Moving towards a military coup in Syria?
By Brian M Downing
The uprising in Syria turned much more violent in the past week and the Bashar
al-Assad government is tottering. Civilians have obtained weapons and begun an
armed resistance. Syrian soldiers are deserting and forming a Free Syrian Army.
While the Arab League on Sunday voted to impose punitive economic and political
sanctions on Damascus, fighting is breaking out nationwide between the Sunni
majority and Shi'ite minority.
A faltering regime and rising violence often leads to a military coup. They
were commonplaces in much of the developing world back in the 1950s and 1960s
and a convoluted and incomplete one began in Egypt last fall. Syria is ripe for
one now. The Arab
League's overwhelming approval of sanctions - the first in its 66-year history
- increases pressure on Assad.
Deterioration
The Assad government faces violence from several quarters. Civilians in the
opposition are arming themselves with weapons brought in from Lebanese markets
and western Iraq by the Muslim Brotherhood and smuggling networks which have
attached themselves to insurrectionary movements. Syrian security forces can no
longer fire into crowds without fear of facing return fire from rooftops and
windows. Nor can they move from town to town without fear of attack.
In recent weeks several thousand soldiers - a precise or even rough figure is
not yet clear - have deserted the Syrian army and formed the Free Syrian Army
(FSA). Better trained and equipped than the civilian fighting forces, the FSA
are mounting attacks on government buildings in Damascus and pulling off deadly
ambushes in between restive cities. The heretofore solid support of the armed
forces can no longer be relied upon by the government.
Sectarian violence is breaking out in a few cities. The Alawite (Shi'ite)
population, from which much of the Assad political, military, and business
elite come, is subject to attacks and intimidations. These events will recall
the early days of sectarian fighting after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq
in 2003, which of course devolved into murderous sectarian warfare.
There are still hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Sunnis in Syria who fled the
warfare and the dismal prospects for their co-religionists in the now
Shi'ite-dominated country. Many will eagerly side with Syrian Sunnis against
the Shi'ites in and out of the regime. Their ties to the Sunni resistance in
Baghdad and Anwar make for a good supply of arms and trained fighters,
facilitated by Saudi intelligence.
Approximately 10% of Syria's 23 million people are Kurds. They have long
endured oppression and will likely seek to break away from Northeastern Syria
and become part of the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurds took
advantage of Saddam's ouster to break away from Iraq, forming a separate flag,
constitution, and army. They are for all practical purposes an independent
state and will welcome incorporating a portion of Syria. Northeastern Syria is
the location of much of Syria's oil resources and would make oil-rich Kurdistan
all the more wealthy, powerful, and of interest to the West.
The military perspective
Armies are not always the steadfast servants of the government they claim to
be. They at times act in their own institutional interests, usually commingling
with nebulous ideas of honor and virtue and duty. Most of the Syrian army
leadership is dedicated to, and part of, the Assad regime. Loyal officers are
rewarded with promotions and upon retirement may expect sinecures in the
regime's business sector (as for example do their colleagues in the Egyptian
and Pakistani armies).
Other officers may see their interests shifting away from Damascus as the
regime is failing to serve the nation's interest, particularly as the new
sanctions impact on business. It can no longer maintain law and order; indeed,
it is the chief cause of unrest. It can no longer guarantee the integrity of
national boundaries, and if the oil-producing region were to break away, the
nation's economy would weaken badly. Further, Assad's rule is leading to the
gradual disintegration of the institution the military cares most for - itself.
For the Syrian officer corps, national considerations as well as institutional
ones make a military coup desirable. Two scenarios are plausible: an elite
group and a more broadly based one.
An elite coup would entail parts of the Assad regime's military, political, and
business notables deposing Assad and perhaps a few high-ranking figures, with
or without their permission. Assad would be sent off into exile or confined to
some sort of protective custody, although a more definitive removal is possible
even by pragmatic loyalists.
Assad is not a strong-willed person or leader. An opthamologist by training, he
was not slated to succeed his father to the presidency until his elder brother
was killed in an automobile accident in 1994. He was then rapidly groomed for
succession with perfunctory positions in the state and army and an attendant
publicity campaign.
He worried parts of the regime after he ascended to the presidency in 2000 when
he began to enact economic reforms, replacing party apparatchiks with more
technically trained experts. Democratic reform in the undetermined future was
alluded to. Many older parts of the regime saw him as a threat well before the
uprisings last spring and may be ready to oust him.
Such a coup would be presented to the public as a substantive change and as a
victory for the public opposition. The new leaders would then appeal for calm
and support for the new government. It would appeal to the Alawite minority and
others who have benefited from Assad rule over the decades, and perhaps also to
others who see the opposition as leading to civil war, sectarian strife, and
foreign invasion.
Iran and Hezbollah would welcome such a coup as the only way to retain a
sympathetic government in Damascus. Russia and China would be supportive but
skeptical as to its viability. The Syrian opposition is unlikely to find such a
government as welcome, viable, or even new. In fact, such a move would be a
sign of regime weakness. It would only strengthen opposition and accelerate
military desertion.
A more plausible coup scenario, if only somewhat, is one based on a broader
portion of the officer corps, including high-ranking but sub-elite colonels and
generals. These officers see their advancements to the highest ranks blocked
off by the regime's preference for Ba'ath loyalty and Alawite piety. In this
respect they could appeal to some in the opposition who also feel stifled by
the regime and also to the Sunni majority.
A coup ousting the Alawite, pro-Iran government would be so advantageous to
Saudi Arabia that the prospect is likely being diligently pursued by Saudi
intelligence in conjunction with Salafist networks inside Syria (and Lebanon)
that enjoy Saudi funding. Detaching Syria from longstanding ties to Iran would
be a serious blow to Tehran, partially compensating Saudi Arabia for Tehran's
gain from the rise of the Shi'ites in post-Saddam Iraq. It would also join with
a Sunni region in western Iraq in opposing Iran and Shi'ite Iraq.
A coup of either sort will be difficult to plan let alone successfully execute.
Many dictatorships (Gamal Abdel Nasser, Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein and
Hafez al-Assad) came to power through military coups and constructed safeguards
to prevent another ambitious colonel from seizing power the same blunt way.
Officers are screened for loyalty and placed under routine surveillance. In
times of stress, the regime increases its watch over the officer corps.
Even a coup led by officers genuinely committed to reform and representative
government would be regarded with suspicion. The Syrian public, like
counterparts around the Arab world, is deeply suspicious of generals purporting
to be on their side. They seem to be willing to toss aside a dictator and
general or two in order to maintain their high positions if not expand them.
Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author of The
Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and
Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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