrive
outside of an oil-driven economy. [7]
While any major alliance
certainly does not seem imminent, since last year a flurry of reports has
asserted that Saudi Arabia would cooperate with Israel in an attack on Iran -
for example, by opening up its air space. [8]
Down the road, if proven, and especially if bolstered by additional credible
charges (for example of Iranian involvement in the killing of US troops in
Iraq), the plot against the Saudi ambassador could even serve as a casus belli
for the United States against the Islamic Republic. It could also be a
justification for President Barack Obama to tacitly approve (sometimes called
giving the "yellow light") on an Israeli operation against Iranian nuclear
facilities.
Whether Israel is capable of confronting Iran on its own - or ultimately
willing to do so - is another question, one that nobody seems to be able to
answer. In any case, Israeli officials are again drumming up the heat on the
Iranian nuclear program.
Leaked estimates claim that the window of opportunity for a strike on the
Islamic Republic this winter will close in two months, because "[i]n normal
winter weather conditions, it would be very difficult to carry out such a
complex assault"; reports in the Israeli press convey how worried American
officials are about a unilateral Israeli operation.
One even has to wonder if the continuous dire admonitions of the former chief
of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, of the Benjamin Netanyahu government to abstain from
attacking Iran aren't to an extent a show intended to dramatize the threat. [9]
According to most estimates, Iran is at least several years away from producing
a nuclear weapon - if it is even going down that route, something it denies.
Nevertheless, tensions in the region are running extremely high - Iraq also
deserves a mention - and the rhetoric of the American administration has grown
very loud. Reportedly, Obama claimed that no options were "off the table in
terms of how we operate with Iran" following the plot incident. [10]
It is possible that elements within the Iranian regime are interested in a
confrontation; the Islamic Republic responded to the accusations with threats
of its own. "Any inappropriate measure against Iran, whether political or
security-related, will be strongly confronted by the Iranian nation," Iran's
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said, quoted by Reuters. [11]
None of this bodes very well for regional peace in the Middle East; if it turns
out that neither side is sufficiently motivated to ward of a confrontation, war
might come around just by inertia.
As a final note, a recurring element in many of the subplots mentioned above is
Hezbollah. While nothing so far points to its direct involvement in the Saudi
ambassador plot, it is known to have significant networks in South America, to
cooperate closely in terrorist activities with the Iranian Qods force, and to
be keenly interested in everything involving Israel and Syria (the latter being
its resupply life line from Iran), including the Shalit deal. Its presence is
rumored in many places touched by the Arab Spring, and its role in the region
is likely gravely underestimated by most analysts
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