The violence in Syria has gone up markedly
in the past two weeks, with massacres in at least
two Sunni villages and sharp skirmishes between
government forces and the rebel opposition in
several cities. The United Nations has had to
suspend its monitoring inside the country.
The increase in rebel activity can be
ascribed to various sources, but the precise
intent of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in
its murderous reprisals is unclear. Most external
powers, other than Russia and Iran, want Assad
out, but beyond that, there is very little unity
at all. Meanwhile, the violence in Syria is
spiraling out of control.
Increased
violence In recent months the forces of the
Free Syrian Army (FSA) showed little ability to
stand up to government troops in the cities of
Homs, Idlib and Deraa. Yet last week the rebels demonstrated
greater tenacity and
probably greater numbers as well. Where did the
FSA's sudden effectiveness come from? Several
sources are likely.
First, angered
citizens and deserting soldiers have fled into
Turkey, where they have trained in basic infantry
tactics, either from deserting Syrian commissioned
and non-commissioned officers or from North
Atlantic Treaty Organization cadres. Second, the
recent massacres may have significantly
accelerated desertions from the regular army,
which after all is largely made up of Sunni
conscripts more sympathetic to the opposition than
to the Alawite regime.
Third, recent
massacres in Houla and Mazraat al-Qubair may have
increased popular outrage toward the regime, made
the sectarian aspects of the conflict more
salient, and encouraged young Sunnis to take up
arms. Fourth, proximity to Sunni regions of Iraq
may have encouraged Iraqis to take up the Sunni
cause inside Syria or to send in weaponry before
returning attention to the campaign against the
Shi'ite government in Baghdad, which is of course
allied to the one in Damascus.
It is
unclear that the US is arming the rebels as is
often claimed. It is probably more accurate to say
the US has no clear policy besides vocal criticism
of the regime. US support may be irrelevant, as
the rebels have numerous ways of obtaining weapons
without US or NATO help. Arms bazaars in Lebanon
are nearby, well stocked and, as often as not,
Sunni in nature and hostile to their own Hezbollah
Shi'ites. Well-established Sunni networks pervade
the region: Sunni insurgents in Iraq, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and Salafi groups all have
clandestine channels for moving personnel and
weapons.
Perhaps most important, Saudi
Arabia and other Sunni petro-states such as Qatar
and the United Arab Emirates have made it their
mission to oust Assad and bring Syria, or parts of
it, into their anti-Iran camp. Their determination
is almost as deep as their pockets. These powers
may well be responsible for the introduction of
anti-tank weapons that Syrian rebels have been
using in recent days against armored vehicles and
supply convoys. They bestowed Russian AT-3 Sagger
missiles on the Libyan rebels last year to good
effect.
Possible outcomes The
recent tenacity of rebel forces is not enough to
guarantee Assad's ouster. Other scenarios are
possible. The regime's vicious repression could
grind down the rebellion just as it did a few
weeks ago, with rebel forces taking egregious
casualties and unable to persist - at least not in
the immediate future. Alternatively, there could
be a coup or the appearance of one, with Assad
going into exile but his regime holding on. Events
in Yemen and Egypt, where power holders have
stepped down but left relatives and associates in
power, will likely make this scenario unacceptable
to Syrian rebels.
A third scenario is the
disintegration of the regime and, more significant
for world affairs, of Syria's territorial
integrity. The Kurdish northeast could take
advantage of the chaos and break away to integrate
with the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, which is
all but independent of the government in Baghdad.
The Assads may seek to establish a redoubt
in the region along the Mediterranean coast where
Alawites and other Shi'ites are concentrated. This
scenario might find support from Russia, which
wants very much to retain its naval base at
Tartus, and from Iran, which wants to retain some
influence in Syria. The recent massacres in Sunni
villages along the Mediterranean littoral may have
been the ethnic cleansing that would precede
establishing such a redoubt along the coast.
Israel may be interested in the prospect
of its most powerful neighbor fragmenting along
antagonistic sectarian lines. Formerly, Syria was
classified as an enemy, though a thoroughly
intimidated one that could be reasonably relied
upon to refrain from a major war. Israel had
decimated the Syrian air force in a series of air
duels in the early 1980s and more recently showed
its ability to suppress Syrian air defenses when
it destroyed a suspected nuclear facility in 2007.
A fragmented Syria with abiding sectarian
hostility might more than compensate for deepening
security concerns to its west in Egypt.
Foreign influences Russia and
Iran have not abandoned their beleaguered ally in
Damascus. Neither is likely to intervene
militarily, though each will support Assad in
diplomacy, armaments or subsidies. At some point,
even Moscow and Tehran may recognize Syria as a
lost cause and a drain on prestige and money, but
they do not seem close to that realization yet.
The interests of other powers coincide in
wanting Assad removed, but in nothing else. A year
ago, Saudi Arabia parleyed with Assad, seeking to
detach him from Iran in exchange for support for
his autocracy - a form of government nearer and
dearer to Riyadh than what the throngs of the Arab
Spring were demanding. When Assad rebuffed them,
the Saudis and their Sunni allies looked to
replace him with an anti-Iranian but no less
authoritarian ruler.
The Sunni autocrats
may be content with a protracted struggle inside
Syria. Assad's repression is weakening Iran, whose
fate is of greater interest than Syria's. Iran's
support is strengthening Sunni hostility toward
Tehran and diminishing what little prestige it has
left in the world. More significant, it is a drain
on Iran's fiscal resources, which are already
under considerable duress from sanctions and
falling oil prices brought on by Riyadh's recent
increase in output. Let Assad brutalize his
people, then: The Sunnis will eventually win out
and Iran will be much the poorer for all its
efforts.
A Syria fragmented along
sectarian lines will not be Riyadh's first option.
Better to suppress the Shi'ites as much as
possible rather than accede to a coastal redoubt
that could only cause trouble in later years.
Nonetheless, a Sunni region in the Syrian center
and east could become a formidable barrier to
Iranian/Shi'ite influence, especially if conjoined
one day with the aggrieved Sunni provinces of
western Iraq.
The US and the European
Union, on the other hand, want Assad out and a
stable democracy in its place, though the disunity
in the Syrian exile movement and events in
post-Gaddafi Libya have hardly been encouraging in
this regard. But looking upon the whirling events
in the Middle East over the past year and a half,
outside powers should not feel themselves capable
of controlling events in Syria.
Brian M Downing is a
political/military analyst and author of The
Military Revolution and Political Change
and The Paths of Glory: War and Social
Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.
He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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