Gulf
crisis ripples across the globe By Brian M Downing
The
United States has shifted its attention away from
Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world and
firmly fixed it on Iran. Along with this has come
a buildup of naval, air and ground forces to
pressure and perhaps even attack Iran over fears
its nuclear program might be designed to build a
nuclear weapon.
Allocating military might
into the Gulf entails removing it from other parts
of the globe which may embolden actors in various
parts of the world to act more aggressively. They
need not act in concert with Iran nor out of any
sympathy for it. They may
simply sense an opening
as the US military becomes more overstretched.
Historical examples of such actions
abound. As Britain and France plunged into World
War II, Japan seized their colonies in Southeast
Asia. After the war, as the Iron Curtain descended
in Central Europe, North Korea - with Soviet
encouragement - drove into South Korea.
More recently, as the US and its European
allies were mired in Iraq, Russia drove into
Georgia, ably conveying its displeasure at North
Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion. The world
today is so laden with conflicts that one or more
of them will likely assert themselves amid the
ongoing Iran crisis.
East and Southeast
Asia The Gulf buildup has reduced the
number of ships assigned to, or available for
reinforcing, US flotillas along China's periphery.
It is now the most important region in US global
strategy, at least in the long term, as it has
been the scene of numerous worrisome actions by
the Chinese navy.
Factions inside the
Chinese state - the armed forces foremost among
them - are annoyed at continued US hegemony in the
Gulf and along China's periphery as well. They
will see an opportunity to enhance national
prestige, consolidate their institutional
interests at the outset of an internal political
transition, secure sea lanes and offshore drilling
tracts, and ease US pressure on a vital ally. This
would be an important step toward establishing
their long-term geopolitical goal of their own
East Asian hegemony.
Upon building
consensus in the state, the Chinese navy could
return to menacing ships of East Asian countries,
surreptitiously planting flags on disputed
islands, and otherwise asserting territorial
claims. Naval exercises near Taiwan might be
another show of force - one welcome in Tehran
though almost nowhere else.
There will be
considerable opposition to such measures within
the Chinese state as more business-oriented
factions seek to prevail over more power-oriented
ones. After all, the former will insist, similar
actions last year led to sharp rebukes from world
capitals and a burst of security talks from South
Korea to Vietnam to India - none of which was
helpful in advancing national interests, military
or economic.
North Korea is another
possible source of disconcerting action in East
Asia. The new leader, Kim Jong-eun, is a boyish
and inexperienced figure whose image has to be
embellished by repeated accounts of improbable
deeds proffered to a credulous public. Less mythic
acts may come early in his rule.
His
father, Kim Jong-il, secured his son's succession
by allowing the military to embark on aggressive
actions against South Korea, including the sinking
of a frigate and the shelling of an island. Kim
Jong-eun may wish to cement his support in the
military by allowing them another round of
provocative actions. Though it might be said that
the military may wish to cement its control over
him by demanding latitude of action.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan
region The volatile countries to Iran's
east are potent sources of additional trouble for
the US. Iran has considerable support in the Tajik
and Hazara populations of the north, but those
peoples are supportive of the US presence in
Afghanistan and will do nothing to discourage the
US from staying on there.
The Taliban
receive some arms from Iran and may be inclined to
mount attacks, sympathetic or merely
opportunistic. The Taliban are entering
negotiations with the US but can scarcely be seen
as forswearing violence in the meantime. In any
event, the Taliban take cues from the Pakistani
army.
A deceitful partner under ordinary
circumstances, the Pakistani army is still angry
over the US's Osama bin Laden raid of last May and
the attack on an army outpost near the Afghan
frontier that killed 24 soldiers last November.
Further, Pakistan has correct (though often
strained) relations with Iran based on oil and gas
purchases and a planned pipeline.
Pakistan
could further restrict US/International Security
Assistance Force convoys into Afghanistan or
increase the tempo of hostile fire incidents with
ISAF and Afghan troops which US soldiers report
are almost routine parts of patrols along the
AfPak frontier.
Two factors, however,
limit the aggressiveness of any Pakistani
response. First, Pakistan's ties to Iran are
weaker than those to the US's chief ally in the
Gulf - Saudi Arabia. Pakistan enjoys generous
subsidies from Riyadh, which sees Pakistan as
generally opposed to Iranian influence in
Afghanistan, a source of anti-Shi'ite mercenaries
in Saudi employ, and a vital partner in any Saudi
nuclear program that might arise.
Second,
any disruption from Pakistan would be unlikely to
detract from US naval and air assets in the Gulf.
They would only affect US ground forces in
Afghanistan and hence would have little strategic
meaning in the crisis.
Militant
groups Various parts of the world from
North Africa to Southeast Asia face armed groups.
Some are purely local in nature while others have
ties to kindred groups elsewhere. Most if not all
are opportunistic in their timing and choice of
targets, and ever eager to grab world headlines.
Al-Qaeda is one such opportunistic group
comprising, if only barely, a loose network of
groups in the Maghreb, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, AfPak
and Indonesia. The recent US assertion that Iran
is harboring al-Qaeda personnel was intended to
suggest operational ties with Tehran but it might
also imply prospects for sympathetic terrorist
attacks, though this is doubtful.
Iran
interned several al-Qaeda figures as they fled
Afghanistan following the Taliban's defeat in 2001
- a campaign in which Iran assisted the US, it
might be noted. In early 2003, Iran offered to
exchange them for members of the Mujahideen-e
Khalq - a group harbored by Saddam Hussein in Iraq
and branded as terrorists in Tehran and Washington
alike. The US declined to make the swap and
recently, amid the US buildup in the Gulf, Iran
released the al-Qaeda personnel.
The
al-Qaeda network is unable to mount a meaningful
strategic diversion, but it could launch a number
of opportunistic attacks that would add to global
concerns about the wisdom of the showdown in the
Gulf. Attacks might also cause a few already
wavering publics to further question their
governments' support for an impending war.
Sub-Saharan Africa, a region rich in
resources and divided into western and Chinese
spheres, is increasingly inflicted by religious
and ethnic conflict. The recent influx of weapons
and former mercenaries from Libya may worsen those
conflicts.
The price of Kalashnikovs has
dropped 50% in local markets since the uprising in
Libya and the opening of many arsenals there.
Furthermore, many of the Tuareg and other
mercenaries in Muammar Gaddafi's now-disbanded
army are looking to the south for opportunity.
Tuareg unrest is presently making itself felt in
Mali and their kin in Algeria, Niger and Burkina
Faso have local grievances and hopes for greater
autonomy.
South Sudan seceded from the
north in July of last year and since then has
faced skirmishes with the north. South Sudan's
recent decision to cease using an oil pipeline
leading north and to build a new one running south
will lead to greater conflict. This will attract
mercenaries and millenarian fighters such as the
Lord's Resistance Army - a group the US and Uganda
have been countering for several years now.
South Sudan's oil went chiefly to China,
which will be watching ongoing military
developments, ever wary that South Sudan is
aligning with Western-backed countries such as
Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Those
countries are currently fighting al Shabaab groups
in Somalia, who, though on the run, have proven
themselves capable of opportunistic attacks in the
region.
Shi'ite unrest may also abound in
the Gulf, with varying amounts of guidance from
Tehran. Saudi Arabia's Shi'ites in the east and
southwest are daring to raise their voices after
being quickly silenced last year. Shi'ites in
Bahrain will mark the anniversary of the
suppression of last year Arab Spring unrest on
February 14. And the Shi'ite majority in Iraq may
attempt to squash the Sunni-directed violence in
the country.
In its effort to halt the
Iranian nuclear program, the world may well see
conflicts and dangers erupting in many parts of
the world, which, again, may be sympathetic to
Iran or merely opportunistic. Further unrest will
underscore the problem of US over-commitment and
lead to strategic and fiscal debates in Washington
as to the size of US forces and the judiciousness
of their use.
Brian M Downing is
a political/military analyst and author of The
Military Revolution and Political Change
and The Paths of Glory: War and Social
Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.
He can be reached
atbrianmdowning@gmail.com.
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