Amid intensive bargaining between the
Muslim Brotherhood and the army in Egypt -
covering anything from where the president will be
sworn-in to how the country will be run and what
the new constitution will look like - it looks as
though, for a moment, the two bitter rivals who
shape the Egyptian political scene are seriously
set on working together.
The new Egyptian
president, Mohammed Morsi, is due to assume office
on Saturday with much fanfare. He will be the
fifth Egyptian president in the millennia-long
history of the country, and the first-ever
democratically elected one.
Beneath the
surface, however, both sides are digging in for a long
battle, which in the
future will likely be felt throughout the region.
Morsi resigned as the leader of the
Brotherhood after his victory, and pledged to
appoint a Christian Copt and a woman as
vice-presidents. In a nod to Israel (and to the
United States and other concerned allies) he also
promised to uphold all of Egypt's prior
international commitments.
His apparent
pragmatic turn is warranted, in part, by the
narrow margin of his victory (less than 3.5% of
the vote) over his opponent Ahmed Shafiq. This
result suggests that the upcoming rerun of the
parliamentary election-expected to be held once
the new constitution is drafted-will be similarly
contested, and the Brotherhood will not enjoy an
overwhelming popular mandate. If it is to
spearhead a constructive transition, as it has
pledged to do, it will need as broad a coalition
as possible.
In a reminder that democracy
still has a limited value in Egypt, and more
turmoil is likely in store, persistent rumors
claim that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) only agreed to honor the results of the
election once Morsi and the Brotherhood made
concessions on a vague power-sharing deal. Still,
for now the rivalry that dates back over half a
century seems to have been swept under the rug,
and a wave of cautious optimism has taken hold,
both in Egypt and abroad.
"We've heard
some very positive statements thus far," United
States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
reportedly said on Wednesday, amid unconfirmed
speculation that she might be the first top
official of the American administration to visit
the new president in Cairo this weekend. "But we
have to wait and judge by what is actually done,"
she added.
Whatever the precise parameters
of the deal-in-progress, for the foreseeable
future the SCAF will continue to hold a lot of
power. The list includes major influence over the
panel that will draft the constitution, control
over the military (the chairman of the SCAF, Field
Marshal Hussein Tantawi, will likely remain both
the commander-in-chief and the defense minister, a
fellow general told Reuters on Wednesday), and, at
least until a new parliament is elected,
legislative powers as well. The army's influence
is deeply entrenched in all sectors of society,
including the judiciary branch and the economy.
However, the military is not omnipotent,
either, as a court decision earlier this week,
which overturned its prerogative to arrest
civilians, demonstrated. [1] The SCAF is also
forced to take popular opinion (often referred to
metaphorically as "the street") into account, and
is consequently willing to share political power.
In addition, a darker motive appears to be
behind the generals' reticent power-sharing
motions. The Egyptian transition to democracy
promises to be long and difficult, not least
economically (the economy is headed for a crash,
many experts agree), and if the opposition can be
co-opted, it can be scapegoated as well. Observing
the evolution of the recent color revolutions in
Eastern Europe, for example, the army must surely
have calculated that once the Brotherhood fails to
deliver, the public sentiment is likely to turn
back to the generals.
In the months and
years to come, the generals will likely use their
pervasive influence in order to smear the
Brotherhood and to sow discord between it and the
rest of the opposition, in a fresh iteration of
the old Roman maximum "divide and rule." According
to the private American intelligence-analysis
organization Stratfor, they would follow a model
similar to the one used by Pakistan's army.
Stratfor writes,
While Pakistan has a far more
vibrant democratic culture than Egypt,
Islamabad's military has been able to make use
of the weakness and incoherence of civilian
institutions - the presidency, the parliament
and the judiciary - to rein in rival political
forces. Using the state's intelligence services,
the army also has pitted different parties
against one another. The military's strength in
the government has waned somewhat in recent
years, but the army is still able to contain
civilians.
Already the SCAF has
exhibited this kind of behavior, as evidenced by
its dissolution of parliament, its pitting
Islamists against secularists and its exploiting
divisions among rival Islamists. Consequently,
the [Muslim Brotherhood] will improve its
relations with political competitors, especially
its anti-Islamist rivals, to deny the SCAF the
leverage it currently has - hence Morsi's
appointing a Copt and a woman as his vice
presidents.
The Brotherhood, in turn,
may seek to transfer some of the responsibility to
others. Most analysts predict that it will try
counteract the influence of the military by using
Turkey's Islamists as a model. Known for its
patient and methodical approach toward power, the
Brotherhood will likely seek to expand slowly, and
will prioritize areas such as education, social
services, and justice. It may be willing to
compromise on ministries that are normally
considered of higher value, such as defense,
finance, and foreign affairs.
In the long
run, the outcome of the political battle is
uncertain. Both opponents have considerable
vulnerabilities. The Muslim Brotherhood faces
challenges from radical Islamists, on the one
hand, and from a diverse group of Christians,
other minorities, and the pro-democracy movement,
on the other. The army, too, faces rifts, such as
a generational divide between the ruling generals
(all of venerable age) and younger officers who
seek to gain access to the wealth and power.
Both models - the Pakistani and the
Turkish ones - apply only in a limited way to
Egypt, and it is possible that others will emerge
in the future.
For now, while a truce is
in place and strong pledges are made that the next
Egyptian government will include representatives
from all sectors of society, Egyptians can breathe
a sigh of relief. So can most of Egypt's neighbors
- for what happens in the most populous Arab
country is certain to reverberate, sooner or
later, throughout the entire region.
Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian
Authority, each have their own (though related)
reasons to worry about the Muslim Brotherhood's
ascent to power. While congratulatory messages
poured in on Morsi from all sides, Hamas, an
offshoot of the Brotherhood, was the most sincere
in its joy. The Palestinian Authority, by
contrast, being weak and heavily dependent on
Egypt (not least in its rivalry with Hamas),
appears to be the biggest loser.
Jordan and Israel can afford to
be less concerned. Jordan's King Abdullah II is a
direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, which
carries a good deal of clout with Islamists. The
more urgent tension in his country is between
ethnic Palestinians and Jordanians of East Bank
descent; while the balance of power among the
Palestinians could have an impact on Jordan down
the road, this influence would mostly be indirect
and there would be time for counter-measures.
Israel's position is best summed up by a
statement by an Israeli security official reported
by the local daily Ha'aretz. According to the
article, "The official said the trend revealed by
the victory of a Muslim Brotherhood candidate was
not a positive trend for Israel. But neither is it
'an Egyptian plague.'"
Another part of the
anonymous senior official's statements stands out:
"The potential is there for a strengthening of
ties between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, and that's
certainly an opportunity for Israel … If they want
to get their goods from the port of Alexandria and
not from Ashdod, let them do so." [2]
Some
right-wing Israeli circles have long advocated the
so-called "Jordanian option" for ending the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the
absorption of the West Bank territories into
Jordan. This would go hand-in-hand with an
"Egyptian option," according to which Egypt would
take control of the Gaza Strip. This was, more or
less, the status quo prior to the 1967 war.
While these ideas have so far remained
mostly on the fringes of the Israeli political
discourse, the continued impasse in the diplomatic
process with the Palestinians has breathed new
energy into them over the last few years. The
controversial Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor
Lieberman, publicly suggested a couple of years
ago that Israel absolve itself of responsibility
for Gaza, [3] and while that idea died out, a new
version of it may well emerge.
It is
important to watch how the relations between Egypt
and Gaza evolve in the future. If it ends up being
up to the Muslim Brotherhood to decide, it will
find it difficult to resist opening the border
crossing at Rafah. From that point on, Gaza, which
is not self-sufficient economically, would grow
increasingly dependent on Egypt, and Israel would
be able to cut all links down the road.
While it is hardly possible to predict the
precise regional implications of the Egyptian
transition - just as the outcome of the internal
power struggle is uncertain - countless intriguing
possibilities that are entirely speculative but
worth considering exist.
One has to
wonder, for example, how and if the civil war in
Syria will be affected by the political rise of
the Muslim Brotherhood on the Nile. Egypt
ostensibly has plenty of internal problems right
now to get engaged abroad; however, if the
bloodshed in Syria continues and Turkey gets
involved, perhaps with broad Arab League support
(as one scenario has it), Egypt and the Muslim
Brotherhood would find it hard to stand completely
on the sidelines. In fact, with some financial aid
(why not from the Gulf), the generals and the
Brotherhood could even find a common cause in
their new partnership; and what better for the
Street than some bread and spectacles,
particularly with a tag of justice attached.
Much of what happens in Egypt continues to
be an enigma. With the inauguration of Mohammed
Morsi as president, the country will enter a new
phase, at least symbolically. How exactly the
symbolism will translate into practice is still
hard to say, but the transition process is
guaranteed to be intense, both for Egypt and the
entire region, and to offer many surprises.
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