Page 2 of
2 Red
lines in the Strait of
Hormuz By George
Friedman
An air campaign against Iran's
conventional forces would play to American
military strengths, but it has two problems.
First, it would be an extended campaign, one
lasting months. Iran's capabilities are large and
dispersed, and as seen in Desert Storm and Kosovo
against weaker opponents, such operations take a
long time and are not guaranteed to be effective.
Second, the Iranians have counters. One is
the Strait of Hormuz. The second is the use of its
special operations forces and allies in and out of
the region to conduct terrorist attacks. An
extended air campaign coupled with terrorist
attacks could increase distrust of American power
rather than increase it among US allies, to say
nothing of the question of whether Washington
could sustain
political support in a
coalition or within the United States itself.
The covert option The United
States and Israel both have covert options as
well. They have networks of influence in the
region and highly capable covert forces, which
they have said publicly that they would use to
limit Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons
without resorting to overt force.
We
assume, though we lack evidence, that the
assassination of the Iranian chemist associated
with the country's nuclear program last week was
either a US or Israeli operation or some
combination of the two. Not only did it eliminate
a scientist, it also bred insecurity and morale
problems among those working on the program. It
also signaled the region that the United States
and Israel have options inside Iran.
The
US desire to support an Iranian anti-government
movement generally has failed. Tehran showed in
2009 that it could suppress demonstrations, and it
was obvious that the demonstrators did not have
the widespread support needed to overcome such
repression.
Though the United States has
sought to support internal dissidents in Iran
since 1979, it has not succeeded in producing a
meaningful threat to the clerical regime.
Therefore, covert operations are being aimed
directly at the nuclear program with the hope that
successes there might ripple through other, more
immediately significant sectors.
As we
have long argued, the Iranians already have a
"nuclear option", namely, the prospect of
blockading the Strait of Hormuz, through which
roughly 35% of seaborne crude and 20% of the
world's traded oil passes daily. Doing so would
hurt them, too. But failing to deter an air or
covert campaign, they might choose to close off
the strait. Temporarily disrupting the flow of
oil, even intermittently, could rapidly create a
global economic crisis given the fragility of the
world economy.
The United States does not
want to see that. Washington will be extremely
cautious in its actions unless it can act with a
high degree of assurance that it can prevent such
a disruption, something difficult to guarantee.
It also will restrain Israel, which might
have the ability to strike at a few nuclear
facilities but lacks the force to completely
eliminate the program much less target Iran's
conventional capability and manage the
consequences of that strike in the Strait of
Hormuz. Only the United States could do all that,
and given the possible consequences, it will be
loathe to attempt it.
The United States
continues, therefore, with sanctions and covert
actions while Iran continues building its covert
power in Iraq and in the region.
Each will
try to convince the region that its power will be
supreme in a year. The region is skeptical of
both, but will have to live with one of the two,
or with an ongoing test of wills - an unnerving
prospect.
Each side is seeking to magnify
its power for psychological effect without
crossing a red line that prompts the other to take
extreme measures. Iran signals its willingness to
attempt to close Hormuz and its development of
nuclear weapons, but it doesn't cross the line to
actually closing the strait or detonating a
nuclear device.
The United States
pressures Iran and moves forces around, but it
doesn't cross the red line of commencing military
actions. Thus, each avoids triggering unacceptable
actions by the other.
The problem for the
United States is that the status quo ultimately
works against it. If Assad survives and if the
situation in Iraq proceeds as it has been
proceeding, then Iran is creating a reality that
will define the region.
The United States
does not have a broad and effective coalition, and
certainly not one that would rally in the event of
war. It has only Israel, and Israel is as uneasy
with direct military action as the United States
is. It does not want to see a failed attack and it
does not want to see more instability in the Arab
world.
For all its rhetoric, Israel has a
weak hand to play. The only virtue of the American
hand is that it is stronger - but only relatively
speaking.
For the United States,
preventing the expansion of an Iranian sphere of
influence is a primary concern. Iraq is going to
be a difficult arena to stop Iran's expansion.
Syria therefore is key at present. Assad appears
weak, and his replacement by a Sunni government
would limit - but not destroy - any Iranian sphere
of influence.
It would be a reversal for
Iran, and the United States badly needs to apply
one. But the problem is that the United States
cannot be seen as the direct agent of regime
change in Syria, and Assad is not as weak as has
been claimed. Even so, Syria is where the United
States can work to block Iran without crossing
Iran's red lines.
The normal outcome of a
situation like this one, in which neither Iran nor
the United States can afford to cross the other's
red lines since the consequences would be too
great for each, would be some sort of negotiation
toward a longer-term accommodation.
Ideology aside - and the United States
negotiating with the "axis of evil" or Iran with
the "Great Satan" would be tough sells to their
respective domestic audiences - the problem with
this is that it is difficult to see what each has
to offer the other.
What Iran wants - a
dominant position in the region and a redefinition
of how oil revenues are allocated and distributed
- would make the United States dependent on Iran.
What the United States wants - an Iran that does
not build a sphere of influence but instead
remains within its borders - would cost Iran a
historic opportunity to assert its longstanding
claims.
We find ourselves in a situation
in which neither side wants to force the other
into extreme steps and neither side is in a
position to enter into broader accommodations. And
that's what makes the situation dangerous. When
fundamental issues are at stake, each side is in a
position to profoundly harm the other if pressed,
and neither side is in a position to negotiate a
broad settlement, a long game of chess ensues. And
in that game of chess, the possibilities of
miscalculation, of a bluff that the other side
mistakes for an action, are very real.
Europe and China are redefining the way
the world works. But kingdoms run on oil, as
someone once said, and a lot of oil comes through
Hormuz. Iran may or may not be able to close the
strait, and that reshapes Europe and China. The
New Year thus begins where we expected: at the
Strait of Hormuz.
(Published with
permission from STRATFOR, a
Texas-based geopolitical intelligence company.
Copyright 2012 Stratfor.)
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