US steps into a virtual Iranian world
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The administration of United States President Barack Obama has launched a
virtual US Embassy in Iran that, as expected, has been immediately filtered.
Tehran sees it as yet another subversive initiative by Uncle Sam to sow
divisions between the people and the Islamic regime that overthrew a
US-friendly dictator and then took American diplomats as hostage for 444 days
in 1979-1980, prompting the US to sever diplomatic ties with Iran.
Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ramin Mehmanparast has called the
Washington initiative an historical admission of its mistake in cutting off
diplomatic relations with Iran. The Americans, on the other hand, scoff at the
notion that they could have maintained relations with their embassy taken over
and their diplomats in custody. For sure, there is no lack of blame on both
sides as to the cause and effect of the long diplomatic alienation between the
US and Iran.
The US's Virtual Embassy Tehran website aims to bring information and dialogue
to Iranian citizens. [1] US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said of the
launch of the initiative:
This is a platform for us to communicate with
each other - openly and without fear - about the US, about our policies, our
culture, and the American people. You can also find information here about
opportunities to study in the United States or to obtain a visa to come visit
us.
For some ordinary Iranians, the ability to file for visas
through the virtual embassy, instead of undertaking the chore of traveling
abroad, at least for the initial application, represents a plus, while others
see this as a US trap to lure Iranians with the promise of rewards by
mobilizing them against their government. The lines between consular and
political activities are cut pretty short here.
Nearly a decade ago, both sides briefly entertained the idea of a US consular
office on one of Iran's Persian Gulf islands, such as Kish or Qeshm, and for a
while the Iranian government under president Mohammad Khatami seemed amenable
to the idea.
But it was quickly forgotten in the quicksand of mutual hostility that has
consistently dwarfed any and all initiatives to restore diplomatic relations
between Tehran and Washington.
This author recalls that one reason for Iran's objection at the time was the
fear that the US would use its facility in the Persian Gulf to spy on Iran's
naval activities. Another concern was the possibility of unwanted long lines
reflecting a big desire on the part of many Iranians to visit the US.
Thus, the new virtual embassy has ignited fresh interest in the old question of
how to overcome the multiple odds preventing real embassies of Iran and the US
opening in one another's capital city. After all, a good many nations with
diplomatic relations do not see eye to eye on a lot of issues, such as the US
and China; in other words, not all outstanding issues between Iran and US need
to be resolved before the light switches are turned back on at their embassies
in Tehran and Washington.
However, from Tehran's point of view, a diplomatic foothold by the US in Iran
would enlarge the US's eye and ears, not a welcome possibility at a time of
considerable tensions over Tehran's nuclear program, among other issues.
Iran recently announced the arrest of a dozen US Central Intelligence Agency
operatives in Iran and, hypothetically, had there been an operating US Embassy
in Iran, we would likely have seen anti-American protests at the embassy gates
and the possibility of things getting out of control, as happened at the
British Embassy a couple of weeks ago.
This means simply that some basic prerequisites, such as a US pledge of
non-interference in Iran's internal affairs and the commitment not to engage in
espionage inside Iran, are needed. This is unlikely to happen since the US is
actually taking advantage of no diplomatic relations for a free hand in covert
and other similar activities, whereas with a full-staff embassy, the US would
be forced to respect some boundaries.
Yet, as with the example of the sophisticated US drone that has fallen into
Tehran's hands after flying deep inside Iranian territory, US hostility toward
the Islamic Republic has implicated Washington in newer steps that violate
Iran's sovereignty. As a result, Iran has officially complained to the United
Nations - to no avail as the UN has in many ways been transformed into an
instrument of the US's global politics.
In other words, the US is definitely on a war path with Iran, all the more
reason why Washington is presently content with only a virtual embassy instead
of an actual one that could act as a buffer handicapping the US's war moves.
The virtual one is not a prelude to an actual one, but rather a substitute as
far as the US is concerned, one that fulfills less a consular and more a soft
power function, as a tool of influence.
Simultaneously, this initiative with some questionable motives contains a
number of unintended consequences, one of which is as stated above to reignite
a new interest in the thorny of question of how to take the steps necessary on
the normalization track that have been derailed by over 30 years of mutual
animosity.
From Tehran's standpoint, the US is entirely to blame, with its militaristic
and interventionist policies in Iran's vicinity - in Iraq, Afghanistan,
base-building in Central Asia, beefing up its military presence in the Persian
Gulf, turning it into an American lake, etc.
Yet, despite the harsh rhetoric, Tehran's politics of geopolitical realism have
translated into a tactical alliance with the US, albeit indirectly, in both
Kabul and Baghdad, which are controlled by regimes backed by both Washington
and Tehran.
The problem with any tactical alliance is, however, its subordination to larger
strategic considerations, as a result of which there is and for quite some time
has been a shade of incoherence in Tehran's and Washington's policies that
mirror each other with respect to certain regional issues and yet are tagged to
other policies that show divergent interests.
The important question is which side has the upper hand and whether or not both
sides can consciously chart a different course of action vis-a-vis the other
side that can thereby translate into a greater pool of shared interests?
This question swirls around the issue of the US's virtual embassy that could
potentially be upgraded via a chat room on US-Iran relations. For sure, we need
much more dialogue on this subject, including on how to build confidence and
tackle existing issues between Iran and US, either globally or issue by issue.
In the final analysis, the virtual embassy, no matter any possible sinister
intentions, is a tiny diplomatic step forward, and in 2012 it will be put to
test: will it help the US make peace - or war - with Iran?
Note
1. The virtual embassy is produced in both Persian and English. The address for
Persian is persian.iran.usembassy.gov; and for English it is
Iran.usembassy.gov.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
