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2 Syria:
America versus Israel By
Giorgio Cafiero
Israel is not interested in
the Assad regime maintaining power because of any
friendship between the two states. Syria fought
Israel directly in October 1973 and via proxy in
Lebanon between 1982 and 2000. Since 2000, Syria
has continued to support Hezbollah in Lebanon and
Hamas in Gaza. Without question, Syria remains the
most, and arguably only, confrontational Arab
state in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However,
Israel understands that the Assad regime will not
attempt to repossess the Golan Heights by military
force and will meet with Israeli leaders to
negotiate for peace, which occurred in 1991,
1995-1996, 1999-2001, and 2008. How a post-Assad
Syria would conduct foreign relations vis-a-vis
Israel-Palestine remains a gamble.
Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood's
position on Israel, Thomas Pierret writes, "[the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood] seeks to 'counter
the Zionist project [the
state of Israel] in its different aspects' - a
position unlikely to change before an Israeli
withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The group has
also traditionally supported Hamas."
Any
Syrian regime (Islamist or secular, democratic or
authoritarian) will lose legitimacy if it
surrenders the Golan Heights to Israel or fails to
support the Palestinian struggle for statehood, as
Syria has historically been the center of Arab
nationalism. Regardless of which sect, ethnicity,
or ideological party governs in Damascus, Syria
will seek to repossess the Golan Heights, defend
its sovereignty, expand trade relations, maintain
deterrence capacity over Israel, and retain
influence in Lebanon and the greater Arab world.
Therefore, Israel is not convinced that Assad's
downfall could advance its geopolitical interests.
Explaining Israel's
reluctance Even if the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood would not take power in a post-Assad
Syria, or even if it would not change Syrian
foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel-Palestine once
empowered, Israel may have national interests in
Assad staying in power for four other reasons.
First of all, Assad's fall could lead to a
disintegration of the Syrian state. Efraim Inbar,
director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for
Strategic Studies, believes that "in the event
that the Syrian regime collapses, Syria's advanced
arsenal, including chemical weapons, shore-to-ship
missiles, air defense systems, and ballistic
missiles of all types could end up in the hands of
... radical elements." The growing presence of
Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQI) in Syria has been
evident since the turmoil began in 2011, and the
potential for AQI, or other militant groups like
Hezbollah, to acquire such weapons could create
new dilemmas for Israel.
The collapse of
the Syrian regime would also further isolate Iran
in the Middle East and potentially provide it with
an additional rationale to develop a nuclear
weapon. As Syria has provided Iran with the
capacity to transform Hezbollah into a force that
the Israeli military cannot defeat, the loss of
Syria may likely mean a weaker Hezbollah, thus
decreasing Iran's ability to deter Israel from
attacking its nuclear facilities.
The
Islamic Republic also took note of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization campaign against
Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. The lesson learned was
that if a state disbands its weapons of mass
destruction program with the intentions of
improving ties with the West, it will be
vulnerable to a foreign invasion. In sum, the
Libyan case has arguably pushed the Islamic
Republic toward developing a nuclear weapon - and
its further isolation, which would come with
Assad's demise, may accelerate Tehran down that
path. Such an outcome would deprive Israel of its
monopoly on nuclear weapons in the region.
The emergence of a regime in Damascus that
bears more legitimacy than Assad's may also permit
the Syrian military to channel more resources
toward external threats (primarily Israel).
Currently, the Syrian military is focused on
suppressing the domestic opposition and dealing
with potential coup d'etats and armed uprisings.
Clearly, the possibility of a future regime coming
to power in Damascus with more legitimacy may be
an overly optimistic prospect (from the Syrian
perspective). However, the Israelis would benefit
from the Syrian military continuing to be bogged
down in domestic affairs.
Finally,
although the Muslim Brotherhood has become
increasingly moderate in the last 30 years, the
other radical Islamist elements in the region,
such as the Salafists or even al-Qaeda, could gain
influence in Syria if a power vacuum forms
following prolonged violence and widespread human
rights violations. Although the significance of
radical Islamist forces within Syria remains a
hotly debated topic, a consensus has emerged that
radical Islam has gained influence in Syria over
the last decade. David W Lesch, professor of
Middle East History at Trinity University, argues
that
What would emerge after the dust
settles down could very well be a polity that is
Islamic extremist, one on the border with Israel
and one that could make common cause with
like-minded elements in Iraq and Lebanon. This
is certainly not in anyone's interest ... Many
in Syria, including Bashar [al-Ashad], see the
regime, more specifically the Baath party, as
the last bastion of secularity against a
seething rising tide of radical Islamic in Syria
... The more radical Salafists in Syria are
certainly a force to be reckoned with, more so
than the Muslim Brotherhood.
In 2005,
Lucy Ashton of The Financial Times reported on a
growing trend of radical Islam in Syria:
Conservative Islam is a relatively
recent phenomenon in Aleppo, known for centuries
as a cosmopolitan trading city whose merchants
"could sell a dead donkey skin to a king",
according to a local proverb. Now, however, it
is becoming a center of Islamic radicalism,
known more for its bombers than its carpet
bazaar and textile weavers ... On the streets of
Aleppo, secular dress was ubiquitous only a
decade ago. Now, more and more children recite
Koranic verses in the streets on their way to
madrassahs [Islamic schools], and women are
tented completely in
black.
Washington's
dilemma The Obama administration should
consider these potential security dilemmas that
have led Israel to avoid aiding Assad's opponents.
The Syrian military's weapons falling into
non-state actors' hands, the increased probability
that Iran would develop a nuclear weapon to
counter its growing isolation, and the possibility
of radical Syrian Islamists with an anti-Western
agenda rising to power would undermine US
interests in the Middle East.
Two US
senators, John McCain (Republican-Arizona) and
Joseph Lieberman (Independent-Connecticut),
visited the Syrian-Turkish border during April and
demanded that the United States take military
action against Assad to remove him from power.
These were the same two voices that lobbied the
Bill Clinton and George W Bush administrations to
topple Saddam Hussein's regime. When the United
States did exactly as these senators advocated,
countless unintended negative consequences ensued.
Such outcomes could be expected if US military
action is taken against Assad. Obama would be wise
to follow Israel's lead on Syria, and not the
advice of McCain and Lieberman.
Instead of
heeding the advice of these two hawkish senators,
the Obama administration should pursue a more
realist foreign policy vis-a-vis Syria that
prioritizes stability. Unquestionably, the
headaches that this regime has caused many US
administrations explain the political motivations
behind Obama's direct and indirect support for
Syria's Islamist opposition. However, the lessons
of blowback should be remembered, for the United
States armed radical forces on many occasions to
advance larger geopolitical interests only to
regret such alliances later.
Preventing
the Syrian state from collapsing and protecting
the region from the chaos that could result should
be Washington's top priority. This does not mean
ignoring the human rights abuses of the Assad
regime or the armed Syrian opposition. Rather,
Washington should continue to work with regional
actors such as Turkey and Iran along with Russia
and China to find a political solution that holds
all actors responsible for the lives lost and
identifies a political solution that brings about
peace, stability, and justice. The Middle East
doesn't need another Iraq War or post-war crisis.
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