SPEAKING
FREELY Saudis embrace China in new
polygamy By Joshua Jacobs
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
Prince Bandar bin
Sultan, the former ambassador Saudi ambassador to
the United States once called the US-Saudi
relationship a "Catholic marriage". When the
remark was uttered in the 1990s it was a view
common in both Riyadh and Washington. The US-Saudi
alliance had just capped two major
victories, one over Saddam's
Iraq and the other over the Soviets in
Afghanistan.
That was an era of good
feeling, so much so that American officials took
to calling the Saudi envoy "Bandar the
Magnificent". However as the past decade has shown
in glaring detail, it was not a lasting sentiment.
The September 11 attacks can be easily identified
as the demarcating line in the US-Saudi
relationship. Following the identification of 15
of the 19 hijackers, and the mastermind Osama bin
Laden, as Saudi nationals, a hitherto unheard of
level of US attention was turned on the sensitive
topics of Saudi society and domestic political
reform.
The friction resulting from this
was compounded by the expanding "war on terror",
disagreements over Palestinian policy, and finally
and perhaps most severely the decision by the
George W Bush administration to invade Iraq. It
was the culmination of these factors that led an
exasperated Prince Saud al-Faisal to amend his
brothers remarks to state that the US-Saudi
relationship was not a "Catholic marriage" but in
fact a "Muslim marriage".
The warning was
remarkably clear, as Islam allows for up to four
marriages the US was to be on notice that Saudi
Arabia could and would pursue other major power
relationships. Whither to go? Rapprochement with
Russia was swiftly discounted as Russia took up
positions behind the Tehran-Damascus axis, while
Europe was both too close to the United States and
too weak. The logical conclusion led Saudi envoys
to Beijing. As a mutually autocratic state with
little interest in Saudi domestic reforms and a
power on the rise, China was an obvious and
attractive option to pursue.
Saudi Arabia
was on familiar ground in China. The kingdom's
relationship with Beijing dated back to the 1980s,
when Beijing acted as a clearinghouse for arms
headed for Afghanistan and as an increasingly
hungry customer for Saudi crude. The first signs
that a Sino-Saudi relationship could bear
strategic fruit came in 1988 when Saudi Arabia
purchased 36 CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic
missiles, and nine launchers.
The sale was
extremely controversial as the missiles have
little utility as conventional weapons and are
geared towards use as weapons of mass destruction
platforms. Upon discovery of the sale the Bush
administration began a series of frantic calls to
Riyadh to try and dissuade the Saudi's from the
"reckless" arms adventure. American worries fell
on deaf ears, and aside from assurances that Saudi
Arabia had no nuclear intentions, their concerns
were rejected. Thus the appealing prospect of an
unfussy Chinese ally was piqued in Riyadh.
Though the relationship had grown in the
1990s with the signing of bilateral trade
agreements, ministerial exchanges, and increasing
trade volume, the real shift began in 2006. In a
remarkable turnaround from the days when Chinese
communists could not even step foot in the
kingdom, King Abdullah made an official state
visit to Beijing.
One of the major issues
highlighted, likely to the discomfiture of
Washington, was the maintenance of regional peace
and energy security, a sphere normally reserved to
the US-Saudi relationship. The trip was soon
reciprocated with a state visit to Riyadh by
Chinese President Hu Jintao, cementing the shift
in the Sino-Saudi relationship.
In early
2011, Saudi Arabia was faced with the growing
tremors of the Arab Spring and an increasingly
aggressive Iran on their strategic periphery. In
quick succession Saudi Arabia faced the collapse
of Hosni Mubarak's regime in Egypt, the
disintegration of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime in
Yemen, and the prospect of an overthrow of the
al-Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain.
The
kingdom's first instinct was to try to contain the
damage and stop the spread of democratic
contagion. However when it turned to the United
States for assistance, or at least acquiescence,
it found an unsympathetic ear. The US opposed
Saudi attempts to buttress the Mubarak regime,
with ties fraying so much that Riyadh offered to
match US aid dollar for dollar if it was cut.
Following the collapse of Mubarak's regime
and the lack of support from the US, the Saudi's
blatantly ignored the United States and sent
troops into Bahrain to stymie street protests and
fortify a critical ally.
There is much
evidence that Riyadh has been scarred by this
experience. When Saudi Arabia felt like it needed
US support the most, it's liberal concerns
inhibited its ability to act and in many cases set
the US in opposition to the Kingdom. The Saudi's
canceled a series of planned visits by US
diplomats in mid-February, and rebuffed attempts
to set up meetings in March, only in April did the
Saudi's agree to a meeting with then US defense
secretary Robert Gates.
The meeting was
chilly by all accounts, and Washington has been
endeavoring ever since to repair the ruptures in
the relationship. However at the same time that
Washington was trying to get its diplomats through
the doors of the palace, Saudi Arabia had
dispatched its own envoys to China.
In a
tag team maneuver King Abdullah sent long time
American ambassador Prince Bandar and his
successor Prince Turki al-Faisal on a series of
meetings to Beijing. The result has been a steady
series of energy, trade, and security agreements.
As recently as a month ago Saudi Arabia and China
inked a major civil nuclear cooperation agreement
that has heralded much speculation about the
future of Saudi nuclear ambitions and the extent
of Chinese cooperation.
While in the
backdrop of the escalating tensions in the Persian
Gulf and increasing economic pressure on Iran, the
Saudi's have been engaging in a mini-version of
shuttle diplomacy with China. Earlier this month
the Saudi's assured Asian oil partners, but China
in particular, that Saudi Arabia's reserve
production capacity was more than enough to cover
an Iranian shortfall. The goal being to leverage
China from its protective stance over Iran, and
join in the oil embargo or at least not impede
further action by the United Nations Security
Council.
The flowering of the Sino-Saudi
relationship has been remarkable both for its
rapidity and the depth of some its connections.
However, there are significant stumbling blocks
for the development of a permanent alliance, and
questions over what the goals of the relationship
are. At the end of the day Saudi Arabia is still
incredibly dependent upon the United States and
the Western powers for its security guarantee.
This is easily evidenced by the quantity
of US bases in the region, the willingness of the
US to deploy significant assets to the Gulf, and
of course the nearly US$60 billion arms deal
announced late last year. There is also a relative
confluence of policy aims between Saudi Arabia and
the United States over Iran, Syria, and Lebanon,
something not evident with Beijing especially in
light over their veto of the United Nations
security council resolution on Syria.
Indeed, it could be said that a growing
Sino-Saudi relationship could reap dividends for
the United States in the short to medium term. If
Saudi Arabia can use its oil weight to leverage
China out of its protective embrace of Iran, or to
abandon its objections to a Syria intervention,
Washington would uncork some champagne bottles.
The use of Saudi crude to effect a more
cooperative outlook on regional policy would be a
major coup, and is a clear goal of the current
diplomatic offensive by Riyadh.
The real
danger for the United States, and where Saudi
Arabia may be hedging its bets, is in the long
term. As Chinese power rises and it may in the
coming decades become a viable replacement for the
US security guarantee. This would afford Riyadh
with what it has always dreamed of, a powerful and
compliant protector. An alliance of the autocrats
would relieve Saudi Arabia of the ceaseless
pressures to reform, to end crackdowns, and to
restrain its foreign policy - returning those
decisions exclusively to the royal court instead.
More immediately, the decision to forge
ties with China may serve as a hedge against
current pressures from the United States.
Washington may not want to push the envelope with
Saudi Arabia, if it believes it will push the
al-Saud further into the Chinese orbit. This gives
Riyadh wiggle room in its relationship with the
United States, and gives China a risk free way to
influence US regional policy objectives.
Saudi Arabia has never had a duality in
its foreign relations, it has been tethered to the
United States virtually since the modern state was
founded in the early 1930s, a relationship
cemented by a state visit from President Roosevelt
in 1945. The creation of a countervailing force
with China as an ally is a new game for Saudi
Arabia, and a relatively new one for China as
well. It is also proving to be an increasingly
useful tool for both, and will likely define the
regional dynamic in the coming decade.
Joshua Jacobs is a Senior Policy Analyst
with the Institute for
Gulf Affairs. His analyses have been featured
on domestic media outlets in North Africa and the
Middle East.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
