SPEAKING
FREELY Dangers of stalled nuclear talks in
Moscow By Hooshang Amirahmadi
and Shahir Shahidsaless
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
Pessimism is setting
in about the planned talks in Moscow on June 18-19
between Iran and the P5+1, the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council (the US, UK,
France, Russia, China) and Germany. Yet, it is
imperative that the negotiations do not collapse.
Both sides have a huge stake in its success even
if that means agreeing at the minimum to continue
negotiations for another round. However, Iran will
only return to the negotiating table if planned EU
and the US sanctions are not enforced by then. The
talks will fail if the P5+1 were to insist in a
disproportionate Iranian compromise to abide by
the UN
resolutions demanding
suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities.
The failure of the talks would almost
automatically lead to two planned detrimental
sanctions to kick in. Effective June 28, the US
will enforce a new law that denies access to the
American market for any foreign company that
conducts business with Iran's central bank.
According to Senator Robert Menendez, the new
legislation simply says to the world that, "you
can either do business with Iran or the United
States, but not both." Immediately thereafter, on
July 1, the EU will boycott Iranian oil, a
significant 20% of the nation's oil exports. If
Iran's main Asian buyers, namely China, India,
Japan and South Korea, were also to cut purchases
under the growing US pressure to do so, then
Iran's export could drop by almost a million
barrels a day.
In its April report, the
International Energy Agency (IEA) stated that,
"recently enacted E.U. and US. sanctions on Iran's
oil and banking sectors are affecting shipping and
trade flows as well as undermining Iran's crude
production outlook." The report added that, "[the]
long list of countries planning to implement
import cuts in coming months suggests Iranian
output could plummet to 2.6 to 2.8 million barrels
a day by mid-summer, unless alternative buyers can
be found." This level of production would be
considerably less than the 3.55 million barrels
Iran produced at the end of 2011. Western powers
are trying to impede Iran from oil sales, a policy
that would result in oil prices skyrocketing,
plunging the already fragile Western economies
into abyss.
Even more crippling sanctions
are in the making. According to Debkafile, an
Israeli-based security think tank, quoting
official sources in Washington on June 4:
In the fall, the US administration
will bring out its most potent economic weapon:
an embargo on aircraft and sea vessels visiting
Iranian ports. Any national airline or
international aircraft touching down in Iran
will be barred from US and West European
airports. The same rule will apply to private
and government-owned vessels, including oil
tankers. Calling in at an Iranian port will
automatically preclude them from entry to a US
or European harbor. This sanction would launch
an air and naval siege on the Islamic Republic
without a shot being fired.
The
Debkafile report is in line with statements on
June 4 by the US Treasury Undersecretary for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Richard
Cohen. While praising the creativity of Israelis
in offering ideas with respect to the sanction
regimes, he assured the world that, "if we don't
get a breakthrough in Moscow there is no question
we will continue to ratchet up the pressure."
Wendy Sherman, the US negotiator, in return from
Iraq, paid a visit to Israel to reassure Israelis
that the US's positions on negotiations with Iran
remains unchanged, meaning, the US will not allow
Iran to develop nuclear bombs. The State
Department said in a communique that Ms Sherman
was in Israel to "reaffirm our unshakeable
commitment to Israel's security".
Even
before these planned sanctions are put in place,
the Iranian economy is moribund. According to
Mahmoud Bahmani, Governor of the Central Bank,
"the country's economic situation has become
unusual due to the sanctions". Boycott of the
Central Bank has led to the depreciation of the
Iranian Rial by over 50 percent relative to US
dollar, and suspension of relations with the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) has almost halted Iran's
ability to use the international electronic money
transfer system. As a result, prices have sharply
increased across the board, particularly for
Iran's sizable imports. With unemployment rate
already in the high teens, rapid rise in poverty
level, and the promised subsidies withdrawn, the
mismanaged economy can hardly survive another
round of crippling sanctions.
A failed
Moscow talk for Iran will most likely translate
into a risk for the survival of the Islamic
system, an outcome that Western powers seem to be
hoping for. The question is what Tehran will do if
its survival is threatened. The US and its
European allies seem to believe that under such a
condition, the Islamic Republic will surrender.
That would have been one possible outcome if
Tehran believed it had no other option. Yet, more
likely than not, this assumption can prove
inaccurate, and all indications point toward a
different mood of thinking in Tehran - one of
resistance to pressure at any cost. Here are the
reasons why:
First, even if Iran's oil
exports were to drop to around 1.2 million barrels
a day from the current 2.2 million, with oil
prices so high, and will be even higher if Iran's
exports dropped, Tehran can still earn significant
revenue from its oil. Iran also has over $100
billion in foreign currency reserves. These funds
can help Iran to module through for at least two
years before it hits the red line of economic
collapse. Meanwhile, an Iran under threat of
survival will speed up uranium enrichment toward
developing military capability if it indeed is
bent to do so as the US and its allies have
claimed.
Second, as many public opinion
polls, such as Rand Corporation, have shown the
Iranian nuclear program enjoys overwhelming
popular support. The nuclear program is often
equated with the nationalization of Iranian oil
industry under the Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadegh, who was overthrown by the US and the
UK. That episode has left a scar in the Iranian
psyche that continues to trouble Iran-Western
relations. Added to this nationalistic sentiment
is the country's culture of resistance
particularly to outside pressure. Therefore, any
unreasonable demand on the part of the Western
powers concerning Iran's nuclear program could
lead to public resentment and rallying around the
flag.
And third, the Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamanei has in many occasions said that
the nation's nuclear program is inseparable from
its national right and dignity and that submission
under pressure is more dangerous to the Islamic
regime than resisting and risking confrontation
with the US. Khamenei believes that the US is
after regime change and holds that "the end of US
pressure and intimidation will only come when
Iranian officials announce they are ready to
compromise Islam and their popular Islamic
Republic." The Ayatollah has also put himself in a
perilous position by appointing Mr. Saeed Jalili,
Iran's nuclear negotiator, as his personal envoy
as well, thus rendering himself directly
accountable for any menacing outcome.
Thus, in case of a failure in Moscow,
Khamanei will be left with only extreme options in
confronting the West. These options could include
disruption (not necessarily closure) of traffic
flowing through the vital Strait of Hormuz oil
route is one such highly risky option. According
to the same Debkafile report,
Word of the US plan [about
introducing new sanctions] prompted a
deliberately provocative visit by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards commander Gen. Mohammad Ali
Jafari Thursday, May 31, to his forces stationed
on the three disputed islands commanding the
Strait of Hormuz, Abu Musa, Little Tunb and Big
Tunb. … In Washington, Jafari's visit was
perceived as Tehran's reminder of its repeated
threat to close the Hormuz Straits in the event
of a blockade to the transit of a large part of
the world's oil.
Another possible
action by Khamanei would be threatening to exit
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an
option that is open to all signatories by giving
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
three months advance notice before pulling out.
The Ayatollah can condition remaining in the
Treaty by the West lifting certain crippling
sanctions. Disruption of the Hormuz traffic along
with a retreat from the NPT could quite possibly
trigger a tit-for-tat chain of retaliatory events,
ultimately leading to a military confrontation
that in Defense Secretary Panetta's words "we
would regret."
A war over the Iranian
nuclear dispute is surely a road to hell for all
involved at a time when the Middle East is in
political-economic turmoil to say the least. The
Arab Spring has led to a re-emergence of political
Islam as a powerful force particularly in Egypt,
the civil war in Syria continues unabated, and
Iraq is maintaining a delicate balance among the
feuding Sunni, Kurdish and Shia factions. It is
almost certain that any attack on Iran will be
extended by the Islamic government beyond its
borders. We must not forget the fact that Iran is
an Islamic theocracy and that it is still a
revolutionary country. Thus, the impact of a war
with Iran will certainly extend beyond destruction
and instability; it could indeed produce what it
was to prevent- a nuclearized Middle East.
The Obama administration should not want
the conflict between Iran and the US intensified
in an election year as escalation of the conflict
can lead to soaring oil and gas prices. A survey
conducted in March by the Washington Post-ABC News
indicated that Obama's approval rating plummeted
mainly because of rising gasoline prices. Unless
the US's plan is to use failed diplomacy and
sanctions as legitimizing means towards a war and
thus create a convincing casus belli to attack
Iran, it should ease tensions by finding a
mutually acceptable step-by-step formula. The US
is the only party that can actually make the peace
or war decision on this dispute.
Given the
tense environment that has developed since the
failed Baghdad talks and the extreme consequences
that can result from the collapse of talks in
Moscow, it is imperative that both sides make
constructive concession. At a minimum, an
agreement should be forged that commits Iran to
move its 20 percent-pure uranium stockpile out of
the country. Iran would also agree to halt uranium
enrichment above 5% and accept intrusive
inspections by the IAEA on all of its nuclear
facilities. In return, the P5+1 would guarantee
the provision of fuel plates for Tehran's Research
Reactor (TRR), and suspend all new sanctions. The
parties must also agree to continued talks at a
short interval, during which other
confidence-building measures, such as Iran
responding to the IAEA's transparency demands in
return for the West addressing Iran's security
concerns, can be put in motion.
Hooshang Amirahmadi is a
Professor at Rutgers University and President of
the American Iranian Council. His latest book on
the political economy of Iran under the Qajars
will be released by I.B. Tauris in July. Shahir
Shahidsaless is a political analyst and
freelance journalist. He writes primarily about
Iranian domestic and foreign affairs.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
(Copyright 2012 Hooshang
Amirahmadi and Shahir
Shahidsaless.)
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