Attack on Iran easier said than
done By David Isenberg
WASHINGTON - Despite renewed media
speculation regarding possible Israeli attacks
against Iran's nuclear facilities as early as this
spring, skepticism that such a campaign could
actually be successfully carried out remains
relatively high, raising the question of whether
there is more bark than bite to Israeli threats.
It cannot expect a repeat of 1981 when the
Israeli air force destroyed the Osirak reactor at
Al-Tuwaythah, just south of Baghdad.
The
Iranians are aware of both Israeli capabilities
and the US-made precision-guided penetrating
munitions in the Israeli inventory. The Iranian
program has been dispersed all over the country -
estimates range between 12 and more than 20
locations - and the facilities have been built
with US and Israeli capabilities
in mind and are
protected by modern Russian air defense systems.
The single-most critical element of the
Iranian program is thought to be the Natanz
facility. The heart of the facility is the
centrifuge area, located in an underground,
hardened structure.
But even if Israel
tries to limits the target set, it would still
have to attack other facilities besides Natanz.
For example, the newer Fordow fuel-enrichment
plant near Qom, where Iran has already moved 3.5%
enriched uranium from Natanz, is built into the
side of a mountain and is heavily fortified. There
is a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, a
heavy-water facility being constructed at Arak and
centrifuge factories outside Tehran.
The
straight-line distance between Israel and Natanz
is almost 1,609 kilometers. Since the countries do
not share a common border, Israeli aircraft or
missiles must fly through foreign - and hostile -
airspace to get to the target.
The least
risky method of striking Natanz is with Israel's
medium-range ballistic missiles, the Jericho II or
III. It is believed that the Israeli missiles
could reach Natanz. However, to travel that far
the missiles will have a limited warhead weight,
and it is doubtful that these warheads would be
able to penetrate far enough underground to
achieve the desired level of destruction.
Thus, an attack by the Israeli air force's
US-made fighter-bomber aircraft is the most likely
option. The Israelis have 25 F-15I and about 100
F-16I jets.
The F-15I is capable of
carrying four tonnes of fuel in its internal
tanks, conformal fuel tanks (CFT), and detachable
tanks. This enables it to fly about 4,450
kilometers. With midair refueling, the range could
be extended further.
The F-15I can carry a
very wide range of weapons such as various guided
missiles and bombs, as well as iron bombs. All in
all, the plane can carry about 10 metric tonnes of
munitions.
The F-16I has an extended
flight range that reportedly allows Israeli forces
to attack targets well within Iran without having
to refuel. Use of CFT could extend its effective
mission range up to 50%. The baseline model has a
combat radius of 1,370 kilometers with two
907-kilogram bombs and two air-to-air missiles,
with 3,936-liter external tanks.
The
Tehran Research Reactor where uranium enriched to
20% is used to produce medical isotopes. Credit:
Jim Lobe/Inter Press Service
Assuming
an air attack, the question is how will the
aircraft fly from their bases in Israel to a
target located 322 kilometers miles inside Iran?
They could go either through Saudi Arabia
or Iraq, possibly even using Jordanian airspace as
well. Either route is a one-way trip of about
1,931 kilometers.
To overfly Saudi Arabia
the strike aircraft would depart southern Israel,
enter Saudi airspace from the Gulf of Aqaba or
Jordan, fly 1,287 kilometers of Saudi airspace to
the Gulf and then 483 kilometers into Iran.
Since the Israeli air force does not
operate stealth aircraft, there is a reasonable
expectation that at some point the aircraft would
be detected over Saudi Arabia. Whether Saudi
defenses could - or would - be able to stop the
Israelis is uncertain. Given Saudi fears over
Iran's nuclear program, perhaps they would turn a
blind eye and claim ignorance.
If they
chose to traverse Iranian airspace, the strike
aircraft depart southern Israel, cross 483 to 644
kilometers of Saudi airspace or a combination of
Jordanian and Saudi airspace, and enter Iraqi
airspace as soon as possible, continue across 805
kilometers of Iraq to the Persian Gulf and then on
to the target.
Entering Iran from Iraqi
airspace would be politically delicate. Although
US troops are no longer there, traversing Iraqi
airspace would not be possible without the
knowledge, and most likely the permission, of the
United States.
The key question is whether
Israel's fighter-bombers can conduct this mission
without refueling. Combat radius - the distance an
aircraft can fly and return without refueling - is
difficult to calculate, and depends on weapons
payload, external fuel tanks, mission profile,
etc.
The best "guesstimate" of the combat
radius of the F-15I and F-16I, outfitted with
conformal fuel tanks, two external wing tanks and
a decent weapons load, is almost 1,609 kilometers.
Either of the two possible flight routes above is
about 322 kilometers further than that. To make up
for the shortfall, the aircraft could be fitted
with an additional external fuel tank, but this
will require a reduction in the weapons load.
Given the accuracy of the weapons in the Israeli
inventory, that might not be problematic.
However, if the aircraft are detected and
intercepted, the pilots would have to jettison the
tanks in order to engage their attackers. Dropping
the tanks would prevent the aircraft from reaching
their target.
Air refueling is a
limitation for the Israelis. In recent years
Israel has acquired five C-130 and four to seven
Boeing 707 tanker aircraft. However, the tankers
would have to refuel the fighters in hostile
airspace. The 707 is a large unarmed aircraft and
would be very vulnerable to air defenses.
Theoretically, the Israelis could do this,
but at great risk of failure. If they decided to
attack Natanz, they would have to inflict
sufficient damage the first time - they probably
would not be able to mount follow-on strikes at
other facilities.
The ultimate question is
once Israeli planes have flown back, won't Iran be
able to repair the damage and accelerate the
nuclear program? Or does Israel assume that the US
would pick up where they left and start a
long-term war with Iran?
David
Isenberg is an adjunct scholar with the Cato
Institute and a contributor to the Straus Military
Reform Project at the Center for Defense
Information.
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