Middle East calm in the eye of a
storm By Victor Kotsev
Earlier this year, amid near-constant war
games and extraordinary, even by Middle Eastern
standards, saber-rattling, the world seemingly
stared at a large-scale war in the Persian Gulf.
Hostilities seemed so close, I speculated that if
an operation against Iran did not materialize by
the beginning of March or so, this could convince
people that it had been called off. [1]
More recently, as more and more sources
report that nuclear talks with Iran are on track
to yield at least an "interim" agreement, and
since a spectacular upset in Israeli politics days
ago opened up possibilities that had not existed
for years, we have had a chance to enjoy a
pleasant and rare daydream of peace. It's not an
entirely baseless dream, though it is an
extraordinarily optimistic one: moments of crisis, experienced
negotiators say, are
also moments of opportunity.
Either
scenario may wait awhile, however, though it is
worth noting that this polarization of options
favors war more than peace, in part because it is
a certain indicator of volatility, which often
leads to violence if left unchecked. A peace
process between Israelis and Palestinians is a
daunting undertaking; a successful one even more
so. Initial steps may be made now, but the bulk of
it will likely have to wait at least until the
United States presidential election in November.
On the other hand, ongoing negotiations
with Iran (a critical meeting is expected to take
place in Baghdad in a week), if successful, will
buy time, but are unlikely to resolve the core
issues. As leaks published by world media have it,
the bone of contention currently is the level to
which Iran would be allowed to enrich uranium
under a deal; however, experts contend that even
stopping the enrichment program altogether may not
prevent Iran from advancing its alleged military
nuclear program. (Still other experts point out
that even the entire nuclear program is only a
part of Iran's pursuit for regional dominance, and
other parts such as the Islamic Republic's
conventional forces matter just as much.)
Anthony Cordesman of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, who published
last week a comprehensive analysis of the vast
collection of unclassified International Atomic
Energy Association documents on the Iranian
nuclear program, writes:
[T]hese reports make it clear that
simply controlling Iran's fuel cycle will not
stop Iran from improving every other aspect of
its nuclear breakout capabilities anymore than
attacking its major current enrichment
activities will. Neither arms control and
inspections that focus on actual enrichment, nor
bombing key enrichment facilities, can now stop
Iran from moving forward in many important
areas.
Iran has gotten too far, and its
technology base is too large ... Iran can cloak
each effort as an exercise in pure research or
with some civil rationale, or it can disperse
the others - often into very small facilities or
ones with a convincing academic or industrial
cover. It also can make many mobile, and put
them in to trailers, truck beds, or palletized
and easily separable assemblies - allowing quick
cover and dispersal. [2]
If this
analysis - based on the best publicly available
information - is correct, a strike that is too
limited or premature would accomplish little more
than relying on a deal (assuming one is reached)
would. Neither would solve the main problems
permanently, but given that the economic stability
of much of the world may be threatened by a war in
the Persian Gulf, waiting a little longer would be
the logical thing to do.
There is a major
caveat: the Israeli leaders will likely rely on
surprise if they decide to launch a strike, and
the most propitious moment may well present itself
at a time when attacking is not the most logical
thing to do. Also, some analysts speculate that,
given the rocky relationship between US President
Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, the latter might launch a strike at a
sensitive moment for the American president. Such action would be based on the expectation that a sharp rise in the price of oil would topple Obama, and could only happen, however hypothetically
should Netanyahu calculate that Obama's opponent has a
good winning chance. (Both the US and Israel have
a long history of interfering subtly in each
other's elections, as Israeli journalist Chemi
Shalev points out.) [3]
These calculations
were shaken up - but not overturned - by the
dizzying political pirouette that Netanyahu
performed in Jerusalem over the past couple of
weeks. First he called an early election, a year
ahead of schedule, over several difficult but
relatively tangential domestic issues (such as
drafting ultra-Orthodox Jews into the Israeli
army). Then, in the middle of the night, just as
the Israeli Knesset (parliament) was debating a
bill to dissolve itself, Netanyahu interrupted the
session to announce that he had just struck a
unity deal with the main opposition party, Kadima.
Arguably, the opinion polls which showed
that Kadima would lose more than half of its
current seats in parliament in an early election
helped persuade its recently elected leader, Shaul
Mofaz, to go back on recent promises and to join
Netanyahu's government.
There are several
ways to interpret these developments - some
commentators crowned Netanyahu "king of Israeli
politics", [4] others claim that Israeli voters
are far more volatile than the polls show and that
he acted out of weakness - but the bottom line is
that the new coalition controls over 75% of the
parliament's seats. Moreover, Netanyahu is now in
a position to balance between partners on his
right and partners on his left, and thus can
attempt reforms and initiatives that until now
seemed almost unthinkable.
There is plenty
to reform. The electoral regulations, for example,
set a relatively low threshold for a party to
enter the Knesset, which has resulted in a long
string of weak governments made up of diverse
coalitions that could not push through
controversial legislation. As George Friedman, the
founder of the US-based intelligence analysis
organization Stratfor, put it, "An Israeli prime
minister spends most of his time avoiding dealing
with important issues, since his cabinet would
fall apart if he did." [5]
Not
surprisingly, changing the system of governance is
one of the professed four top priorities of the
unprecedented new coalition; the other three are
tweaking the model of conscription (one of the
main issues that set off the crisis), passing a
"responsible" (the finance minister seems to read
that that as "biannual") budget, and (gasp) the
peace process with the Palestinians.
Within days, the Israeli government made
several impressive steps toward resuming the peace
process, including a deal to end the hunger strike
of over 1,500 Palestinian prisoners, the symbolic
transfer of the bodies of around 100 Palestinian
militants to the Palestinian Authority, and a
meeting between Netanyahu's special envoy and
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
Still, it is too early to say whether this
is a sign of anything bigger coming, or if it will
remain as a token gesture to Mofaz (who is a
steadfast proponent of negotiations and proposed
his own peace plan back in 2009).
Besides,
several challenges loom on the horizon, including
Palestinian demonstrations commemorating the wars
of 1948 and 1967 (Nakba and Naksa days, the first
of which falls on Tuesday, May 15). Last year,
demonstrators from Syria and Lebanon attempted to
run the Israeli border; dozens died in the clashes
that followed, and hundreds were injured. (This
year, nevertheless, most analysts expect the
demonstrations to be smaller and better
contained.)
In general, many see Mofaz as
a moderating factor in the Israeli government. As
the prominent Canadian-Israeli academic and
intellectual Bernard Avishai put it in a telephone
conversation, "I do not see Mofaz giving the
strident side of Netanyahu a blank check; I see
him giving the cautious and globalist side of
Netanyahu support that he couldn't get from other
parties in his coalition."
This assessment
applies to domestic issues, the peace process with
the Palestinians and the Iran crisis and alike.
Iran, though, not mentioned as one of the top four
coalition priorities, is the proverbial elephant
in the room.
It bears noting that Mofaz, a
former chief of staff in the Israeli army who was born in Tehran,
brings a unique perspective and set of skills into
the Israeli security cabinet (a key body on
security decisions). According to most estimates,
Mofaz will not rush into a decision to attack
Iran's nuclear program, but his presence (and the
presence of his party into the coalition) would
add credibility to the Israeli threats.
Should the Israelis choose to attack, the
presence of Mofaz (the third former chief of staff
in the nine-strong security cabinet) would shield
Netanyahu from potential criticism to an extent. It would also give him additional ammunition to counter the so-called "spy revolt". [6]
For the time being, a focus on sweeping domestic reforms could prove to be not only an ideal holding action for the Israelis, but also a way for them to make use of an exceedingly rare opportunity. It could also help Netanyahu to cement his grip on power further, which is hardly a chance a politician would miss.
We may call it a temporary policy of isolationism on the part of Israel, interspersed perhaps with symbolic exchanges of gestures with the Palestinians. This scenario is not assured, but in the context of the American presidential election, the world economic crisis, and the Arab Spring, it would make a lot of sense.
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