A
portentous skirmish in Ghazni
province By Brian M Downing
Encouraging signs in the Afghan war are
not in good supply, but a recent small engagement
in the eastern province of Ghazni may be one.
Weary of the absence of schools, medical help,
safe marketplaces, and pockmarked roads, local
Pashtuns calling themselves the "National Uprising
Movement" fought the local Taliban bands.
Remarkably, the locals inflicted sharp casualties
on the Taliban and forced them to back down. The
Movement won. [1]
The National Uprising
Movement did not act in concert with US troops or
the Afghan National Army (ANA). They oppose the US
and the Afghan government as much as they do the
Taliban. This "third force" in the long Afghan
war, though opposed to both sides, will probably
benefit the US and Kabul side. But of course
artlessness in dealing
with this movement could detract from if not ruin
its possibilities.
Origins This
Pashtun third force might be best seen in the
context of a fiercely independent tribal order
amid a protracted stalemate. It should be no
surprise that Afghans are looking for a viable
option to ceaseless war.
The Taliban have
made little in the way of territorial gains in the
last few years and are unable to engage US,
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or
ANA troops without taking heavy casualties. Their
recent offensive consists of a spate of improvised
explosive devices and an occasional spectacular
attack in a city, though the latter are likely the
work of the Haqqani network, an old mujahideen
band only partially integrated into the Taliban.
Western forces and the ANA have not fared
much better. They hold a number of enclaves in the
south and east but have not been able to expand in
the "oil spot" fashion of counter-insurgency
doctrine. The Taliban adroitly assassinate
government officials; Kabul sends out another
group. US and ANA raids kill or capture local
Taliban commanders; the Taliban promote new ones.
From the perspective of the Ghazni
militia, neither side is appealing. Each in its
way is an affront to local autonomy and an
obstacle to development. The Karzai government's
incompetence and corruption are well known now in
much of the world but they are daily burdens in
Afghanistan. The US and other ISAF troops are seen
as foreign occupiers with little respect for local
people.
The Taliban are widely resented,
for old and new reasons. In their days in power
(1996-2001) their government was often deemed a
haughty clique of southerners who ruled with a
rough hand and failed to develop the economy.
Further, they conscripted locals for an
inexplicable war against the Northern Alliance -
fellow mujahideen who had helped oust the
Russians.
Today, the Taliban oppose
schools and development often on political grounds
as schools and roads may weaken their appeal.
Paradoxically, the Ghazni militia offered to side
with the Taliban if they'd allow the schools and
markets to operate and the roads and wells to be
improved. When the Taliban refused, the shooting
started - and the Taliban came out the worse for
it.
The Movement's
significance There are many Pashtun tribes
with long-standing loyalty to the Taliban
especially in the south, but there are many tribes
that have equally long-standing hostility to them.
Neglected in this neat division are the many
Pashtuns who are disinterested in extra-local
matters and who may be eager to adopt the
assertive methods of the Ghazni militia.
The Movement's concern with local
education and economic development offer a clue as
to which side in the war is likely to benefit from
their stirring. Local memories are unlikely to
know of international sanctions back in the 1990s,
but they will remember that Taliban efforts to
rebuild after the Russian war were not very
successful. The Taliban's present-day opposition
to development will underscore that assessment.
Western aid programs came into remote
districts with high hopes, big budgets, and a
stream of officials, contractors, security
details, and the like who could not but appear to
villagers as foreign occupiers. Little came of
these efforts as security deteriorated and
bureaucratic infighting, confusion, and
insensitivities made themselves abundantly clear.
Perhaps local villagers will judge that the
westerners, for all their conceit and
heavy-handedness, are at least able to deliver
resources into villages and may do so again on the
villagers' terms.
Responses The
US instinct will be to see the Movement as a
god-send amid stalemate and to provide it with
generous supplies of arms and money. After all,
the Movement seems to parallel the Iraqis who,
embattled by al-Qaeda, came over to the US side.
This would almost certainly be a blunder as
association with the US or Kabul would taint the
movement in the ever-wary eyes of most locals and
perhaps undermine it.
It would be better
for now simply to watch the movement as word of it
spreads throughout the east and south. The
war-weary, the parochial, and those sitting on the
fence will soon enough learn of the Movement, its
outlook, and its victory over the local Taliban.
Afghan president Hamid Karzai, as artless
a politician as the world holds before us, will
also be inclined to step in. The Movement
represents a potential obstacle to his rule in
Ghazni, perhaps even as a rival to it. Nor should
the ANA seek to link up to the Movement. The army
has too many non-Pashtuns (Tajiks and Uzbeks) who
are unlikely to be welcome in Ghazni villages. At
most, Kabul should use non-obvious means to spread
word of the Movement.
The Taliban's
response will be critical. The local commander's
decision to back off may of course be overruled by
a more doctrinaire superior. This, however, could
open up a new war of attrition that will likely
benefit their more enduring enemies and spread the
legend and appeal of the Movement.
The
Ghazni Movement and any parallel groups that
should arise are unlikely to coalesce into a
united force; their outlooks do not extend beyond
their village or valley. But even in sporadic,
isolated actions, they can become an important
dynamic in the war, underscoring the futility of
the stalemate and in time constituting an
intermediary for negotiating local truces and even
meaningful peace talks.
Brian M Downing
is a political/military analyst and author of
The Military Revolution and Political Change
and The Paths of Glory: War and Social
Change in America from the Great War to
Vietnam. He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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