The
Saudi endgame for Iran (it isn't everyone
else's) By Brian M Downing
Wars bring together states in common
purpose and create myths of unity and friendship.
Such myths are eagerly bought by the media and
general publics alike. Meanwhile, behind the
scenes, there is considerable squabbling that only
becomes apparent when the war is over and
long-standing differences arise, memoirs are
published, and accusing fingers are pointed.
Today there is an international effort to
pressure Iran to abandon or limit its nuclear
research program. Not all powers in this effort
have the same goal. Some want to bring regime
change to Iran; others want to gravely weaken
Iran. Saudi Arabia is in the latter camp. It
wishes to cripple Iran and establish itself as the
dominant power in the region. The United States
and European
Union must be cautious
about just where the Saudis are leading them.
Political change: no good
options International opposition will lead
to change inside Iran. There are three groups in
Iran that will seek to enhance or retain their
power as the crisis unfolds. Saudi Arabia is
unlikely to be content with any likely scenario of
political change.
A theocratic elite at
present holds power in Iran. A protracted crisis
or an attack will bring Iranians, pious and
relatively secular alike, to the side of the
government. Embattled nations enjoy substantial
centripetal forces. This is undesirable to Riyadh
as it would strengthen the Iranian state and
enhance its prestige among Shi'ites from North
Africa to Afghanistan, resonant as injustice and
suffering are in their beliefs.
The
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has risen
in power since the long Iraq war (1980-88), after
which it created legends of its central role in
defeating Saddam Hussein's army. These legends are
not widely credited in the regular army or by
outside observers, but their power is
unmistakable, as is the mythmakers' ambition. Like
military counterparts in Egypt, China, and
Pakistan, the IRGC has diversified from a purely
military orientation and delved off into industry,
banking, and government. The IRGC may use the
nuclear crisis to further its interests,
converting Iran from a theocratic regime with a
zealous bodyguard to a military regime with a
supportive clergy.
This would not sit well
in Riyadh either. A military regime could well be
stronger than today's theocracy by replacing
scriptural reasoning with practical expertise then
bringing it to bear in the economy and
geopolitics.
The US, EU, and Israel would
like to encourage democratic political change in
Iran, replacing the mullahs and generals with
fairly elected figures. As appealing as this is to
Western sensibilities, it has no such appeal to
the Saudis. Democracy is antithetical to Saudi
views of proper authority.
Indeed, Riyadh
is seeking to roll back democratic movements in
the region lest the contagion spread south from
Egypt and north from Yemen into the kingdom.
Further, a democratic Iran would still be a
geopolitical and sectarian enemy. As for the
thesis that democratic countries do not start
wars, Riyadh could indelicately point to recent
counter-examples. In any case, democracies
certainly have been known to develop nuclear
weapons.
Protracted
weakening From the vantage point of the
House of Saud, none of these scenarios of change
is attractive. They all leave a religious and
geopolitical enemy intact with considerable power,
resources, and potential. Saudi Arabia does not
have the ability to destroy Iran. Its lavishly
funded military is mainly for show and its effort
to get Iraq to do the job back in the eighties
failed badly. Israel can hit Iranian targets
repeatedly but not with devastating effect. The US
of course can but is balking at the undertaking
and in any case might not want to create more
instability in the region.
Saudi Arabia,
then, will likely seek a three-tiered policy of
protracted weakening of Iran. First, Iran will be
hit by continuing sanctions, by lower oil prices
from boosts in Saudi production, and by currency
manipulation that makes Iranian imports all the
more costly. Second, Iran will continue to be
struck by assassinations and bombings and perhaps
by periodic air strikes by Israel and the US -
perhaps with token participation by planes from
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
Third,
Iran will endure insurgent movements, supported
from without, aimed at drawing off resources and
threatening the territorial integrity of the
country. Specifically, the Kurds in the northwest,
the Baluchs in the southeast, and the Arabs in the
western province of Khuzestan will be encouraged
to resist, rebel, and otherwise oppose the regime
and its IRGC enforcers.
Such efforts have
been tried before, from Wilhelm Wassmuss's efforts
to lead pro-German tribal revolts during World War
I to Saddam's efforts to bring the Khuzestani
Arabs to the Arab side. None has met with great
success.
Again, the Saudis are unable to
destroy Iran, nor can they get anyone to do it for
them. Protracted weakening of Iran is, however,
nearer to its reach and it can make Saudi Arabia
the only significant power in the Gulf - one that
other Gulf states will fall in line with even more
readily than they are today.
The strategy,
like any such effort in world affairs, has
problems. First, low oil prices from increased
Saudi output hurt not only Iran but all oil
producers. This is especially true of Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf states, which have doled out
immense amounts of oil revenue to keep their
populaces content. Generous disbursements of oil
revenues constitute a principal basis of state
legitimacy, and cutting back on state largesse is
not without risks.
Second, states do not
always use new power and hegemony wisely. All too
often they act foolishly, arrogantly, and
belligerently - to the dismay of other states in
and out of the region. Saudi Arabia lording over
the Gulf might become the newest case in point.
Third, encouraging terrorism and
insurgency inside Iran could of course lead to
Iranian repayments-in-kind inside Sunni states.
All of them have appreciable Shi'ite population;
some have Shi'ite majorities. In all cases, the
Shi'ites are increasingly restive over lower
status and limited opportunities. Minorities on
both sides of the conflict may become problematic.
Curiously, Saudi oil reserves are
concentrated in a Shi'ite region and Iran's are in
an Arab region. Surely, the gods of geology and
geopolitics have a sense of mischief.
Brian M Downing is a
political/military analyst and author of The
Military Revolution and Political Change
and The Paths of Glory: War and Social
Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.
He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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