Putin
offers threadbare blanket for
Syria By Sami Moubayed
Whenever the world seemed to start caving
in around them, Syrian politicians have leaned on
the Russians for support. Moscow, both now and
during the Soviet era, has always been Syria's
"security blanket". Syrian leaders, however, have
almost equally misjudged how far Russia was
willing to go to help them.
In 1956,
then-president Shukri al-Quwatli visited Moscow
seeking Russian support for Egypt in the infamous
Suez War. He roared at the Kremlin: "Syria wants
you to send in that big Red Army that defeated
[Adolf] Hitler!"
A few years earlier,
president Husni al-Za'im threatened at a press
conference: "If the Americans continue to provoke
me, I will extend my hand to the Russians. Yes, I
will do that. I will go to
Moscow and let a Third
World War erupt from right over here, from
Damascus!"
Today, 63 years later, there
are many in Damascus who, like Husni al-Za'im,
wrongly believe that Moscow would indeed ignite a
"Third World War" for the sake of Syria. To show
their support for the strongman of Moscow, these
same Syrians came out demonstrating in favor of
Vladimir Putin, the man behind his country's
strong pro-Syria stance, at the gates the Russian
Embassy in Damascus. Carrying photos of Putin,
they wished him luck in his bid for re-election to
the Russian presidency. A senior Lebanese figure
recently returned from Moscow and was quoted
saying: "I heard from the Russians that if Putin
stays, then [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad
stays."
These Syrians are waiting for
Putin to return to the Kremlin. Others, however,
are waiting for him to change his positions on
Syria shortly after his re-election. They believe
that he has stood behind Syria since disturbances
began a year ago for one reason only: to
re-establish his country's image and position as a
powerful and influential Middle East broker - as a
superpower that can stand up for its allies should
the need arise.
It's not about the
Soviet-era supply and maintenance base in the port
city of Tartus, dating back to 1971. Russia's
macro-interests are much more strategic. Putin was
seemingly telling the world: "No solutions for the
Middle East can be reached anymore in complete
disregard for Russian interests. If you want
things done, you have to do it through us."
Apart from that, everything is on the
table for the Russians, including regime change in
Syria. Putin realizes that he cannot have the
entire cake in Syria, on his own - at least not
forever. A staunch pro-regime position might
secure paramount influence in today's Syria, but
it would eventually leave the Russians out of any
international future understanding for Syria, and
greatly damage Russia's image in the eyes of the
opposition street in Syria itself. Putin would
rather "share" Syria with the United States and
the European Union than be left out completely, as
is the case with Libya. To do that, one thing has
to happen: The Americans and Europeans have to ask
for his help, and they have to do so nicely.
Calling its recent veto at the United
Nations "despicable" and "disgusting" will not
help change Russia's position on Syria. Rather, it
will only deepen Putin's anger. The US and the EU
have to treat him with respect and show that they
need Russia if they want to see a change of
position on Syria. Serious talks, at the highest
level, need to find common ground on Syria. The
more Russia feels needed and important, the more
it will yield on the issue.
Moscow may
like the Syrian regime, but it certainly likes
Russian interests in the Middle East a whole lot
more. This is the fundamental thing that Syrian
authorities still remarkably fail to understand.
Moscow needs assurances that its political
influence will be maintained in Syria, and needs
guarantees on a basket of other issues, such as
the US defense shield in Europe, for example, and,
of course, Georgia.
Money of course would
also likely change Russia's position, clearly from
all the courting currently underway between the
Kremlin and heavyweight countries in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), who are planning to
meet with Russian Foreign Minister Serge Lavrov
this month. If politics doesn't persuade the
Russians to support regime change in Damascus,
then money will.
Several indicators to
this effect have come out of Moscow in recent
days. One was an interview last Friday by Putin
with six international journalists, where he said
he didn't have "a special relationship with
Syria". He noted that Russia's trade relations
with Damascus did not exceed Britain's, and when
asked about chances of the regime's
survival, he failed to defend his Syrian allies
aggressively. Instead, he surprised the
journalists with a blunt statement: "I don't know,
and I can't speculate on this."
Then came
statements by Georgy Petrov, deputy president of
the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who
said the chamber would temporarily suspend doing
business in Syria until "the situation
normalized".
Russia also recently
suspended - but did not cancel - touristic
cooperation with Syria because of the
deteriorating security conditions. According to
the influential Syrian economic bimonthly
Aliqtisadi, bilateral Syrian-Russian trade in
2011, "despite the difficult conditions in Syria,
stood at US$2 billion". Russian investments in
Syria stood at $19.4 billion in 2009.
The
more the Russians distance themselves, either
economically or politically, from Damascus, the
more likely this will damage the Syrian economy,
where the pound now stands at a historic 83 to the
US dollar, threatening the state - and ordinary
Syrians - with bankruptcy.
On a separate
track, US diplomats seem to have finally realized
what it takes to strengthen cooperation with the
Russians on Syria, and are doing it rather
aggressively.
Last Thursday, Jeffrey
Feltman, US assistant secretary of state for Near
East affairs, spoke to the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee about Syria. First, he clearly avoided
using provocative words to describe the Russians,
as the US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, had
done - wanting to court rather than provoke them.
Feltman noted that Russia's stance on Syria "is a
key element in how this goes forward". The
Russians can use their influence, he added, "to be
part of the solution in Syria".
Feltman
said that during a recent visit to Moscow, he
sensed "a lot discomfort" with Russia's
international isolation due to two vetoes at the
UN, in October and January. He also said he did
not see a fundamental difference between his
country and Russia over Syria, since both wanted
to democratize the nation and both wanted to end
the violence.
On February 29, Dennis Ross,
the influential American diplomat who handled
peace talks in the 1990s and served as special
adviser on Iran to Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton until recently, penned an article
further courting the Russians on Syria. Writing
for USA Today, Ross said dealing with Russia was
"vital" and noted that when or if the Russians
change their position on Syria, "the balance of
power is likely to shift". He said Moscow needed
to "be able to take credit" for producing regime
change in Syria - in whatever manner it likes -
and seal the deal just like the GCC signed off on
Yemen and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
signed off on Libya.
And finally came a
statement in The Moscow Times saying: "Russia has
made it clear that it will not be able to stop
other countries from launching a military
intervention if they try to do it without UN
approval." Despite a routine translation of the
Russian press in several Syrian state-run dailies,
apparently nobody picked that up, perhaps on
purpose. That statement seemed to be telling the
Syrians that there were limits to how far Russian
could go. If a "surgical strike" were to happen,
Russia was helpless at stopping it.
The
Syrian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation, signed between then-president Hafez
al-Assad and the USSR in October 1980, does not
include a clause for mutual defense. It specifies
regular consultations on bilateral and
multilateral issues, coordination of policies, and
military cooperation - but it does not oblige
Moscow to take military action to defend Syria.
That means the limit of how far the Russians can
go, given current circumstances, is the recent
veto at the UN. It cannot do more to help the
Syrians.
Nobody realizes that better than
Putin himself, who needs a success story "the day
after" he returns to power in Moscow. It needs to
make him and his country feel relevant, strong,
democratic, and accepted within the international
community. That success story can be Syria.
Sami Moubayed is a university
professor, historian, and editor-in-chief of
Forward Magazine.
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