Opportunity beckons for Iran's
Guards By Brian M Downing
The United States and other powers are
seeking to change the government of Iran from the
present mullah-centered authoritarianism to a
representative government, or at least to a
government more acceptable to regional powers.
This objective is being pursued amid a program of
sanctions and violent attacks
including assassinations and
bombings. Strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities
and perhaps even a protracted air campaign may be
in the offing.
The outcome of these
efforts cannot be determined, though there is no
shortage of people, in Washington and elsewhere,
who are confident that regime change can be
brought about. A look at politics inside Iran
might offer insight as to the likely political
dynamics and outcomes. Perhaps some caution may be
offered as well.
The Iranian public The dramatic popular protests following the
disputed 2009 elections that saw President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad re-elected and the ongoing events in
the Middle East have caused some to see Iran on
the verge of a "Persian Spring" - a sweeping
movement to oust the regime and move toward
representative government.
Discontent
among the urban middle classes is substantial, but
pious rural dwellers and the urban working class
constitute a larger portion of the public by far
whose significance is minimized by outside
observers. They tend to support the regime and are
more likely to blame foreign powers for their
country's ills and to oppose outside interference.
Religion, nationalism and suspicion of outside
forces go hand in hand, as rulers and historians
have known for centuries.
The
effectiveness of external threats in channeling
urban middle-class discontent into meaningful
action is dubious. It is perfectly consistent for
the middle classes to yearn for Western-style
government and yet oppose Western meddling.
Iranians do not see Anglo-Russian occupations
during the world wars and continuous interference
as irrelevant historical details, nor are the more
recent assassinations and bombings. They are all
of a piece of their long national travails and
fighting them is an almost reflexive part of their
identity.
The urban middle-classes do not
see Iran's nuclear program as aimed at destroying
Israel or having any offensive intent or
usefulness. It is a deterrent to foreign invasion
such as the Iraq War that killed 800,000 Iranians,
and also a source of national pride, much as the
French nuclear program was in the aftermath of
colonial losses in Indochina and Africa.
Historically, foreign danger has led to
popular support for governments, even unpopular
ones. Americans will recognize this from Pearl
Harbor when the Japanese attack rallied the
country, even theretofore isolationist and
anti-Roosevelt elements. More recently, the
September 11 attacks on the US had the same
centripetal effect.
Joseph Stalin's rule
over the Soviet Union was deeply unpopular in 1940
yet it garnered tremendous support the following
year when Germany invaded. Indeed, the war and
ensuing victory solidified the communist
government; its prestige and authority persisted
for decades.
Similarly, Ruhollah
Khomeini's government, which took power in 1979,
was far from solid until Iraq invaded the
following year. Most Iranians rallied to the war
effort, even many officers of the shah's army who
had fled the country. Even the Arab population of
western Iran ignored Iraq's calls for support, and
fought against the invaders.
The
Iranian state Foreign pressure will lead
to changes within the three main power centers of
the state: the "elected" government, the
ayatollahs, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC).
Though the government is the
most prominent of the three power centers owing to
the boorish rhetoric of Ahmadinejad, in many ways
it is the weakest. It has always had its power
limited by the ayatollahs, its control over the
military is negligible, and its attempts over the
past few years to expand its purview have been
quickly slapped down.
Ahmadinejad may seek
to rally public support to him in time of crisis,
but other centers of power greatly mistrust him
and will act to halt such mobilization. Any
attempt to expand his power is unlikely to meet
with success - barring a paralyzing air campaign
against the IRGC.
The ayatollahs look to
the Arab Spring and shudder. It bodes ill for
elite rule of any sort and introduces internal
conflict and foreign intrigue. The Iranian
presidency, they judge, has shown itself to be
bent on reform, aggrandizement, and bowing to the
public. The ayatollahs are looking for ways to
avoid the election constitutionally mandated for
next year, as it could entail another round of
embarrassing public unrest and hamfisted
repression.
The ayatollahs are losing
prestige among all but the most pious. Much of the
blame for the economic torpor of recent years has
fallen on the elected government and on the
sanctions imposed on the country, but the clumsy
influences of the ayatollahs are not unnoticed.
The sybaritic wealth of a few ayatollahs is
commonly discussed, though only in private.
The once formidable unity of the
sacerdotal caste has not held up well over the
thirty-three years of governing a large,
modernizing country. Divisions have arisen over
national policy, allocating businesses to family
members, and determining the proper course amid a
welter of contradictory opinions and
interpretations.
Some mullahs prefer the
"quietist" approach to Islamism whereby the clergy
establishes principles and offers occasional
counsel then leaves government to politicians.
Such is the approach of many ayatollahs in nearby
Iraq, including the revered Ali al-Sistani - a
Persian from Mashhad in northeastern Iran.
Quietists know that theology is only a basis for
modern politics and that when the saints go into
the sausage-making business, they lose their unity
and halos as well.
The IRGC is the third
center of power and the one best positioned to
benefit from the Gulf crisis. Since its creation
during the 1979 revolution as a counterpoise to
the regular army whose officer corps had been
groomed by the shah, it has expanded into business
enterprises including construction and
hydrocarbons. Retired officers have been placed in
many state bureaus where it is expected they will
retain institutional loyalties.
The IRGC
has ambitions of becoming an expansive military,
economic and political conglomerate along the
lines of the militaries of Pakistan and Egypt.
Ongoing events will help to advance those
ambitions.
The IRGC is a reasonably
compact military (about 125,000) with an upper
officer corps forged in the long Iraq war. It has
used its considerable influence in Iraq to expel
the US but still sees a powerful US-led alliance
arrayed against Iran. Powerful air and naval
assets are stationed throughout the Gulf and
deadly attacks go on inside the country with
seeming impunity.
Perhaps most ominous to
the IRGC are the Kurdish and Baloch insurgencies
in the northwest and southeast, respectively,
which are encouraged by Israeli intelligence.
Combined with Saudi exhortations to the Arab
population of Khuzestan - an oil-rich region in
western Iran - these could pose a graver danger
than air strikes on nuclear facilities. Those
sites can be rebuilt; not so territorial
integrity.
A protracted air campaign on
the air defense system, army and IRGC bases,
communication centers and road systems leading to
Kurdish and Baloch regions could trigger serious
uprisings. The IRGC has seen Iraq fragmented by
coalition forces and is watching Syria torn by
sectarian fighting and Kurdish demands for
autonomy. It will act to prevent Iran from going
down the same road toward dissolution.
Improbable though dissolution may seem
from without, national security institutions in
Tehran, like those in Washington and Jerusalem and
Riyadh and elsewhere, will almost instinctively
attach great weight to the direst of scenarios. It
is perhaps what they do best.
The IRGC can
present itself to the state and public alike as
expert in military matters, above political and
theological squabbles, and the most capable
institution to lead the country in parlous times
and ensure territorial integrity. Many bewildered
and worried people, pious or not, will find their
arguments appealing.
The Gulf crisis,
then, could lead to political change quite
different from the one envisioned by the powers
arrayed against Iran and the one worked for by
reformists inside the country. The IRGC is well
positioned to increase its power in the state and
establish itself as co-equals with the ayatollahs,
perhaps even as having the upper hand and
transforming the ayatollahs into a consultative
legitimizing body.
The prospect of the
Iranian people pressing more earnestly for
democratic reform as war looms is not likely. Such
actions would be seen by most reformers as
ill-timed and by security forces as treasonous.
The hope of a new wave of reformism toppling the
regime seems based on a mythic, romantic
understanding of historical change and perhaps
also on a disregard of the outcomes of recent
efforts to bring change to the region.
Brian M Downing is a
political/military analyst and author of The
Military Revolution and Political Change and The
Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America
from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be
reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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