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2 Iran well prepared for the
worst By
David Isenberg
Most discussions of possible
United States military operations in the Persian
Gulf, should Iran try to prevent maritime traffic
from going through the Strait of Hormuz, generally
say that while it would not be a cakewalk, it
would not be an enormously difficult task either.
But that conventional wisdom
is wrong, according to a recent report issued by
an independent, non-profit public policy research
institute in Washington DC. The report found that
the traditional post-Cold War US military ability
to project power overseas with few serious
challenges to its freedom of action may be rapidly
drawing to a close.
While such conclusions have
been voiced before, most notably in
regard to capabilities being
developed by the People's Republic of China -
which is developing an anti-access/area-denial
(A2/AD) battle network that could constrain the US
military's ability to maneuver in the air, sea,
undersea, space and cyber-space operating domains
- China is hardly the only country that has
developed such options.
According to the report
published by the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), "Iran, in
particular, has been investing in new capabilities
that could be used to deter, delay or prevent
effective US military operations in the Persian
Gulf. Iran's acquisitions of weapons that it could
use to deny access to the Gulf, control the flow
of oil and gas from the region, and conduct acts
of aggression or coercion, are of grave concern to
the United States and its security partners."
The
report, "Outside-In: Operating from Range to
Defeat Iran's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats"
[1] notes that Iran has been preparing for a
possible military confrontation with the United
States for decades. Instead of engaging in a
direct military competition, which would be
pitting its weaknesses against US strengths, Iran
has developed an asymmetric "hybrid" A2/AD
strategy that mixes advanced technology with
guerilla tactics to deny US forces basing access
and maritime freedom of maneuver.
Even
if Iran did not disrupt Gulf maritime traffic for
long, it could still have a devastating impact. A
recent report by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) found that Iran's closure of the Strait of
Hormuz would "neutralize a large part of current
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] spare capacity," saying "alternative
routes exist, but only for a tiny fraction of the
amounts shipped through the strait, and they may
take some time to operationalize while
transportation costs would rise significantly."
"A blockade of the Strait of
Hormuz would constitute, and be perceived by
markets to presage, sharply heightened global
geopolitical tension involving a much larger and
unprecedented disruption," it said.
The
IMF said that "supply disruption would likely have
a large effect on prices, not only reflecting
relatively insensitive supply and demand in the
short run but also the current state of oil market
buffers".
"A halt of Iran's exports to
OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] economies without offset from other
sources would likely trigger an initial oil price
increase of around 20-30% (about US$20-30 a barrel
currently), with other producers or emergency
stock releases likely providing some offset over
time," the report showed.
It
stressed that "a Strait of Hormuz closure could
trigger a much larger price spike, including by
limiting offsetting supplies from other producers
in the region".
"If you could cut off oil
flow for even several weeks the global economy
would be in depression. That would be a serious
price to pay; it is a sobering thought," according
to Patrick Cronin, a senior advisor at the Center
for a New American Security, a Washington DC
think-tank.
Attacking ships is not the
only option available to Iran to disrupt oil
supplies, according to Cronin. In a phone
interview with Asia Times Online he said, "Forget
about shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, you
could hit the oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia;
that would have enormous impact."
Cronin, who was involved in
the reflagging of oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq
war of the 1980s, agrees that the Iranian ability
to disrupt maritime traffic is real. "Iran is
acquiring greater capabilities and has
geographical advantages. Even back in the 1980s,
we were very worried."
Currently, aside from
military factors, Iran can take advantage of a
number of political and demographic realities.
For
example, the populations, governments and much of
the wealth of the region are concentrated in a
handful of urban areas within range of Iran's
ballistic missiles. While attacks against Gulf
cities may have little direct military utility,
their psychological and political impact on
regional governments could be significant,
especially if Iran demonstrated the capacity to
arm its missiles with chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear warheads.
And,
as most analysts recognize, Iran could also
mobilize its network of predominately Shi'ite
proxy groups located across Southwest Asia to
conduct acts of terrorism and foment insurrection
in states that remain aligned with the United
States.
Iran's proxies could become
far more dangerous should Iran arm them with
guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles
(G-RAMM). Other groups, like the Lebanese
Hezbollah, could conduct a terrorism campaign
designed to broaden the crisis and hold US rear
areas - even the US homeland - at risk.
And
while that indirect approach may not succeed, Iran
could use its ballistic missiles and proxy forces
to attack US bases and forces in the Persian Gulf
directly.
Iran's hybrid strategy would
continue at sea, where its naval forces would
engage in swarming "hit-and-run" attacks using
sophisticated guided munitions in the confined and
crowded waters of the Strait of Hormuz and
possibly out into the Gulf of Oman. Iran could
coordinate these attacks with salvos of anti-ship
cruise missiles and swarms of unmanned aircraft
launched either from the Iranian shore or from the
islands guarding the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
That last scenario is hardly
theoretical. Lieutenant General Paul K Van Riper
(US Marine Corps-retired) gained notoriety after
the Millennium Challenge 2002 wargame, which was a
major exercise conducted by the US armed forces in
mid-2002, likely the largest such exercise in
history.
It cost $250 million and
involved both live exercises and computer
simulations. The simulated combatants were the US,
referred to as "Blue", and an unknown adversary in
the Middle East, "Red", commanded by Lieutenant
General Van Riper.
Red received an
ultimatum from Blue, essentially a surrender
document, demanding a response within 24 hours.
Thus warned of Blue's approach, Red used a fleet
of small boats to determine the position of
Blue's fleet by the second day of the exercise.
In a pre-emptive strike, Red launched a massive
salvo of cruise missiles that overwhelmed the
Blue forces' electronic sensors and destroyed 16
warships.
This included one aircraft
carrier, 10 cruisers and five of six amphibious
ships. An equivalent success in a real conflict
would have resulted in the deaths of over 20,000
service personnel. Soon after the cruise missile
offensive, another significant portion of Blue's
navy was "sunk" by an armada of small Red boats,
which carried out both conventional and suicide
attacks that capitalized on Blue's inability to
detect them as well as expected.
In
the years since then, Iran has been investing in
the capabilities necessary to carry out Van
Riper's strategy. Looking at its maritime forces,
in mid-2001 Iran launched the first of a new type
of locally built craft equipped with rocket
launchers.
In July 2002, a conventional
arms sale triggered sanctions on several Chinese
companies. Beijing had transferred high-speed
catamaran missile patrol boats to Iran. The C-14
boats are outfitted with anti-ship cruise
missiles. Short-range anti-ship missiles for the
patrol boats also were sold from China to Iran in
January 2002. The high-speed gunboat can carry up
to eight C-701 anti-ship cruise missiles, and
usually have one gun.
Between 2003 and
2005, authorities in the Iranian navy continued to
talk about their pushes for greater
self-sufficiency, including the continued
development of domestically produced missile boats
and frigates, as well as new details about
submarine projects.
In
2006 and 2007, the Iranian navy accepted new
missile boats and a frigate, as well as two types
of submarines. The Sina class missile boats,
introduced in 2006, were essentially Iranian
copies of Kaman missile boats already in service.
Also in 2006, the Iranians deployed the first of
the Nahang class of midget submarines, described
as the first Iranian submarine designed and
produced without foreign assistance.
In
2007, the Iranian navy accepted the first of three
planned Mowj-class frigates, again essentially
copies of a ship already in the Iranian inventory,
the Alvand class. Also in 2007, it deployed the
Qadir midget submarine, sometimes referred to as
the first of the Yono class.
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