The
consequences of war for Saudi
Arabia By Brian M Downing
Discussion of a possible war between Iran
and the coalition aligning against it centers on
destroying Iranian nuclear sites and ensuring that
oil tankers freely transit the Strait of Hormuz.
Countries embarking on war scrutinize as many
scenarios and possibilities as they can, but wars
invariably present unexpected situations and
changes within their borders are seldom
anticipated.
Saudi Arabia is a
family-ruled, tribal country with an array of
tensions over religion, power, succession and
foreign relations. Another Gulf war is not
expected to be long or require an appreciable
number of Saudi forces, nonetheless hostilities
will bring significant challenges to the kingdom.
After all, not even the
victor leaves a war the
way it went in.
Sunni discontent The Saudi-Iranian conflict pits Sunni against
Shi'ite. In Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi clergy deem
Shi'ism a vile heresy and try to instill that view
in the Sunni majority. A war, however, would bring
about significant religious-centered concern.
War, in Islamic thought, should be between
the faithful and the infidel and not between
fellow Muslims. One need not look far back into
history to the Umayyad or Fatimid dynasties for
cases in point. In only the past few decades wars
within the faithful have taken place in Iraq,
Yemen and Afghanistan.
In as much as the
House of Saud was very much involved in these
wars, by backing one side and even sending small
troop contingents, the pious norm may be said to
be quite frail. Some, however, may see the
kingdom's repeated disrespect for the norm as a
call for reviving it in order to prevent deepening
divisions within Islam and further outside
interference.
Perhaps more importantly,
Saudi Arabia's non-Islamic allies against Iran
will cause excited discussion - certainly in
private, perhaps even in public. The chief power
in the coalition against Iran is the United States
- a state widely deemed arrogant, intrusive and
evil.
Any war on Iran would rely
overwhelmingly on US naval and air power, with
Saudi forces playing only subordinate roles. Saudi
feats of arms will be boldly proclaimed in
official media, as they were in the 1991 Gulf War
in which Saudi forces hardly distinguished
themselves, but the underlying dependence on the
US, however, cannot be kept from the public.
It will underscore the ineffectualness of
the House of Saud and undermine its aura of
legitimacy and claim to be guardian of Islam and
its most holy sites.
Perception of
weakness will heighten discontent and strengthen
demands for reform which were squelched last March
through shows of force but which have been kept
alive by more audacious movements in the region.
The Saudi rulers may try to counter this
perception by building up its armed forces.
American, British and Chinese defense contractors
will gladly help with the undertaking, but it will
pose problems for already strained state coffers
which currently dole out immense sums to tribes
and family members.
The expenditures will
also place more power in the military than the
rulers or populace wish to see and serve to
strengthen justification for revanchist plans in
Iran.
It has scarcely gone unnoticed
inside the kingdom that, at least in regard to
Iran, Riyadh has been speaking almost in concert
with Jerusalem - an embarrassing situation that
official announcements can neither hide nor
satisfactorily justify. Intelligence reports
indicate that Saudi Arabia has granted flyover
rights for an Israeli attack on Iran and will help
refuel returning aircraft. Reports will merge
freely with popular lore and take on greater
magnitude.
Cooperation with Israel has
required lowering the priority of the Palestinian
issue for the time being. The plight of the
Palestinians has long been prominent in the Saudi
public mind, but it is appearing to be merely
something their rulers invoke when it suits them.
Paradoxically, and quite obviously as
well, Iran has been more consistent with its
support for the Palestinians by backing Hamas in
Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is thought to
have led to Saudi acquiescence to Israeli attacks
on the Iranian proxies.
Conspiracies are
very much part of Saudi folklore and foreign
manipulation of Muslims is a recurring theme - an
unsurprising legacy of Ottoman, British and US
intrigues. It will take little encouragement for
many to believe that the impetus to war with Iran
comes from the machinations of Israeli and
American bureaus.
(Curiously, Israelis
worry that the US, European Union and Saudi Arabia
will, upon settling the Iranian matter, plot to
turn their concerted attention to imposing a
Palestinian settlement on Jerusalem.)
Sunni discontent will be most pronounced
in the Wahhabi clergy and traditionalist tribes,
especially in those who are irked by the House of
Saud's impious allies and who are not overly
influenced by the exuberant rulers and generals
bruiting their victory over the Shiites.
Similarly, Saudi youth may be unimpressed
by the victory and more concerned by lack of
opportunity and the barrenness of subsidized
lifestyles. For many of them, the Sunni-Shi'ite,
Arab-Persian rivalry is irrelevant and akin to the
absurd rallying cries of the dictators who are
receding in relevance in the Middle East, though
not quickly enough.
War and its aftermath
will shape the course of the momentous succession
dynamics that are forming as the sons of the old
warrior king are well into old age and quite
apparently infirm and often doddering.
A
large number of men, some several thousand, can
rightfully lay claim to be princes. Many of them
resent the concentrated power of the dominant
Sudairi clique and the very notion of a family-run
state in the 21st century. They will press for
greater opportunity and perhaps also for moving
with the tide of change all around them. More than
a few princesses may join them.
Shi'ite
unrest Saudi Arabia, though predominantly
Sunni, has a Shi'ite minority of 10-15% that is
concentrated in the oil-rich east and in the
strategically important southwest. They do not
have the same access to work and education of the
Sunnis and are increasingly vocal in their
protests.
Their position in national life
has always been colored by their sectarian
beliefs, no more so than in 1979 when some openly
protested after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called
for Islamist uprisings. They were swiftly crushed
by Saudi security forces.
More recently,
when Shi'ites joined with young Sunnis to ask for
greater voice in their country's affairs, they
were suppressed - less forcefully this time. The
Saudi state was convinced, with little if any
evidence, that they were directed by the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
War on
Iran could lead to two Shi'ite responses inside
the kingdom. First, there could be a purely
indigenous movement, chiefly peaceful, that would
repeat previous efforts to attain equal treatment.
Angered by recent repression and encouraged by
recent movements in Libya and Syria, the Shi'ites
could defy state edicts and assemble peacefully,
willing to endure suppression by security forces.
Second, a Shi'ite response could have
international aspects, including ones quite
worrisome for regional security. Iran, if
attacked, will not sit back like a chastened
student. It will strike back - in and out of the
region, wisely or not, but reasonably swiftly and
certainly violently.
The IRGC, it might be
more than suspected, has been busily laying out
responses for some time now. It could deploy its
own personnel skilled in bomb-making and other
guerrilla operations. To use the old insurgency
maxim, these Iranian fish may find welcoming
Shi'ite oceans in vital parts of Saudi Arabia.
Their targets could include oil facilities,
security forces, and even members of the ruling
family.
Iran may look to the Saudi-Yemeni
frontier as a base of operations. Already armed
and operating there are the Houthis - a Shi'ite
tribal movement that fights encroachments by the
Yemeni government and its Saudi backers. Several
thousand strong, the Houthis raid on both sides of
the frontier and will provide sanctuaries for IRGC
guerrillas to use for operations just to the north
inside Saudi Arabia.
Despite Saudi
allegations, there has thus far been little
evidence of Iranian influence with the Shi'ites on
either side of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier. A war on
Iran, however, might make that influence both real
and problematic.
Brian M Downing
is a political/military analyst and author of
The Military Revolution and Political Change
and The Paths of Glory: War and Social
Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.
He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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