Iran
nuclear talks primed for
failure By Hooshang Amirahmadi
and Shahir Shahid Saless
Factional
infighting is becoming more apparent in Tehran,
with potential to block any agreement that could
break the impasse as the international meeting
over Iran's nuclear program approaches.
Overconfidence within the Barack Obama
administration - caused by repeated demands from
high-ranking Iranian officials for the West to
remove crippling sanctions - could also derail the
planned May 23 talks in Baghdad.
Indications of heightened rivalry within
the Iranian ruling factions, represented by the
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad, over the nuclear talks began with
publication of a front page article in the Iran
newspaper on May 2, entitled "Deceptive
Operations". The Iran newspaper is an official
publication that reflects the views of Ahmadinejad
and his administration.
The article says
that "while the Islamic Republic has constantly
maintained that Western
sanctions have no impact on the Iranians' living
standards, some officials involved in the foreign
policy and some members of the majlis
[parliament] have adopted an unexplainable
position by constantly talking about Iran's
expectation that the sanctions be removed". Iran
then singles out Ali Akbar Salehi, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Alaedin Boroujerdi, chairman
of the Foreign Policy and National Security
Committee of the majlis.
The
article criticized the two officials for
repeatedly asking the West, directly or
indirectly, to remove the sanctions. The article
posits that the approach has already weakened
Iran's position in the upcoming negotiations
between Iran and the P5+1, also known as the "Iran
Six" - the permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council (the United States, Britain,
France, China and Russia) plus Germany. It states
that by insistently asking for the removal of
Western sanctions, they have indeed revealed that
pressures have worked on the government and that
the country has become vulnerable to the
sanctions.
While Iran named only two
officials, it by extension criticizes others for
similar tactical mistakes. They can include Haddad
Adel, a close associate of the Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ali Bagheri, deputy to
Saeed Jalili, the secretary of the Supreme
National Security Council who is also Iran's chief
nuclear negotiator. According to some reports,
which have drawn no denial by Tehran, "Jalili,
during his bilateral talks with [ European Union
foreign policy chief Catherine] Ashton, asked 100
times for a delay in oil sanctions".
The
article itself sparked a harsh response from
Ahmadinejad's enemies. Baztab, a site close to
Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Expediency
Council, wrote: "Just before the Istanbul talks,
Ahmadinejad unexpectedly visited Abu Musa Island,
intensifying tension with the Arab countries. Yet,
in the past years he traveled to the Persian Gulf
countries several times, including the UAE [United
Arab Emirates], and granted them many diplomatic
concessions." The UAE is disputing Iran's
ownership of the island. (See US
strikes a military pose for Iran, Asia Times
Online, May 1, 2012).
Baztab added: "Many
experts believe that these administration's
actions are designed to make the negotiations with
P5+1 fail because they are being led by the
Revolution's Leader while the administration is
sidelined. Being aware of the nezam's
[system's] determination to resolve
tension-creating issues, the Western and Arab
governments did not take the administration's move
seriously; thus, Istanbul talks ended successfully
and set out grounds for Baghdad talks."
This unprecedented assertion by Baztab
that Ahmadinejad is plotting to derail the nuclear
negotiations is complemented by a revelation of a
hitherto secret nuclear agreement that Ahmadinejad
has supposedly blocked. Specifically, Baztab
claimed:
[C]oncern exists that the experience
of the Brussels' Agreement, which could have
prevented sanctions against Iran, would be
repeated. That agreement consisted of 11
articles and was signed between Ali Larijani,
then secretary of the National Security Council,
and Javier Solana, former European Union foreign
policy chief.
The signed draft of the
agreement, which was coordinated with the
Revolution's Leader, faced fierce opposition
from Ahmadinejad, who ... in an unexpected
speech in Qods Friday Prayer, announced that the
agreement has been signed without his knowledge;
subsequently Larijani was forced to resign as
the Secretary of the National Security Council
[and as Iran's top nuclear negotiator].
Competition between Ahmadinejad and
the Supreme Leader of Iran first came into public
domain a year ago when Ahmadinejad forced Heydar
Moslehi, the minister of information and
intelligence, to resign. To prevent the president
from taking control of the important ministry,
Khamenei intervened and reinstated Moslehi to the
post. In protest, Ahmadinejad retreated from the
public eye for 11 days and relations between the
two were damaged beyond repair. (See Ahmadinejad
swings back in line, Asia Times Online, May
10, 2012.)
Now, amid historical
negotiations over Iran's nuclear impasse, Iran's
leader faces a tough call. Ahmadinejad's record
over the past seven years indicates that he is not
controllable even by the Supreme Leader.
Ahmadinejad is expected to again find a way to
torpedo a possible agreement that may result from
the Baghdad talks. Under the circumstance, the
only instrument at Khamenei's disposal, as Baztab
also notes, is to give Ahmadinejad a "serious
warning" and hope for the best.
Besides
the fierce rivalry in Iran over gaining control of
the talks, another major factor that potentially
can jeopardize negotiations is the US' misreading
of Tehran. Specifically, signals sent by United
States President Barack Obama's administration
with regard to its position in the Baghdad talks
point in two contrasting directions.
According to an April 27 story published
by the Los Angeles Times, a source in the Obama
administration revealed that the US has concluded
that, "Iran is unlikely to agree to a complete
halt in enrichment." That story adds: "A senior
administration official said that if Iran fulfills
US and other world powers' demands for strict
enforcement of UN monitoring and safeguards,
'there can be a discussion' of allowing low-level
domestic enrichment."
Though this approach
will face practical difficulties, it is realistic
and offers a solid base for the continuation of
negotiations for mutual compromise. However, if
the demands from P5+1 were to include unrestricted
access to Iran's secret military sites or the
ability to interview the country's key nuclear
scientists, Iran would walk away again, and an
opportunity for reconciliation will be lost.
Some other signals point in the opposite
direction. For instance, Victoria Nuland, the US
State Department spokesperson, in response to the
Los Angeles Times story, affirmed that the US
position "remains as it has been" and that the
Obama administration wants "to see Iran live up to
its international obligations including the
suspension of uranium enrichment" as demanded by
several UN resolutions.
Nuland's
statements might just reflect the US tactic to
keep pressure on Iran and maintain a strong
position ahead of the Baghdad talks. If so, there
is hope for the upcoming negotiations. However, it
is also possible that the statements are
indicative of the administration's overconfidence,
caused by high-ranking Iranian leaders repeatedly
demanding the removal of the sanctions. If the
latter explanation holds true, then the US is
misreading Tehran and the negotiations would
undoubtedly fail, leaving war the only remaining
option.
The danger of a US miscalculation
becomes apparent if it is noted that for the first
time, Jalili, Iran's top negotiator, is
representing not just Iran but the Supreme Leader
as well. Indeed his new appointment letter as
Iran's negotiator also identifies him as the
"personal representative of the Supreme Leader".
In this context, any demand that would be
considered humiliating and disrespectful of Iran's
national pride would have no chance of success.
Khamenei has relentlessly linked the nuclear issue
to ezzat-e melli (national dignity).
For example, in a speech to nuclear
scientists he said: "They [that is, the 'arrogant
powers'] tried to discourage our nation on many
occasions. They tried to convince our people that
they were incompetent ... You cannot make progress
... [Yet] every scientific advance is a testimony
to the competence of our nation ... Your work ...
instilled a sense of national dignity into this
nation and this country."
Disregarding
Iran's sense of dignity and pride, Western
policymakers and analysts alike believe that
Khamenei is now in a tough position and will
accept the full suspension of uranium enrichment.
They do not realize that accepting such a defeat
would be the beginning of the end of his authority
and stature among his followers, not to speak of
the general public, as a symbol of resistance
against the "global arrogance".
Now that
Jalili is also negotiating for the Supreme Leader,
his failure in the negotiations will make Khamenei
adopt a more radical position. First, because
failure would bring about an intensification of
sanctions, making Khamenei seem defeated in his
struggle against the "arrogant powers", and second
because the failure would present Ahmadinejad with
an opportunity to challenge the Supreme Leader's
soft approach. Ahmadinejad has constantly boasted
that on the nuclear issue Iran must deal with the
West from a position of strength. Khamenei cannot
afford to lose these battles.
For these
two reasons, following the failure of the
negotiations, inaction is not an option for Iran's
Supreme Leader. He has to demonstrate his resolve
and bravery to overcome the challenges he will
come to face. "Resolve and bravery" are frequently
used terms defining required characteristic for
the Supreme Leader.
As things stand, the
only real option left for Iran is to threaten to
exit the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Khamenei is expected to set a deadline for the
removal of sanctions and then pull Iran out of the
NPT if this demand is not met. Such a move would
significantly increase the chance of a military
confrontation. Obama rightfully says that the
window for diplomacy is shrinking. However, this
dictum must not merely apply to the Iranians. The
US government should also give careful
consideration to the implications of its
overconfidence, which will would be a factor
should the Baghdad negotiations fail. The same
Jalili who has repeatedly demanded for sanctions
to be lifted has also repeatedly said that,
"suspending Iran's nuclear activities in return
for the removal of sanctions is a literature which
belongs to the past".
There is no doubt
that Iranian leaders are under pressure from the
US-led international sanctions. There is also no
doubt that they are interested in settling the
dispute at this point. However, they are not
prepared to settle at any cost, particularly if
that were to involve suspending uranium enrichment
altogether. The outcome of US miscalculation in
this respect and the factional struggle in Iran
over the nuclear negotiations could be calamitous.
It might lead to a conflict that in Leon Panetta's
words, "we would regret".
Hooshang
Amirahmadi is a professor at Rutgers
University and president of the American Iranian
Council. Shahir Shahid Saless is a
political analyst and freelance journalist.
(Copyright 2012 Hooshang Amirahmadi and
Shahir Shahid Saless.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
