Several clocks are simultaneously
ticking in the Middle East. We can still dare to
hope for a last-minute miracle - and we can be
certain that there are plenty of well-intentioned
people working tirelessly behind the scenes to
produce one.
Truly, the gloomiest moments
are often also the moments of greatest
opportunity, for war drums drown out the noise of secret
negotiations, and when the
hawks are occupied, the doves get just a moment of
opportunity to fly free.
Yet it is not
easy to be hopeful. Policy analysis often uses
historical paradigms to evaluate the course of
international crises, and while indeed there are
examples of the above pattern in history (the end
of apartheid in South Africa comes to mind, as
well as that of numerous low-intensity conflicts
from the past few decades), there are also some
very worrying counter-examples.
Fiery
rhetoric carries inertia of its own, and massive
arms build-ups - such as we have witnessed in the
Middle East in the past years, months and weeks -
cannot be sustained for very long. This produces a
sense of urgency. If a breakthrough in
negotiations fails to materialize, the likelihood
of an explosion of violence increases. Even a
fairly minor incident could trigger a major
confrontation; a prominent example of this is the
start of World War I in 1914.
Nor is there
a shortage of potential triggers for a large-scale
confrontation in the Middle East. For example,
following the sanctions against institutions
dealing with the Iranian central bank, which
United States President Barack Obama signed into
law at the very end of 2011, the black-market
exchange rate in the Islamic Republic reportedly
shot up to 16,000 rials to a US dollar, or a level
about 30% higher than the official exchange rate
of 11,170 rials to a dollar.
This bodes
poorly for the Iranian economy and regime; in
fact, scholars of peace and conflict sometimes use
the gap between the official and unofficial
exchange rates in a country as an indicator of its
stability. The ayatollahs are finding themselves
with little room to maneuver, and this makes war
an attractive option for them. In some ways, an
American or Israeli attack would be a political
blessing to them, as it would rally domestic
support.
A pre-emptive strike on Iran's
nuclear facilities may well happen, although
likely not in the next few months, and only if the
crisis is not resolved in some other way first.
Israel's threats have grown to a crescendo over
the past month or so, but an Israeli operation
does not appear imminent. More recently, the US
has taken an increasingly tougher stance against
Iran, and analysts have started to ask themselves
if Obama may not order an attack in the run-up to
the November presidential election. [1]
Whether Iran would attack first is a more
complicated question. Up to a point, the pressure
also makes negotiations more attractive to the
regime. A major question in this respect is
whether the new American sanctions cross that
line, as experts (including some US administration
officials) have warned. Importantly, the harshest
penalties on the bill, aimed at cutting down
Iran's profits from oil exports, will not come
into effect immediately, and Obama will be able to
waive them if he judges it appropriate.
Iran has threatened to cut off oil
shipments through the Strait of Hormuz in response
to the sanctions. "If they impose sanctions on
Iran's oil exports, then even one drop of oil
cannot flow from the Strait of Hormuz," the first
vice president of the Islamic Republic,
Mohammed-Reza Rahimi, said a few days ago. [2] The
threat came at the beginning of a 10-day Iranian
naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, which
culminated in the firing of what were described as
"long-range missiles". [3]
This is most
likely bluff and bluster, because such an action
would not only provoke an American military
response, but would also rally world support for
it. Moreover, Iran itself would be hurt. As a RAND
Corporation researcher told the Jerusalem Post
recently, "Iran is as reliant, if not more
reliant, on the Strait of Hormuz than any other
country." [4]
However, Iran could opt for
a more limited response that in turn could
escalate into all-out war. This is particularly
likely if the harsher sanctions are activated or
internal stability starts to erode significantly
(not least because it would divert world attention
away from the brutal crackdown with which the
regime would try to quell the unrest). There are
plenty of areas where Iran could turn up the heat
on the Americans and their allies with either
plausible deniability or under a plausible pretext
(Iraq, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip come to mind).
Besides, the Islamic Republic might quite
literally be drawn into a war with the United
States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- for example, in Syria, where the civil war
between the regime of Iran's close ally President
Bashar al-Assad and the (reportedly
foreign-funded) opposition, is escalating. A team
of Arab League monitors entered the country days
ago, only to confirm atrocities had taken place
and to generate calls for tougher action. [5]
True, a Libya-style military intervention
there is unlikely, at least while Russia and China
continue to block successfully any resolution of
the United Nations Security Council that could
authorize such intervention or impose very harsh
sanctions on the Assad regime.
However, as
world condemnation of the brutal crackdown of the
regime grows, so does the pressure on its
international supporters. It is not impossible to
imagine a scenario where United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 377 (aka "Uniting for Peace")
is invoked to override the Russian and Chinese
vetoes.
If, moreover, the situation in
Syria deteriorates to the point where central
authority collapses in key areas, an intervention
might be launched under the pretext of securing
Syria's stash of missiles and chemical warheads.
Finally, a more limited war, a military
operation by the Israeli army in Gaza, seems to be
in the works. In the last months, the Egyptian
Sinai Peninsula which borders the Strip has become
a hotbed of arms trafficking and lawlessness, and
this has destabilized the southern Israeli
communities, on the one hand, and allowed the
rapid armament of the Gaza militants, on the
other.
Israel has confirmed preparations
for a campaign in the Strip, which will reportedly
be very violent. "Under a plan overseen by Chief
of General Staff Lieutenant General Benny Gantz,
the next Gaza operation would be shorter than the
one launched in late 2008, but would employ far
greater firepower," the Israeli daily Ha'aretz
reported days ago. [6]
Such an attack
would aim to crush Hamas and the Islamic Jihad,
the most powerful militant groups in the Strip,
before the Egyptian elections are complete in a
couple of months and a new government dominated by
the Muslim Brotherhood is inaugurated.
Arguably, this would close the window of
opportunity for an Israeli operation, since Hamas
is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
new Egyptian government would be extremely hostile
to any Israeli intervention in Gaza. In turn, this
would embolden the militants to unleash attacks on
Israel with less fear of retaliation.
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