Plot may be part of Iran power struggle
By Mahan Abedin
The announcement by the United States Department of Justice on October 11 that
two men had been charged in connection with an Iranian Qods force plot to
assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, has
touched off a flurry of speculative reporting and analysis.
While the contents of the criminal complaint issued by the US government have
raised many eyebrows, the story is already firmly entrenched in the narratives
of opposing policy camps in the US.
To the neo-conservatives and the broader hawkish community in the US, the
charges are clear proof of a new round of aggressive behavior by Iran, which
they argue must be met with a military
response by America. Meanwhile, more dovish elements have cast serious doubt on
the veracity of the story, arguing that the charges are either fabricated or
manipulated to justify a more belligerent approach toward Iran.
There has been a dearth of balanced analysis of what may have motivated some
elements in Iran to undertake this operation, assuming that there is more than
a grain of truth to the criminal complaint released by the US Justice
Department.
This article sets out a plausible scenario, but one that is purely speculative
and unsupported by strong information. If as the US government charges, the
Qods force is implicated in this plot, then the operation may have been a
symptom of the profound discord between the ruling clerical establishment and
the independent-minded government of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.
Moreover, in so far as the
strategic dimensions of the operation are
concerned, the plot may have been more defensive
in nature, essentially designed to fail, with a
view to sending unmistakable signals foremost to
Washington.
A strange
plot
There is more than enough in the US Justice Department's criminal complaint to
cast profound doubt on the veracity of the charges. Widespread skepticism has
been reinforced by the energetic and hawkish response to the charges by US
leaders and senior officials, including President Barack Obama and Vice
President Joe Biden, who have called for repercussions, namely to further
punish - by way of additional sanctions in the first instance - an already
isolated and embattled Iran.
The hawkish posture of US leaders is in stark contrast to their far more
relaxed attitude to arguably more serious charges concerning direct Pakistani
involvement in attacks against US targets in Afghanistan.
Only last month, the former US joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Mike Mullen,
alleged in his final congressional testimony that the Haqqani network was a
"veritable arm" of Pakistani intelligence, and that the same nexus had
conducted terrorist operations against the US Embassy in Kabul, as well as
organizing at least one recent attack on US forces that wounded 77 GIs.
It appears that US leaders had prepared for the announcement of the charges
well in advance and that they are more than determined to exploit them for
maximum gain in their intricate strategic rivalry with Iran in the Middle East,
as well as broader efforts to further isolate Iran internationally on account
of the latter's controversial nuclear program.
But beyond the posturing of US leaders, the charges themselves, as well as the
choice and location of the target, raise serious doubts about the narrative
which the American administration wants the world to believe.
The most troubling aspect is the Mexican dimension. The Iranian intelligence
community may lack the inter-cultural competence, connections and the
diplomatic muscle to operate effectively in the West, but they have enough
sense to avoid contact with serious organized criminals.
All the components of the Iranian intelligence community maintain solid links
to the social science departments of the country's major universities, as well
as to the country's think-tanks and research institutes. This is in addition to
the intelligence services' in-house open source research departments.
The study of Western societies is a key priority for the Iranian intelligence
services and they regularly commission work - either directly or through third
parties - to outside research centers.
All the major components of the Iranian intelligence services would know that
serious organized criminals, such as the Mexican drug cartels, who are involved
in a billion-dollar business, are highly unlikely to sign up to a politically
motivated crime for a mere US$1.5 million, which to the cartels is tantamount
to loose change.
The Iranian intelligence services are aware that Mexican drug cartels would
ordinarily stay well away from such a risky operation for fear of provoking the
wrath of a vengeful US government.
The inability of the Iranian intelligence services to operate effectively in
the West is not due to lack of academic or empirical understanding of Western
societies but to the dearth of competent people who can assist these services
in carrying out successful operations in the West.
The most ideal community for recruitment is the large and prosperous Iranian
diaspora in the West, but members of this community - even elements who are
sympathetic to the Islamic Republic - stay well away from the Iranian secret
services for fear of inviting disproportionate retribution by Western security
and judicial organizations.
On that point, the profile of the field agent, the 56-year-old Mansour
Arbabsiar, contrary to lazy analysis by a wide range of pundits, actually lends
credence to the Justice Department's complaint, for it is precisely these
desperate and frustrated elements who are willing to accept the appalling risks
of cooperating with Iranian intelligence on West European or American soil.
Another questionable feature of the Mexican cartels connection is the manner in
which the field agent (Arbabsiar) had come to trust the purported representative
of the cartels, who was in actual fact a Drugs Enforcement Administration
informant.
Again, the Iranian intelligence services would be well aware that since the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, internal US security agencies, in
particular the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), have escalated the use
of informants and agents to lay traps for unsuspecting would-be terrorists, who
for the most part are dreamy young men susceptible to manipulation by FBI
agents trained and encouraged to plant grandiose plots in their minds in order
to develop the case.
There are more questionable features of the Mexican connection, for example the
wiring of two sets of funds (on each occasion just short of $50,000) to the
field agent so that he could pay the cartel. While it can be argued that the
Qods force was trying to bolster the credibility of their field agent with the
cartel (by showing that he had access to money), it is worth noting that every
intelligence service in the world knows that wiring $10,000 or more at any one
time is a bad idea as that immediately attracts the attention of US anti-money
laundering monitors.
Beyond the nature and activities of the field agent, the location and choice of
the target raises serious questions. The Iranian intelligence services have
never before conducted a known violent operation on US soil. The risks are
calculated to be far too high and in any case Iran has been careful to avoid
giving any pretext to the US to initiate a direct confrontation.
The choice of the target, namely Saudi ambassador Jubeir, is also baffling.
While leaked diplomatic cables and other sources portray Jubeir as holding
strident anti-Iranian views, there are countless other Saudi officials with
similar views, many of whom are more influential and effective than Jubeir.
If Iran wanted to eliminate an important Saudi official by way of sending a
strong signal to Riyadh, there are plenty of targets in the Middle East theater
of operations, an area which Iranian intelligence dominates. An operation in
the Middle East would also be far less politically risky and less likely to
provoke US retribution.
Another dimension worth considering is that the operation may have been an
elaborate false flag operation, designed to harden US attitudes toward Iran and
hasten confrontation. v The semi-official Mehr news agency reported on Tuesday
that the man accused by the US Justice Department of being a senior Qods force
officer, and Arbabsiar's handler in the operation, Gholam Shakuri, is in fact a
member of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq organization (MeK), a militant cult that has
been trying to overthrow the Iranian government for decades.
Despite the fact that Mehr attributes parts of its allegations to Interpol, the
story is not supported by strong sources. There may indeed be an MeK member by
the name of Gholam Shakuri, but that doesn't necessarily negate the existence
of his namesake inside the Qods force.
Moreover, it is worth noting that certain elements in Iran reflexively
implicate the MeK in anti-Iranian agitation on the international stage
Clerics vs Ahmadinejad
But what if the content of the US Justice Department's criminal complaint is
essentially true? What could have possessed the Qods force, and their clerical
overlords, to order such a risky and apparently reckless operation?
The background political tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are well known.
From an Iranian perspective, the Saudis have breached the red lines on at least
three fronts; first by trying to stifle or manage the revolution in Yemen by
supporting incumbent Ali Abdullah Saleh; second by intervening militarily in
Bahrain to crush the Shi'ite-led revolution there; third, and most importantly,
by actively assisting the Syrian opposition with a view to facilitating the
downfall of Bashar al-Assad, a key Iranian ally in the region.
But if the Qods force was behind the plot, then the primary target was the US,
and the key motivation was likely a desire to impair Iranian-US relations even
further. That desire may have been generated by fears in the ruling clerical
establishment that the Ahmadinejad government is laying the grounds for serious
dialogue between the two countries.
As Asia Times Online argued in
Iran and US edge toward confrontation (October 14), the Iranian
intelligence services are ultimately controlled by the ruling clerical
establishment, and not the serving government.
The independent-minded Ahmadinejad government has tried to exert more control
over the intelligence services, in particular the Ministry of Intelligence and
Security (MOIS), which is the only fully professional intelligence outfit in
Iran and is subject to more government control than the intelligence services
connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
In early April, Ahmadinejad came into direct political confrontation with the
clerical establishment by sacking the intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi,
but was quickly ordered by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to re-instate
the minister.
Aggressive posturing by the Iranian intelligence services usually play out
against the backdrop of discord between the clerical establishment and the
executive branch of government. A notable example is the so-called "chain
murders" of several intellectuals and writers in the late 1990s which were
attributed to MOIS agents.
At the time the clerical establishment was locked into a bitter power struggle
with the reformist government of president Mohammad Khatami. In some ways the
clerical establishment's power struggle with the Ahmadinejad government is
deeper than the one with the Khatami government, not least because Ahmadinejad
is widely assumed to reside in the hardline camp of the Islamic Republic.
The foiled operation in Washington may have been ordered by the clerical
establishment to embarrass Ahmadinejad further, and more specifically to
sabotage any chance of dialogue between the US and Iran, and set back eventual
rapprochement even further down the distant horizon.
But if that is really the case, then the operation was almost certainly
designed to fail. The calculations behind the plot were likely very intricate
and accurate and there would have been acute realization at every level of the
planning process that a successful operation of this nature would have been
considered a very serious escalation by the US and its allies and may have
invited a military response.
Despite its deep dislike of the US, the ruling clerical establishment has no
desire to engage in any type of direct military confrontation with the world's
sole superpower. In any case, if the Qods force really wanted to pull
off a successful terrorist operation in Washington and eliminate the Saudi
ambassador in the process, they could have probably done it.
Through the unscrupulous exploitation of Arbabsiar, and by setting him up to
fail, the Qods force and its clerical overlords, may have wanted to send
unmistakable signals to Washington.
One signal may have related to a story originally published by Asia Times
Online, namely that Iran is now considering retaliation for the unrelenting
murder of its best scientists by Israel (see
Israel wages war on Iranian scientists August 27).
More broadly, the Qods force and its masters may be sending a general warning
about the dangers of escalation, pointing out to Washington that unlike the
US's other adversaries over the past two decades (chiefly Iraq under Saddam
Hussein) Iran will not adopt a reactive posture in the face of US belligerence.
In other words, Iran can take the initiative and throw US decision-making into
disarray.
In the light of immediate US reaction, it could be argued that Iran's rulers
have miscalculated. On the other hand, it is worth remembering that in the past
three decades the ruling clerics have proven to be masters of strategic
maneuvering and have time and again outplayed and outsmarted their opponents.
What appears to be reckless and foolish in the first instance, in actual fact
masks multiple layers of deception, designed to either confuse, embolden or
demoralize, with a view to turning strategic threats into strategic
opportunities.
Mahan Abedin is an analyst of Middle East politics.
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