Straining NATO on short Syrian
leash By Vijay Prashad
On February 18, I asked the Indian
ambassador to the United Nations, Hardeep Singh
Puri, why there was no appetite for a strong UN
resolution on Syria.
After all, the
violence in Syria seemed to have already exceeded
that in Libya. If the UN could pass Resolution
1973 (on Libya), why was it reticent to pass a
similar resolution on Syria? Puri pointed his
finger directly at the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) states.
They had
exceeded the mandate of Resolution 1973, moving
for regime change using immense violence. All
attempts to find a peaceful solution were blocked.
The African Union's high-level panel was prevented
from entering Libya as the NATO barrage
began. Any UN resolution
that was sharply worded and that was not
explicitly against a humanitarian intervention
would open the door to a NATO-style attack. That
seems to be the fear.
If there is a sense
that NATO exceeded the mandate of 1973, I asked,
would the UN now consider an evaluation of how it
was used in the Libya war? "Russia has asked for
the Security Council to undertake an evaluation of
protection of civilians, because Resolution 1973
is about protecting civilians," Puri said. "So
what kind of damage was there, collateral damage
to civilians, etc? There is great reluctance to
undertake that."
A report by independent
Arab human-rights groups in January 2012 and a
report by the UN Human Rights Council (March 2,
2012) have been largely ignored. Both showed that
the proposition that Muammar Gaddafi's forces were
conducting genocide was grossly exaggerated, and
both called for an open investigation of NATO's
aerial bombardment.
The point of the
second call is simple: if NATO went into the
conflict with its "responsibility to protect"
(R2P) civilians, what was the civilian casualty
rate as a result of NATO's bombardment? Would the
UN Security Council sanction further NATO
"humanitarian interventions" if the kill rate from
the saviors is higher than or equals that of the
violence in the first place?
Puri
indicates that the NATO states in the Security
Council have not warmed up to the idea of an
evaluation. When the Human Rights Council began
its investigations, NATO's legal adviser Peter
Olson wrote a sharp letter to the commission's
chair:
We would be concerned if "NATO
incidents" were included in the commission's
report as on a par with those which the
commission may ultimately conclude did violate
law or constitute crimes. We note in this regard
that the commission's mandate is to discuss "the
facts and circumstance of ... violations [of
law] and ... crimes perpetrated". We would
accordingly request that, in the event the
commission elects to include a discussion of
NATO actions in Libya, its report clearly state
that NATO did not deliberately target civilians
and did not commit war crimes in
Libya.
In other words, NATO was eager
to prejudge the investigation - it would not allow
the investigation to even take up issues of war
crimes by NATO. That was to be stopped at the
door.
On March 25, The New York Times' C J
Chivers wrote a strongly worded essay "NATO's
Secrecy Stance", which revisited a story that
Chivers had written about the August 8 NATO
bombardment of Majer (a village between Misrata
and Tripoli). It is clear that at 34 civilians
died in that attack. It is a test case for NATO's
refusal to allow any public scrutiny.
NATO
claims that it has already carried out a review of
this case. Chivers is right to note that this
raises an issue fundamental to democratic
societies; namely, civilian control over the
military. If the public and the political
authorities are not allowed access to the evidence
and provide oversight over the NATO command, the
idea of civilian control of the military is
violated.
Five days later, The New York
Times editorial ("NATO's Duty") followed Chivers,
noting that NATO "has shown little interest in
investigating credible independent claims of
civilian fatalities". This is strong language from
an editorial board that has otherwise been quite
comfortable with the idea of humanitarian
intervention by NATO.
The next day (March
31), NATO's spokesperson Oana Langescu responded
that NATO has already done its investigation, and
if the Libyan authorities decide to open an
inquiry then "NATO will cooperate". There is no
indication that the threadbare Libyan government
is going to question its saviors. NATO is safe
from scrutiny.
Suspicion around NATO's
operations is now general among the BRICS states
(Brazil, India, China and South Africa). In the
Delhi Declaration of March 29, the BRICS noted
regarding Syria, "Global interests would best be
served by dealing with the crisis through peaceful
means that encourage broad national dialogues that
reflect the legitimate aspirations of all sections
of Syrian society and respect Syrian independence,
territorial integrity and sovereignty."
Additionally, the BRICS states championed
their "strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy
with the United Nations playing a central role in
dealing with global challenges and threats".
The threat of NATO intervention in the
name of human rights is on the minds of the
leadership of the BRICS. No longer will NATO be
given a long leash with UN authorization. As
Ambassador Puri put it, "Because of the Libyan
experience other members of the Security Council,
such as China and Russia, will not hesitate in
exercising a veto if a resolution - and this is
the big if - contains actions under Chapter 7 of
the UN Charter, which permits the use of force and
punitive and coercive measures."
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