The
Iranian-Turkish struggle for
Syria By Sami Moubayed
One of the aftershocks of the Syrian
uprising is an abrupt end to a Turkish-Iranian
honeymoon, which started shortly after the Justice
and Development Party came to power in Turkey
almost 10 years ago. For many years Turkey and
Iran - heirs to two strong empires - found plenty
in common thanks to Syria. They now have a million
reasons to disagree, also because of Syria.
The countries cooperated on post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq, worked side-by-side to crush Kurdish
separatists, and united efforts on Lebanon and
Gaza after the wars of 2006 and 2008 respectively.
That marriage of convenience began to fall
apart - rather rapidly - when the Syrian uprising
began in March 2011. Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan took a radically anti-Damascus
stance, calling for the regime's downfall, whereas
Iran stood firmly behind its Syrian ally, with
whom it has held strategic relations
since 1979. It all boils
down now to a Persian-Turkish struggle for Syria.
Historical background According
to Daphne McCurdy, a senior researcher associate
with the Project on Middle East Democracy: "Turkey
has traditionally viewed Iran, unlike how it has
viewed other Middle East countries, as a large and
important nation-state that must be managed,
rather than confronted."
Back in 1979, for
example, the Turks were among the very few
regional heavyweights who did not panic when the
Islamic Revolution took place in Tehran. It also
became one of the first countries in the world to
recognize the Khomeini government, and to refuse
to impose sanctions upon it, after the 1979-1981
US hostage crisis at the American Embassy in
Tehran.
Turkey did this, it must be noted,
despite a systematic Iranian campaign to tarnish
the image of the Turkish Republic's founder,
president Kamal Ataturk, and his strong brand of
secularism. In the 1990s, the two countries signed
a US$24 billion gas deal, despite mutual
accusations of backing the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK).
After the Israeli war of 2006,
Prime Minister Erdogan saw to it that $50 million
worth of aid was provided for the reconstruction
of south Lebanon, a Hezbollah stronghold, which
was music to the ears of Iranian officialdom.
In June 2010, Turkey voted against a
US-backed UN Security Council resolution imposing
further sanctions on Iran. Despite the slump in
political relations since mid-2011, Turkey still
relies on Iran for one-third of its oil supply.
Differences surface One view
says that Tehran and Ankara soon realized that
apart from short-term political issues, the two
countries had very little in common, thanks to
Syria. Another view, of course, speaks the exact
opposite, claiming that economic interests
overshadow political differences between Ankara
and Tehran.
The truth, of course, lies
somewhere in-between. Turkey's AKP was indeed a
religious party that marketed a strong brand of
moderate Sunni Islam, whereas Iran was a Shi'ite
theocracy bent on marketing radical political
Shi'ite Islam to the world, automatically
challenging countries like Turkey.
Last
November, Turkey agreed to host an early warning
radar as part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's missile defense system, infuriating
the Iranians, who saw it as a direct threat to
their security. The Europe Missile Shield, after
all, was originally created to intercept Iranian
missiles.
Turkey of course only agreed to
host the defense shield in September 2011 after
tensions had begun to mount between the two
countries over Syria. The head of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard's aerospace division, General
Amir Ali Hajizadeh, snapped that, "should we be
threatened, we will target NATO's missile defense
shield in Turkey and then hit the next targets."
Then came a statement by Ali Akbar, senior
advisor to Iran's Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
who said that Turkey's model of "secular Islam"
was actually a "version of Western liberal
democracy that is unacceptable for countries going
through an Islamic awakening". In response,
Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc said:
"I am addressing the Islamic Republic of Iran: I
do not know if you are worthy of being called
Islamic; have you said a single thing about what
is happening in Syria?"
Iran realizes that
although it has the ear of top Syrian officials,
its popularity on the Syrian street is very thin
when compared with that of Turkey.
It has
tried non-stop since 1979 to boost
people-to-people relations through tourism,
cultural exchange, and investment projects in
Syria. Religious tourism did indeed flourish, for
example, but it was one-sided, from Iran to Syria
and not vice-versa. Few Syrian tourists went to
Tehran for sightseeing.
However, in
Turkey's case, where Syrian tourists visiting
Turkey jumped from 332,847 in 2007, for example,
into almost 900,000 in 2010. In Iran's case,
800,000 Iranians came to Syria in 2010, for
example, but the Iranian Ministry of Tourism
refrained from mentioning how many Syrian tourists
visit Iran per year.
Turkish soap operas
have been translated into Arabic and are very
popular in Syria, but the same cannot be said for
the numerous Iranian works translated into Arabic
- and an entire Iranian channel dedicated to
broadcasting Iranian works dubbed from Persian
into Arabic. This of course is namely due to joint
Syrian-Turkish history, intermarriage, and the
fact that Turks are Muslim Sunnis while Iranians
are Muslim Shi'ites, creating an invisible
religious barrier that is very difficult to
transcend.
Iran feels outsmarted by Turkey
at a grassroots level, although Tehran has been
trying to win affection of the Syrian people for
over 30-years, while the Turks have been doing it
only since 2003. The Turks managed to win
affection of ordinary Syrians - regardless of
politics - despite 80 years of indoctrination in
Syrian media against the Ottoman Empire and its
legacy in the Arab world. There was no such
indoctrination ever against Iran - and yet,
Syrians prefer to do business with Ankara and to
go sightseeing in Turkey rather than Iran. This is
noteworthy, although Iran is a breathtaking
country with magnificent history, breathtaking
tourist attractions and plenty of wealth.
The crux of the struggle today, therefore,
is Syria. Relations will continue cooperating on
bilateral trade, regardless of how much politics
divides them, but Syria remains a sticking point
in Iranian-Turkish relations.
Iran is
worried that regime change in Syria would give the
Turks unlimited access to Syria, excluding Tehran
from all political, military, cultural, and
economic influence. The Turks after all, are
strongly allied to the opposition Syrian National
Council (SNC), which was established in Istanbul
last summer, and currently host the Free Syrian
Army (FSA).
All talk about a no-fly zone
on the Syrian-Turkish border raises red sirens in
Tehran, but at the end of the day, the Iranians
are unable to go to war for Syria. If the Syrian
Army ventures into the northern Syrian city of
Idlib, as it did in Homs, then this would place it
dangerously near the Turkish border, and the Turks
are ready to act, invoking Article 51 of the UN
Charter, being "self-defense".
In fact,
Erdogan might even see it as a blessing in
disguise, giving him the pretext to put his loud
words into action. That explains why Iran is very
worried. They realize that contrary to what they
believed, there is an entire street in Syria,
being the majority, that doesn't like them, and
has little affection anymore, for Hezbollah.
That doesn't mean the Syrian street likes
Erdogan any better. On the contrary, ordinary
Syrians are beginning to view him also with plenty
of suspicion and scrutiny for saying nothing but
loud words since the Syrian uprising began in
mid-2011.
Supporting the resistance in
Lebanon, however, is no longer enough for Iran to
win the minds and hearts of the Syrian people.
Also, loud words in favor of the Syrian rebels are
also no longer enough for Erdogan to score points
with ordinary Syrians.
The two countries -
and both Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Recep Tayyip
Erdogan - will have to do things differently from
now on to win over ordinary Syrians. Otherwise,
both will be viewed as nothing but hot air
balloons. Turkey may have the upper hand at a
grassroots level, but politically speaking, both
countries are losing ground within Syria, both
with ordinary Syrians, and against each other,
rather rapidly.
Sami Moubayed is
a university professor, historian, and
editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine in
Damascus.
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